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Abstract 
 
Counter-insurgency assumed a status during the twentieth century as one of the 
British military‟s fortes. A wealth of asymmetric warfare experience was 
accumulated after World War Two, as the small wars of decolonisation offered the 
army of a fading imperial power the opportunity to regularly deploy against an 
irregular enemy. Yet this quantity of experience has been misguidedly conflated with 
quality. This thesis holds that the British, far from being the counter-insurgent 
exemplars that history has benevolently cast them, have in fact consistently proven to 
be slow learners and slow strategic burners in the realm of counter-insurgency 
warfare. 
The case study-based nature of this thesis, utilising the chronologically and 
geographically dispersed examples of Malaya (1948-60), Kenya (1952-60), South 
Yemen (1962-67), the first decade of the Northern Irish „Troubles‟ (1969-79), 
culminates with an analysis of the recent British counter-insurgency campaign in 
southern Iraq (2003-09). 
This thesis will blend historical narrative with critical analysis in order to establish a 
new paradigm through which to interpret and analyse British inertia in counter-
insurgency and help unpack the mythology of inherent British competence in the 
realm of irregular warfare. Three major dimensions emerge. These elements 
constitute a „Tri-Partite Counter-Insurgency Model‟, and were carefully selected as 
comprising the major causal and impacting factors contributing to success or failure 
in counter-insurgency, and were settled upon after an exhaustive review of primary 
and secondary literature relating to counter-insurgency, both historical and doctrinal. 
The Tri-Partite Model is constructed by three interactive and interdependent factors: 
the counter-insurgent, the insurgent, and the international political context. 
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CHAPTER 1: Britain, Counter-Insurgency and the Tri-Partite Model 
 
Counter-insurgency assumed a status during the twentieth century as one of the 
British military‟s fortes. A wealth of asymmetric warfare experience was 
accumulated after World War Two, as the small wars of decolonisation offered the 
army of a fading imperial power the opportunity to regularly deploy against an 
irregular enemy. Yet this quantity of experience has been misguidedly conflated with 
quality. This thesis holds that the British, far from being the counter-insurgent 
exemplars that history has benevolently cast them, have in fact consistently proven to 
be slow learners and slow strategic burners in the realm of counter-insurgency 
warfare. 
 
The case study-based nature of this thesis, utilising the chronologically and 
geographically dispersed examples of Malaya (1948-60), Kenya (1952-60), South 
Yemen (1962-67), the first decade of the Northern Irish „Troubles‟ (1969-79), 
culminates with an analysis of the recent British counter-insurgency campaign in 
southern Iraq (2003-09). The poor operational performance in and around Basra 
pulled the mask away from the hitherto rosy popular trans-Atlantic perception of 
British competence at counter-insurgency. Indeed, it went further by fulfilling a 
linear progression of British conduct in irregular warfare, arguably demonstrable 
from Malaya onwards, by failing to swiftly apply lessons learnt from previous 
campaigns, and by failing to achieve a level of strategic cogency until after the 
insurgency has had time to flourish.  
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This thesis will blend historical narrative with critical analysis in order to establish a 
new paradigm through which to interpret and analyse British inertia in counter-
insurgency and help unpack the mythology of inherent British competence in the 
realm of irregular warfare. Three major dimensions emerge. These elements 
constitute a „Tri-Partite Counter-Insurgency Model‟, and were carefully selected as 
comprising the major causal and impacting factors contributing to success or failure 
in counter-insurgency, and were settled upon after an exhaustive review of primary 
and secondary literature relating to counter-insurgency, both historical and doctrinal. 
These factors are essentially timeless and universal in insurgencies, therefore 
circumventing any temporal or regional restrictions on the analysis. The factors 
inherent in the model provide a comprehensive analysis of the doctrinal elements that 
underpin counter-insurgency and a practical assessment of the application of counter-
insurgency strategy and tactics. I make no claims to have constructed a prescriptive 
model that tells us how to beat insurgents. Instead, it is offered as a pragmatic 
framework that allows us to make sense of the numerous factors impacting upon  a 
state‟s conduct in counter-insurgency conflicts, and allows us to assert the factors 
that impinged upon British „success‟ in the realm of irregular warfare. This model is 
intended to be creative, not imitative. In an era when insurgency and terrorism has 
come to define contemporary conflict it is hoped that this framework can shed some 
light on this often perplexing form of warfare. Indeed, the factors identified in the 
model reveal that history has a lot to teach us about how to combat the contemporary 
threat posed to Western states. There are perhaps more consistencies than 
innovations in the trends insurgent groups have shown and the way in which states 
combat them. Beware the neologists. 
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The Tri-Partite Model is constructed by three interactive and interdependent factors: 
the counter-insurgent, the insurgent, and the international political context. The rest 
of this chapter will lay out the premise of this model and explain how it presents a 
revelatory insight into the way we can interpret slow learning and slow burning by 
the British in the realm of counter-insurgency. 
 
At the heart of the model is the first factor that analyses the strategy, tactics and 
operational art of the counter-insurgents, in this case the British. Literature on British 
counter-insurgency, both primary and secondary, has revealed, to my mind at least, 
that all British counter-insurgency operations ultimately rest on three inter-twined 
factors: military effectiveness, which is proved to be strategically slow if tactically 
innovative; active intelligence gathering, particularly by indigenous police forces; 
and close political management of both military operations and societal co-operation. 
 
The British military has long prided itself on the ethos in counter-insurgency 
campaigns of „minimum force‟, and this has, by-and-large, held true. On the frontline 
the British military have had to adapt to new conflict environments and change 
tactics, even strategy, accordingly. Military priorities, particularly in rural 
insurgencies, are initially focused on cutting insurgents off from their supply network 
before moving in to strangle the pockets of resistance with accurate and efficient 
engagements. 
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Yet military operations would have been totally ineffective, be it in the Malayan 
jungle, the Kenyan forest, or the Ulster housing estate, if it was not for accurate 
intelligence as to the location and intention of insurgents. The intelligence 
community, both British and indigenous, plays a crucial role in insurgencies and the 
information garnered is vital for the wider counter-insurgency effort. This requires 
cultivating a network of informers and agents, as well as establishing an effective 
system of interrogation for surrendered or captured enemy personnel. This has 
proved to be one of the most controversial and brutal elements of British counter-
insurgency operations.  
 
However, the military campaign can be severely undermined by bad political 
management. Counter-insurgency operations are inescapably political in their scope 
(indeed so are the insurgencies that provoke a reaction), therefore the objectives of a 
counter-insurgency strategy are politically motivated and require astute political 
leadership. The political authorities, both in Whitehall and within the host nation, are 
responsible for employing economic and social measures to wrest control of the 
insurgency and instigating legal controls that mutually ensure popular support for the 
government and dissuade sympathy and help for the insurgents. This thesis also 
contents that all colonial insurgencies must be viewed in the context of the retreat 
from Empire, whereby a politically stage-managed military withdrawal after the 
establishment of an acceptable post-colonial regime backed by an effective post-
colonial security force became the ultimate end-game of British counter-insurgency 
strategy. From Malaya onwards, it became clear that close civil-military relations 
were essential to a successful counter-insurgency effort and that delegation to the 
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most local level was required in order to meet specific regional insurgent threats, 
albeit conducive to an eventually enunciated national strategy. 
 
Yet too many counter-insurgency texts are what I would label „internally agent-
centric‟ in as much as they focus primarily inwards on the counter-insurgent nation 
(i.e. Britain) and that they place too much of an emphasis on the role of individuals 
(i.e. General Templer in Malaya). Therefore it is essential to analyse counter-
insurgency campaigns within the context of factors relating to the insurgent group 
itself. This contextualisation is necessary in helping explain the short-comings of 
British counter-insurgency efforts by measuring their own strategic merits and 
deficiencies against those of their opponents. For this to be achieved, four factors 
must be analysed in regard to the insurgent group: their organisational structure, 
which dictates the level of cohesion and autonomy to undertake guerrilla activities, 
whether hierarchical or cell-based, as well as their level of preparedness; the guerrilla 
strategy and tactics that they adopt, from a Maoist rural revolt to urban terrorism, 
which will inevitably shape the counter-insurgency response required; the level of 
domestic support for their cause, which is commensurate with the level of political 
sympathy and logistical supplies from internal supporters; and the level of external 
support they are receiving from outside groups or a sponsor state in terms of 
solidarity or logistical help. 
 
By including the wider international political picture into the analytical framework 
this thesis, in part, aims to transcend the traditional bi-polar schools of decolonisation 
theory. The „liberal commonwealth‟ interpretation places the causes of 
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decolonisation at the door of British policy, blaming Whitehall intransigence and 
imperial arrogance for losing the Empire. Conversely, the „nationalist‟ perspective 
contends that decolonisation came about as a result of grass roots anti-colonial 
protest, forcing a ground swell of opinion across the Empire to break the imperial 
chains.
1
 However, what these two schools fail to account for is the role of external 
actors outside the metropole-periphery relationship in the process of decolonisation 
and the insurgencies it provoked. Not only did Britain have to contend with the 
exigencies of a crumbling Empire in the post-World War Two era, but concomitantly 
deal with a new order of world politics as America gained a primacy of power at the 
start of the nuclear age. Britain‟s economic dependency on the US during the phase 
of post-war reconstruction placed restrictions on the financial costs of maintaining 
the Empire. The post-war era brought about, in Frank Furedi‟s words, the 
„termination of the Western consensus regarding colonialism‟, which fostered a „new 
international environment (that) complicated the task of imperial control.‟2 As the 
temperature of Western-Soviet relations plummeted in the late 1940s it became 
increasingly difficult to separate the dual developments of anti-colonial insurgencies 
and Cold War proxy conflicts, especially given mutual policy decrees such as the 
Truman Doctrine or Nikita Khrushchev‟s 1961 declaration of Soviet support for 
„wars of national liberation‟ in the Third World.3 The superpower age now rendered 
it increasingly impossible for a medium power like Britain to engage in a counter-
insurgency campaign that involved defeating a communist enemy (as in Malaya), or 
                                                          
1
 For discussion see John Darwin, Britain and Decolonisation: The Retreat from Empire in the Post-
War World (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 1988), pp.17-25. 
2
 Frank Furedi, „Creating a Breathing Space: The Political Management of Colonial Emergencies‟, in 
Robert Holland (ed), Emergencies and Disorder in the European Empires After 1945 (London: Frank 
Cass, 1994) p.90. 
3
 For an analysis of Soviet policy on Third World conflicts see Roger E. Kanet, „The Superpower 
Quest for Empire: The Cold War and Soviet Support for “Wars of National Liberation”‟, Cold War 
History, Vol.6 No.3 (2006), pp.331-52. 
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engaging in conflict with forces known to have superpower backing (as in Yemen) 
without causing an interplay between the perceived imperial right to maintain control 
in the colonies and the pervasive global ideological strive for dominance that 
overshadowed international relations for nearly half a century. Even supposed 
„domestic‟ conflicts, such as the „Troubles‟ in Northern Ireland were unavoidably 
tinged with the effects of the wider geo-political scene, given both the large influence 
of the Irish diaspora in American politics in attempts to mediate in the conflict, as 
well as republican groups‟ efforts to secure Soviet arms in the spirit of solidarity in 
undermining the British occupier. As scholarly benchmarking supersedes the „post-
9/11 world‟ for the „post-Cold War world‟, the emphasis on the international 
dimension of insurgencies is as relevant as it was fifty years ago. Although the 
causes and catalysts for insurgencies have changed, the global dimension to the way 
they are conducted has not. States clamoured to join President Bush‟s „coalition of 
the willing‟, which has now effectively been turned into a huge counter-insurgent 
military force in response to the degeneration of the War on Terror into a protracted 
war of attrition with a disparate yet determined insurgent resistance movement. If the 
War on Terror is the defining conflict of the early twenty-first century, then counter-
insurgency is the defining mode of waging war against the enemies of Western 
states. As these insurgents take their fight to domestic populations through acts of 
mass terrorism (New York, Washington, Madrid, London, Bali) the 
internationalisation of insurgency has embedded itself in not only analysis of 
asymmetric warfare but in our evaluation and understanding of contemporary 
international relations.  
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Insurgencies in History 
One of the first aspects of insurgencies and the efforts to counter them we must 
qualify is that they are not new. We must place insurgencies within their temporal 
context, exposing neologist misconceptions of this form of warfare. Armed 
insurgency and guerrilla conflict is, in Walter Laqueur‟s phrase, „as old as the hills,‟ 
and indeed predates what we would conceive of as conventional warfare.
4
 Whether 
labelled „guerrilla‟, „partisan‟ or „insurgent‟, the irregularity of the warfare such 
combatants are involved in is far from modern. Despite being overshadowed by the 
rise of the standing army and the set-piece, increasingly destructive, wars that came 
to define war in the industrial age, irregular or asymmetric warfare has formed a 
perennial element of conflict on almost every continent. The Roman Empire was 
littered with pockets of native insurgencies against imperial rule, perhaps setting a 
precedent for another two millennia of insurgent casus belli. Even the great Imperial 
Army of Rome had difficulties adopting an effective strategy to eliminate small 
insurgent groups. Superpowers, both then and now, are still plagued by that very 
same problem. 
 
Westphalian Europe witnessed a high degree of sub-state insurgent activity, notably 
in the Vendee region of France, in the Tyrol, and in Spain, where the term „guerrilla‟ 
was first coined to describe the form of warfare waged against Napoleonic France 
between 1808 and 1813. It must also be remembered that the adoption of insurgent 
tactics played a role in both the French and American Revolutions of the late 
eighteenth century, whilst the Latin American wars of independence in the 
                                                          
4
 Walter Laqueur, Guerrilla: A Historical and Critical Study (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 
1977), p.vii. 
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nineteenth century utilised similar methods against colonial rulers.
5
 Of particular 
relevance to the emergence of British counter-insurgency strategy were the 
insurrections of the New Zealand Maoris, the southern African Kaffirs, the Burmese 
dacoits, and especially the Boers of South Africa in the mid to late-nineteenth 
century, where the British remained unable to contain the cavalry hit-and-run strikes 
of the Boer horsemen. The British experiences in the first three of these examples 
were to prompt the emergence of arguably the first theoretical analysis of counter-
insurgency, C.E Callwell‟s 1896 work Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice6. 
This book offered the „first real synthesis‟ of modern counter-insurgency7, and 
although steeped in imperial arrogance offers some enduring observations on the 
importance of intelligence and population „reconcentration‟ (resettlement in modern 
terms). In the inter-war years, the British had amassed a significant amount 
experience at suppressing uprisings and rebellions through Empire-wide „imperial 
policing‟. Ensuring the internal security of colonies in the far-flung corners of the 
Empire did not render a particularly nuanced approach from the British, and this 
heavy-handed inclination was exposed during the Anglo-Irish war of 1919-21 when 
the wonton brutality of the Black and Tans in arguably Britain‟s first outright 
counter-insurgency campaign sent shockwaves through British society and had 
inevitable political consequences.
8
  
 
                                                          
5
 Laqueur‟s book offers an excellent overview of the historical roots of guerrilla warfare and insurgent 
tactics. Chapter 1 is particularly useful.  
6
 C.E Callwell, Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice (Lincoln, NB: Bison Books, 1996 [1896]). 
7
 Ian Beckett, „The Study of Counter-Insurgency: A British Perspective‟, Small Wars and 
Insurgencies, Vol. 1 No.1 (April 1990), p.48. 
8
 Thomas Mockaitis, „The Origins of British Counter-Insurgency‟, Small Wars and Insurgencies, 
Vol.1 No.3 (December 1990), p.212. 
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Doctrinal attempts on behalf of the military to codify conduct in such conflicts came 
with the publication of the pamphlets Notes on Imperial Policing (1934) and Duties 
in Aid of the Civil Power (1937), which were tested during the Jewish insurgency in 
Palestine (1943-48) when groups such as Irgun and the Stern Gang initiated a 
terrorist campaign against the colonial rulers in favour of the creation of the Israeli 
state. Martial law and exclusively military solutions to the Jewish guerrillas proved 
ineffective in quelling the violence and further alienated the government from the 
wider Jewish population. Such critical miscalculations were to undergo a 
fundamental reappraisal in the post-World War Two era when irregular warfare, in 
the form of colonial insurgencies, proliferated across European colonies, provoking 
the emergence of a body of literature that laid the foundations of counter-insurgency 
doctrine that would last nearly half a century. 
 
Counter-Insurgency Literature and Doctrinal Shifts 
 
The literature on counter-insurgency, in both a doctrinal and empirical context, has 
been sporadic to say the least.  Marginalised from mainstream security and strategic 
studies literature, counter-insurgency research has a longevity problem. This can 
largely be attributed to the emergent correlation between interest in counter-
insurgency and the strategic priorities of the American military that has become 
manifest in the aftermath of Vietnam. The conventional warfare culture that 
pervaded American military thinking pre-Iraq sidelined any efforts to build a 
coherent and consistent body of knowledge on irregular warfare. Other militaries, 
notably the British, have more successfully cultivated a sizeable library from their 
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extensive counter-insurgency experiences throughout the latter half of the twentieth-
century, with British and French so-called „warrior-scholars‟ forming the backbone 
of the „classical‟ counter-insurgency research in the 1960s. The imbibing of these 
lessons in later asymmetric combat zones is, however, a different matter altogether. 
 
Counter-insurgency research has not produced a consistent body of literature since its 
ascendance as arguably the standard form of warfare in the post-World War Two era. 
Indeed, the pattern of emergent literature on the subject has been as irregular as the 
nature of the conflicts themselves. In the Cold War era, and the unipolar phase that 
has followed, the strategic priorities of the US came to dictate the military thinking 
of other Western states. Consequentially, counter-insurgency research has always 
fluctuated with American engagements and the demands of the American „way of 
war‟. The first major wave of counter-insurgency literature was resultant from the 
need of the American military to learn irregular warfare in Vietnam, and this need for 
strategic direction produced some of the early „classics‟ in the field, notably Robert 
Thompson‟s Defeating Communist Insurgency9, John McCuen‟s The Art of Counter-
Revolutionary Warfare
10, and David Galula‟s Counter-Insurgency Warfare: Theory 
and Practice.
11
 Pre-occupied with strategic planning for a large conventional war in 
Europe and for a nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union, the US essentially 
attempted to fight an irregular war with regular warfare tactics, arguably up until the 
removal of General William Westmoreland in 1968, by which time the insurgency 
had wrestled the military initiative away from the Americans and secured a foothold 
                                                          
9
 Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam (St 
Petersburg, FL: Hailer Publishing, 2005 [1966]). 
10
 John J. McCuen, The Art of Counter-Revolutionary Warfare (St Petersburg, FL: Hailer Publishing, 
2005 [1966]). 
11
 David Galula, Counter-Insurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006 
[1964]). 
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in the population. However, instead of triggering a consistent level of counter-
insurgency research that would inculcate an understanding of irregular warfare into 
American, and therefore wider Western, military culture, the end of American 
involvement in Vietnam witnessed a parallel curtailment of academic interest in 
counter-insurgency as attention returned to conventional, and largely hypothetical, 
strategies of a ground or nuclear war with the Soviets. The decade that followed 
American withdrawal from Vietnam became, in the words of one RAND 
Corporation report, a „fallow period‟ for counter-insurgency research.12 There was a 
momentary resurgence of interest as the Reagan administration concomitantly 
attempted to support and suppress numerous insurgencies in Latin America, however 
the abrupt end to the Cold War and the dawn of the unipolar era significantly reduced 
the military and political establishment‟s eagerness to understand the peculiar 
machinations of low intensity conflict. If counter-insurgency had been eclipsed as a 
major research topic in the 1980s by the arms race, it became overshadowed in the 
1990s by the „Revolution in Military Affairs‟ (RMA) and so-called „New Wars‟. 
Despite the military and economic investment in peace-keeping and nation-building, 
counter-insurgency was barely touched upon as an issue affecting such priorities, 
despite the significance of actors such as the guerrilla forces of Mohammed Farrah 
Aidid who caused the infamous „Black Hawk Down‟ incident that provoked 
American withdrawal from Somalia, and the Kosovo Liberation Army who acted as 
a de facto NATO ally in undermining Serbian security forces with guerrilla strikes 
against army units. As if to further demonstrate that counter-insurgency research has 
always waxed and waned with American strategic engagements, we have witnessed 
an exponential rise in counter-insurgency literature, in terms of monographs, reports, 
                                                          
12
 Austin Long, On ‘Other War’: Lessons from Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency Research 
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2006), p.9. 
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and journal articles in the wake of the insurgency in Iraq after the 2003 invasion. The 
US Army has even been compelled to significantly update and revise its counter-
insurgency field manual for the first time in twenty years.
13
 As David Kilcullen 
astutely observed in late 2006: „more has been written on it [counter-insurgency] in 
the last four years than in the last four decades.‟14 The rapid transformation of the 
Iraq war from a well-executed demonstration of how to win a conventional land war 
to a quagmire of ill-conceived counter-insurgency operations that belies strategic 
planning has converted counter-insurgency research from a focus of historical 
analysis to a relevant contemporary subject that provides signposts for the way out of 
an increasingly intractable imbroglio. The Americans have also demonstrated, 
particularly in Iraq, a slow burning strategy that arguably attained impetus with the 
2007 „surge‟ of troops and the parallel strategic shift implemented by General David 
Petraeus.  
 
„Classic‟ has been a label attached to the first body of counter-insurgency literature 
that emerged in the 1960s, borne primarily out of the experiences of a number of 
Western states in fighting insurgencies in South-East Asia: the British in Malaya, the 
French in Indo-China, and the American‟s picking up where the French left off in 
Vietnam. The other most noteworthy contribution to the body of „classical‟ work 
came in the early 1970s with Frank Kitson‟s Low Intensity Operations, which 
emanated from his extensive low-intensity combat experiences, especially in Kenya 
and Northern Ireland.
15
 As Bard O‟Neill has noted of these and other „classical‟ 
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works: „there were two kinds of writings on the subject: descriptive and theoretical. 
Seldom did the two come together.‟16 The former type of work provided historical 
overviews of events and outcomes (such as Julian Paget‟s Counter-Insurgency 
Campaigning),
17
 whilst the latter sort offered proscriptive „how-to‟ theoretical 
manuals for conducting a counter-insurgency campaign that were heavily influenced 
by their own personal involvement in particular conflicts (Thompson, Galula, and 
McCuen). Furthermore, these texts were written, either exclusively or to a large 
extent, in response to Maoist rural insurgencies, which require their own nuanced 
counter-insurgent response as opposed urban terrorism, for example. 
Consequentially, the „classic‟ counter-insurgency literature is narrowly focused upon 
defeating one variety of a multitude of insurgent strategies. This is a trend that has 
been fundamentally overhauled in the latest body of literature that has emerged as a 
result of the war in Iraq. At the forefront of this new wave of literature is a new 
generation of American so-called „warrior-scholars‟ who are attempting to redress 
American military preferences for conventional war planning. General David 
Petraeus received command of American operations in Iraq in February 2007 and 
was responsible for authoring large parts of the updated US Army counter-
insurgency field manual. Other notable scholars include David Kilcullen, whose 
piece „Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company Level Counter-
Insurgency‟, that originally appeared in Military Review, has now been emailed to 
every company commander in the field in Iraq
18
; Robert Cassidy, whose research has 
focused on how military cultures have indisposed superpowers, in particular the US, 
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from imbibing counter-insurgency lessons
19
; and Thomas Hammes who has 
attempted to contextualise insurgencies in the wider landscape of human warfare.
20
 It 
remains to be seen whether this level of scholarship into the cause and effects of 
insurgencies and the nature of the required response will be maintained after the 
eventual withdrawal of the coalition forces from Iraq and Afghanistan in a similar 
vein to the trend witnessed after the US left Vietnam. However, what this new body 
of literature has done is to evolve our understanding of the fundamental nature of 
counter-insurgency. It has transcended the essentially anti-Maoist strategies 
developed by the original pioneers of counter-insurgency, providing strategists and 
policy-makers alike with a relevant appraisal of the evolved nature of the 
contemporary insurgent threat and the need to adapt the response accordingly. The 
presence of 24-hour international news coverage and the globalised, networked 
insurgent threat facing American and British military forces has invalidated previous 
tenets of irregular warfare doctrine such as population resettlement. Certain elements 
of the doctrine remain universal, such as the need for close civil-military relations, 
yet this latest body of counter-insurgency literature has achieved the modernisation 
of the central tenets of asymmetric war. The new manifestation of the importance of 
understanding the culture of the population in which counter-insurgency operations 
are being conducted has become a central theme of the new generation of thinkers, 
shifting analysis away from the „classical‟ focus upon tactical and organizational 
approaches. This new „cultural revolution‟21 in counter-insurgency analysis is even 
enshrined in the new US Army counter-insurgency field manual. As Beatrice Heuser 
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has stated, it has reached a stage in the contemporary literature whereby references to 
the „classical‟ works are „a case of pacifying the worshippers of the old god when 
building a temple to the new god.‟22 
 
So why for so long has counter-insurgency research found itself separated from 
mainstream security and strategic studies literature? There are several possibilities. 
Firstly, I suggest that it is because the rules of the game in irregular conflict differs to 
that of conventional warfare, which has come to dominate Western military thought 
over the last half century, and hence has dictated academic research agendas for the 
most part. In addition, the temporal realm of counter-insurgency is more elastic than 
conventional warfare. Such conflicts are often measured in years (possibly decades) 
not months, obfuscating conceptions of an identifiable „victory‟, thus rendering 
counter-insurgency far more difficult to analyse and theorise.
23
  Furthermore, 
counter-insurgency research has tended to be the preserve of historians and not 
strategists therefore negating the necessity for forward-thinking planning.
24
 Another 
reason offered here for the peripheral nature of counter-insurgency research is that 
much of the literature has been the result of temporary scholarship in the area. 
Widely cited works, such as Charles Townshend‟s Britain’s Civil Wars and Richard 
Stubbs‟ Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla War, have epitomized how excellent 
scholarship in the area has been but a momentary focus for many academics before 
attention has been diverted elsewhere.
25
 Despite the prolific output and determined 
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presence of the likes of Ian Beckett, Thomas Mockaitis and John Newsinger in the 
field, counter-insurgency research has a longevity problem. Attention is sporadic and 
invariably case-specific. This latter factor can largely be accredited to the fact that 
some of the best research on counter-insurgency has been produced by area 
specialists (such as Middle East expert Clive Jones‟ work on the insurgency in 
Yemen, or African specialist Caroline Elkins‟ studies of the Mau Mau uprising), 
therefore limiting the scope for applied counter-insurgency analysis across a 
multitude of cases and preventing overarching frameworks of analysis from being 
formulated.
26
 It is hoped that this thesis can go some way in redressing this 
imbalance. 
 
There does, however, remain an academic trend within counter-insurgency research 
that is primarily historical in its methodology and analysis (for example, John 
Newsinger‟s useful yet limited British Counterinsurgency).27 Yet the scope of this 
thesis, tracking the development and consistencies in British counter-insurgency 
campaigns over the past sixty years and exposing its consistent inconsistencies, 
contends that history is not enough. History alone cannot help us explain and 
understand recent British strategy in Iraq. The historical literature fails to provide an 
adequate framework of analysis for us to evaluate the effectiveness of strategic and 
tactical development from one insurgency to another. Furthermore, there has been a 
propensity to focus solely on counter-insurgency as a one-way process, analysing 
just the actions of the state army and security forces. The failure to interpret counter-
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insurgency as an inter-active process between insurgent and counter-insurgent, where 
the strategy, tactics and resourcefulness of the former are as important to the 
outcome of an insurgency as that of the latter, has revealed that counter-insurgency, 
as a sub-field of strategic studies, is suffering from a paucity of analytical 
understanding. Therefore, in order to rectify this hole in counter-insurgency analysis 
this thesis will reflect not only the imperative of understanding the factors relating to 
the insurgent group themselves, but will also identify the key factors that lend 
counter-insurgents the tools with which to contain, suppress and eliminate an 
insurgency. Bearing all these omissions and deficiencies of counter-insurgency 
literature in mind, the „tri-partite model‟ is intended to provide an original framework 
through which we can observe and explain the way in which the British, in counter-
insurgency terms, have been slow to learn and have belatedly achieved strategic 
cohesion. 
 
 
Explaining the Model 
 
The First Dimension: Counter-Insurgency Forces 
 
The Military Element 
Counter-insurgency poses a unique military problem. Such campaigns lack the 
decisive strategic goals of conventional war between state armies and contain an 
19 
 
overtly political endgame. Counter-insurgencies are fought for, what Rupert Smith 
has labelled, „softer, more malleable, complex, sub-strategic objectives‟, whereby the 
ultimate aim is not to take and hold territory, but to establish the conditions under 
which the counter-insurgent state can fulfil its political objectives.
28
 Counter-
insurgency is therefore strategically sensitive. It has its own rules. The application of 
conventional concepts of warfare is at best redundant, at worst counter-productive. 
As Eliot Cohen rightly pointed out in the mid-1980s, small wars such as counter-
insurgency campaigns are „not “half” a war, but rather a completely different kind of 
conflict.‟29 Counter-insurgency therefore requires a different military doctrine, 
altered military expectations of „victory‟, a diffusion of manpower and resources, and 
crucially, an inherent tactical flexibility that is sensitive to the variations in threat in 
different areas and avoids a blanket response. This will then allow for a variance of 
tactics to be utilised if, for example, the military is fighting concomitant urban and 
rural-based insurgencies (as in Aden and South Arabia). Aggressive search and 
destroy missions in isolated areas of insurgent-controlled countryside would certainly 
be unsuitable and erroneous if employed in built-up areas with a high density of 
civilians unsympathetic to the insurgent cause who are vital to the broader battle for 
„hearts and minds‟. Conventional „search and hold‟ operations must be conducted 
alongside small-unit operations, especially in populated areas, therefore allowing for 
the more discriminate location and elimination of insurgent cells. Yet the importance 
of harnessing such tactical innovations for use in future conflicts is rendered useless 
unless the military accepts the critical notion of transferring counter-insurgency 
lessons. Effective armed forces in counter-insurgency campaigns are forced, through 
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the painful lessons of history, to become successful „learning institutions‟ where a 
reflexive military culture is fostered in order to assess tactical accomplishments and 
deficiencies and imbibe them into strategic thinking for future conflicts.
30
 This does 
not mean that the military is always preparing to fight the last war, but in fact means 
that it is historically conscious of previous successes or failures that can aid the 
planning and conduct of the contemporary conflict by providing perspective and 
context.
 31
 All counter-insurgencies are scenario specific with their own detailed 
casual factors, demographic appeal and political demands, however to deny that 
certain strategic and tactical elements of a counter-insurgency approach are not 
transferable is to be blind to the utility of history and put to waste valuable and hard-
learned lessons of past conflicts regarding, for example, the importance of a sound 
politico-military strategy, the axiomatic nature of a good intelligence infrastructure, 
and the need to keep the population safe.
32
 Again, neologism can be a dangerous 
thing. Asymmetric conflict, inclusive of counter-insurgency, has been a constant 
form of warfare despite paradigmatic shifts through different „generations‟ of 
warfare. Indeed, current analysis of „Fourth Generation Warfare‟ places asymmetric 
conflict at the forefront of understanding contemporary war.
33
 As the case studies go 
on to demonstrate, transferring counter-insurgency lessons has been sporadic in the 
British case. 
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The centre of gravity for any counter-insurgency campaign is the population, 
ensuring that plans for a military assault upon the enemy have to be couched in terms 
of protecting the civilian population and preserving their trust. For this reason the 
concepts of „minimum force‟ and „hearts and minds‟ have become integral to the 
British conduct of counter-insurgency campaigns.  
 
Central to the British Army‟s traditional espousal of an ethos of „minimum force‟ in 
its conduct is the principle of restraint. As Rod Thornton points out: „the quality of 
force… has to be seen to be more important than its quantity.‟34 Thornton argues that 
this is the by-product of ethical Victorian values combined with ingrained 
pragmatism through centuries of imperial policing. The public outrage at the 
Amritsar massacre in 1919 certainly impacted upon the future conduct of the British 
Army and marks a turning point in the level of force used by the military in trouble 
spots. Thornton‟s conception of Victorian evangelicalism leading to gentlemanly 
conduct does, however, overlook the unavoidable inculcation of imperial racism, a 
metropolitan superiority complex, into the Army‟s outlook, that led to on-going 
subjugation and repression. The chivalrous behaviour of British polite society could 
never be transferred to conflict zones around the world. The Empire was not built on 
altruism. This is why Thornton‟s secondary emphasis on experience at imperial 
policing retains far more credence as an explanatory tool. Such experience fostered a 
realisation that the Empire could not be maintained by violence and that a balance 
needed to be struck between preserving a forcible military presence yet only utilising 
it as a last resort. The same principle still holds true in the post-colonial era. As John 
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Lynn points out in regard to excessive use of force in contemporary counter-
insurgency, it only serves to generate „the three R‟s: resentment, resistance and 
revenge.‟35 Analysis of counter-insurgency campaigns, whether British, American or 
French, clearly reveals a link between the appropriate use of force and the level of 
military and political strategic success. There are implications for heavy-handed 
counter-insurgency conduct (just look at the French in Algeria) as it fuels what 
Martha Crenshaw labelled the „action-reaction syndrome‟, whereby violence 
becomes cyclical, ratcheted by corresponding strike and counter-strike.
36
 In a 
specifically British context, Thomas Mockaitis has no qualms in arguing that: „it 
would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of the principle of minimum force to 
British counter-insurgency.‟37 Its importance is unquestioned, but it is its actual 
application that will be evaluated throughout the case studies.
38
 In an age now where 
the conduct of counter-insurgency operations is under the constant critical scrutiny of 
international law, the 24-hour global media, human rights groups and other NGOs, 
the concept of minimum force, with all its permutations of the absence of civilian 
casualties and the expectations of operational legitimacy, has never been under more 
intense observation.  
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A second factor key to the military conduct of British counter-insurgency, and 
central to strategic planning, is that of winning civilian „hearts and minds‟. In short, 
this is an adherence to military and political principles that imbibe confidence in the 
indigenous population as to the counter-insurgent‟s strength and competence whilst 
concomitantly delegitimising the insurgents appeal. As David Kilcullen has 
succinctly stated: „Hearts means persuading people their best interests are served by 
your success; minds means convincing them that you can protect them, and that 
resisting them is futile.‟39 An overt emphasis on „hearts and minds‟ dominated 
counter-insurgency theory in the early 1960s in the wake of the British campaign in 
Malaya. It was widely accepted that the domestic population had to be placated, 
offered security, have their living standard maintained if not raised, and even granted 
more political rights. Yet as US involvement in Vietnam escalated in the mid-1960s 
the prominence granted to „hearts and minds‟ diminished in favour of instituting a 
quid pro quo between the military and the population whereby concessions and 
improvements were only granted if co-operation was forthcoming from the 
communities.
40
 This failure to acknowledge the importance of the battle of ideas in a 
counter-insurgency campaign cost the American‟s dearly, and should be treated as a 
cautionary lesson in the dangers of undermining the importance of „hearts and 
minds‟ to a counter-insurgency strategy. As Robert Taber quips of counter-insurgent 
forces: „they must be wooers as well as doers.‟41  
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„Hearts and minds‟ is both an ideational and material concept. Counter-insurgent 
authorities are obliged to shore up ideological support within a population for the 
political system they are preserving or installing whilst also legally, socially and 
politically invalidating the ideological premise of the insurgency, be it communism 
in Malaya or jihadist Islamism in Iraq. Parallel to the battle for ideas must be an on-
going process to improve the material lives of the population. This can be achieved 
in a number of ways, yet first and foremost it is the ability to provide security. 
Shelter from violence and the protection of their means of living is an essential 
function the counter-insurgent forces must fulfil – if they don‟t then the insurgents 
will. Engineering works to the national infrastructure also emit an aura of 
competence and security, particularly if basic provisions such as water, electricity 
and garbage collection can be maintained in the face of on-going insurgent attacks. 
This is perhaps where the American-led coalition in Iraq initially faltered in its battle 
to win „hearts and minds‟, given that water supplies in Iraq only reached half of all 
households and that electricity supplies ran at around half the actual demand, indeed 
falling below pre-war levels for a period in early 2006.
42
 This situation demonstrates 
that „hearts and minds‟ are won when actions speak louder than words.43 But perhaps 
the most telling element of the British approach to „hearts and minds‟ is that it was 
an explicitly coercive process too – the two dynamics need not be dichotomised.44 
We need look no further than the „New Villages‟ in Malaya to see just how the 
forcible resettlement of segments of the population (half a million rural squatters in 
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this case) was achieved under the guise of offering them land rights and modern 
amenities to placate any objections. When population control becomes an element of 
the counter-insurgency military strategy, it is invariably sugar-coated in order to off-
set the potential detrimental effect on the wider battle for „hearts and minds‟. Indeed, 
one of the key tools with which to wage this wider battle is an effective propaganda 
campaign. By utilising the widest possible communication methods, visual, audio 
and electronic, the counter-insurgency authorities are able to undertake a double–
edged information war that both dissuades insurgents from continuing their 
campaign and the public from supporting them, as well as incentivises disillusioned 
insurgents to surrender and shores up popular support for the authorities. It may seem 
obvious, but the most effective way to win the hearts and minds of the population is 
through their eyes and ears. What they see and hear influences their allegiances, 
hence the importance of a rigorous information campaign.  
  
One of the most crucial, yet often under-evaluated, elements in most counter-
insurgency military strategies is the utilisation of indigenous troops for intelligence 
and political purposes.
45
 Local forces in irregular conflicts not only strengthen the 
quantity of troops available for operations, but also allows for an intelligence 
dividend to be reaped by tapping into local knowledge, culture and language that 
arises through joint training and patrolling. Yet it is not just indigenous regular 
troops that the British have traditionally cultivated for an „over-watch‟ role preceding 
a military withdrawal. A notable pattern in British counter-insurgency has been the 
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use of irregular indigenous fighters, mainly via the utilisation of „turned‟ insurgents. 
So called „pseudo operations‟ have proved to be an effective component to the 
military side of counter-insurgency campaigns. In such operations surrendered or 
captured insurgents, in conjunction with government forces, return to an insurgent-
controlled area posing as an insurgent unit. These operations can be valuable 
militarily, in the instance of an armed assault, and especially in terms of reaping 
intelligence on future operations and the whereabouts of key leaders should the 
pseudo-gang be accepted and ingratiated into the insurgent organisation. Such groups 
can also plant false information in order to cause operational disfunction or induce 
surrender.
46
 The use of „turned‟ insurgents can be seen throughout the case studies 
employed in this thesis, from the „running dogs‟ in Malaya to the „Freds‟ in Northern 
Ireland, and will be emphasised as an integral element to the military conduct of 
British counter-insurgency campaigns. 
 
One key constitutive element of the „Tri-Partite Model‟ to point out is the placement 
of the police, and policing duties, under the military banner. This is because, as 
Charles Townshend articulates, „as a hybrid form of conflict it [counter-insurgency] 
calls for a synthesis of police and military skills.‟47 The Army is often called in to 
fulfil the role of military aid to the civil power, which requires a quasi-policing 
function, such as law enforcement and keeping the peace. Concomitantly, the police 
fulfil quasi-military roles, primarily through being one of the prime intelligence-
gathering agencies in a counter-insurgency campaign. With their local contacts and 
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knowledge of a particular area the police can act by detaining known or suspected 
supporters of the political wing or facilitators of the supply network of an insurgent 
group. In short, local police forces in counter-insurgency campaigns are crucial for 
fulfilling the wider military strategy of constraining the activities of the insurgent 
group, whilst the military are constantly required to act as a de facto police force in 
order to maintain the security of the wider population, who themselves are the 
fulcrum of any counter-insurgency campaign.   
 
 
The Political Element 
 
All insurgencies are inherently political by nature, seeking the imposition of their 
political creed and structure over a particular region, society or country. 
Consequentially, the counter-insurgent response is also inexplicably political as 
nation-states seek to assert (or reassert) their authority in the face of a threat to their 
monopoly of violence. The overarching counter-insurgency strategy will always be 
constitutive of a large political element, namely to achieve a reduction and eventual 
eradication of the threat to state control or a particular sphere of interest. In counter-
insurgency scenarios, therefore, the military battle is highly politicised. 
Clausewitzian truisms regarding war and politics are still applicable to asymmetric 
counter-insurgencies. David Kilcullen has gone as far as to state that: „Modern 
counter-insurgency may be 100% political.‟48 Although his calculations may be high, 
his point is well made – political considerations, sensitivities, and necessities are 
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omnipresent in a counter-insurgency campaign. This is not a new phenomena. Whilst 
Western states attempted to counter Maoist rural insurgencies in the 1960s and 1970s 
it was also noted, lucidly by David Galula, that: „so intricate is the interplay between 
the political and the military actions that they cannot be tidily separated.‟49 It is the 
political masters who send in the military to reassert control; it is the political 
masters who assess the strategic threats posed by insurgent groups to the national 
interest; it is the political master‟s electoral sensitivities that impinge upon the 
longevity of the military campaign. As the case studies will go on to demonstrate, 
counter-insurgency campaigns are initiated, conducted, and curtailed by the hidden 
hand of politicians. As General Sir Rupert Smith has rightly noted: „(P)olitical 
considerations provide the context for the strategy… (M)ilitary considerations and 
actions must always work within and contribute to the political purpose.‟50  
 
However, it is not just the central control of the wider counter-insurgency campaign 
that asserts the importance of the political dimension. The introduction of sound 
political practice on the ground in the country facing the insurgent threat is essential 
too. Representative government lends legitimacy to the campaign, mutually 
providing a political vision for the future that the indigenous population of all races, 
tribes and religious groupings can rally behind, whilst undermining the insurgent‟s 
appeal to represent the „people‟. Thomas X. Hammes is correct in his assertion that: 
„The fundamental weapon in counterinsurgency remains good governance.‟51 This 
was evident in Malaya, for example, as the ethnic Chinese, the mainstay of the 
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insurgent Malayan Communist Party, were brought into the electoral franchise, given 
political rights hitherto not granted, and sought to foster a mainstream, non-
Communist political party that provided a platform for Chinese opinion. Attempts in 
Iraq to foster a multi-party, multi-sect government have proved an essential, although 
ultimately as yet unfulfilled, element of the strategy in Iraq.  
 
Whilst the military threat needs to be dealt with, the population will inevitably 
demand political representation by their own kith and kin. Prolonged and centralised 
political control by an external counter-insurgent force, especially as decolonisation 
became a seemingly unstoppable reality, ran the risk of jeopardising the necessity of 
winning indigenous „hearts and minds‟ by destroying the trust bestowed by the 
population upon the counter-insurgent forces as both guarantors of security and 
amenities as well as creators of a new political order in which they will have a 
greater say. Making political provisions for the mainstream ethnic and religious 
groups has long been a reality in British counter-insurgency as it lends the wider 
campaign a degree of legitimacy, and ensures that it is seen to be both constructive 
(in terms of building new institutions and improving the infrastructure) and as well as 
destructive (in terms of eradicating the insurgent threat militarily). Illegitimate or 
controversial political control and management of a counter-insurgency campaign 
will inevitably aggravate an insurgency leading to a deterioration in the security 
situation. Just note how the extended political control of the Provisional Coalition 
Authority in Iraq under Paul Bremer in the wake of Saddam‟s downfall quickly 
turned notions of the coalition troops as liberators into that of occupiers.  
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Close civil-military relations are vital for ensuring that a co-ordinated and coherent 
combined counter-insurgency strategy is implemented efficiently and effectively. 
Britain‟s historical experiences, notably stemming from Malaya during the 1950s, 
have demonstrated the need for close civil-military liaison, particularly through a 
decentralised, committee-based decision-making structure. This reflects the 
inescapably political nature of counter-insurgency and ensures that the military 
campaign is commensurate with overarching political objectives. Therefore it is at 
the level of civil-military relations that the two primary planks of any counter-
insurgency strategy – the political and the kinetic – coalesce, with the cohesion of 
this relationship proving vital to the efficacy of the campaign as a whole. This is 
axiomatic to strategic „success‟ given the widely acknowledged reality that counter-
insurgency campaigns are not won by outright military force alone (of which the 
2009 Sri Lankan Army repression of the Tamil Tigers stands as a bloody and 
controversial anomaly) but requires significant civilian input into building 
governance structures and undertaking reconstruction plans. As David Kilcullen 
memorably puts it: „counter-insurgency is armed social work.‟52 This requires, 
therefore, both civilian and military unity of effort.  
 
However, such unity of effort cannot be achieved unless adequate resources are 
provided to civilian counter-insurgency work if the non-kinetic instruments of 
influence, such as reconstruction projects, are to prove effective. This was arguably a 
barrier thrown up between close civil-military relations in Iraq, where severely 
restricted financial resources hindered cross-agency co-operation as each 
organisation sought to fulfil its own purview with a limited budget at the expense of 
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pooling resources. The civilian role in counter-insurgency should not be reduced 
simply to development-oriented work designed to make the life of the military easier 
by being a friendly „follow on force‟, but should be seen as a fundamental facilitator 
of essential counter-insurgency tenets such as building population resistance to 
insurgent narratives, strengthening host nation governance structures, as well as the 
obvious need to improve the material well-being of indigenous communities via 
reconstruction work – goals that the military themselves are also seeking to fulfil in 
parallel. Close civil-military relations, based on common goals, effective 
communication and good working relationships, are therefore at the heart of the 
security-development nexus, particularly when we assess the whole gamut of civilian 
input into a counter-insurgency campaign, from reconstruction to humanitarian work, 
from central political leadership to on-the-ground diplomacy. The spectrum of such 
civilian involvement in irregular warfare does however flag up the importance of 
heightened civilian and not just military education as to the particular nuances and 
complexities of counter-insurgency warfare.
53
 Undeniably, counter-insurgency does 
blur the traditional „lanes of authority‟ that in times of regular warfare have 
notionally delineated civilian management of a campaign and the military execution 
of it. Yet this challenge to redefine civil-military relations within the context of 
irregular warfare is one that the British have, throughout the case studies employed 
in this study, not entirely conquered. Consistent restrictions on military resources by 
civilian politicians have proven to be a major thorn in the side of cohesive relations, 
whilst the political supremacy of strategic planning, attained arguably during the 
South Arabian campaign, has ensured friction at senior levels of civilian and military 
leadership. 
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The two main traditional schools of thought regarding civil-military relations have 
coalesced around two of the scholars to first theorise on the topic, Samuel 
Huntington and Morris Janowitz. These pioneers in this field retained an essentially 
domestic quality to their understanding of civil-military relations, defining it 
primarily in terms of the military‟s relation to the state as a political entity, and not 
necessarily as an assessment of working relations between the military and civilian 
workers in theatres of operation (an interpretation of civil-military relations that this 
thesis will adopt).
54
 The Huntingtonian School disaggregates the military from the 
political sphere, denying a link between military means for political ends. Huntington 
depicts members of the military as subordinate servants of the political state and 
argues for an explicit distinction between the way political decisions on matters of 
conflict are reached and the way in which those decisions are carried out by the 
armed forces. In short, there is to be no political encroachment on military affairs.
55
 
This is maintained, argued Huntington, because the military‟s inherent sense of 
professionalism and its outlook of conservative realism, allowed for a separate 
military sphere to develop. 
 
Conversely, the Janowitzean School advocates that the military establishment imbibe 
political sensitivities into their own professional outlook. Consequentially, Janowitz 
argues, military understanding of overarching political imperatives would be 
achieved via the integration of political and military leadership. In Janowitz‟s more 
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sophisticated interpretation, the military retains close links with the state whom they 
serve and the society whom they protect. This is reflected, Janowitz maintains, in the 
transition of Western militaries in the twentieth century into highly professional 
forces whose application of kinetic activity is now tightly controlled, in part due to 
political necessity.
56
  
 
These two models can broadly account for the differences in civil-military relations 
in a historical counter-insurgency context between the US and UK. The Americans 
have traditionally fostered a Huntingtonian relationship, with a deliberate and warily 
maintained division of civilian and military responsibilities and leadership within the 
Pentagon (a factor that has arguably led to many of the post-war problems in Iraq). 
Conversely, the British have developed a set-up akin to the Janowitzean model, 
nurturing the cohesion of civilian and military personnel in the defence decision-
making process in Whitehall.
57
 The nature of this particular variation of warfare has 
proved that as the military and political side of the battle are inter-twined, then so 
must the respective branches of civilian and military leadership. Close civil-military 
relations are therefore requisite in counter-insurgency and can take one of two forms: 
visible civil-military relations, such as joint reconstruction projects, provide the 
„observable physical interface‟ between the two spheres and this can engender public 
perceptions of a „comprehensive approach‟ at work; whilst non-visible civil-military 
relations provide essential cross-agency liaison on issues such as operational 
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planning, intelligence co-operations and economic provision.
58
 Unity of effort in 
both forms of civil-military relations are bound to make the most effective use of the 
different strengths and expertise that the various branches of the military and the 
multivariate civilian agencies bring. Close civil-military relations simply reflect the 
political nature of the beast – a beast that British governments throughout the 
twentieth, and into the twenty-first, century have shied away from taming, often 
preferring to cut and run (as in South Arabia and Iraq) or accept an uncomfortable 
stalemate (such as Northern Ireland during the Troubles). The political management 
of British counter-insurgency is presented in this thesis as inconsistent, which in 
itself has played a large part in creating the conditions for strategic inertia counter-
productive to the attainment of „success‟. 
 
But what constitutes „success‟ in counter-insurgency warfare? In short, success in 
counter-insurgency is compromise. Often, best case outcomes are achieving what is 
realistically attainable once a campaign is underway rather than attempting to meet 
idealised targets created in advance. Asymmetric warfare is fluid and complex in 
nature, rendering concepts of „success‟ as defined in regular warfare entirely 
nebulous. Campaign success will of course boil down to the question of whether 
insurgent violence has been curtailed sufficiently. Yet the impact of several factors 
impinge on the qualitative nature of such success, particularly time, political goal-
post shifting and altered public expectation of what „success‟ looks like. Taking these 
issues into consideration, we can see that „success‟ in Malaya took twelve years to 
achieve – a timeframe almost unthinkable in today‟s media-intensive world. 
„Success‟ against the Mau Mau came at the price of indiscriminate detention and 
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heavy-handed policing – an aberration of minimum force, „hearts and minds‟-
oriented campaigning. There was no success to talk of in South Arabia given the 
alacrity of the politically-dictated withdrawal and the failure to suppress insurgent 
violence. To speak of „success‟ in relation to Northern Ireland is to couch it heavily 
in terms of compromise. The IRA was never militarily defeated – hence talk of an 
„acceptable level of violence‟ being maintained - rather its political wing was forced 
to realise the inevitability of peace negotiations and power-sharing given wider 
societal revulsion at on-going violence. Having Sinn Fein partially control the 
Executive branch of government in Northern Ireland would certainly not have been 
an original tenet of campaign „success‟ in Northern Ireland at the start of Operation 
Banner, yet given the effects of time and political necessity, it became the most 
practical and achievable solution for ending violence. Compromise of a different 
sort, however, came to characterise politico-military claims of „success‟ in southern 
Iraq. Negotiating from a position of weakness given the military inability to curb 
militia violence, the British stuck a deal with the Shia insurgents allowing the Army 
to withdraw from Basra, effectively surrendering the city to the militias whilst 
enabling the British to point to a transfer of security responsibilities to the newly 
trained Iraqi Army and police force. The Iraqi case alone openly demonstrates the 
utterly subjective nature of the constructs of campaign „success‟ in counter-
insurgency terms. The political acceptance of the inevitability of decolonisation led 
to a permissive political exit strategy (i.e. independence for Malaya and Kenya) 
being utilised to undermine insurgent political plans. This is the fortunate context 
under which British Army were conducting campaigns in the 1950s and 1960s and 
stands in stark contrast to the French experience in Indo-China and Algeria, for 
example, where the French aggressively opposed the process of decolonisation and 
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therefore committed themselves to a concept of strategic success that could only 
entail an outright military defeat of the insurgency and not permit a politically-stage 
managed withdrawal. Perhaps we should therefore conceive of success in counter-
insurgency terms as simply being able to acknowledge what is practically achievable 
given firstly, the temporal expanse of irregular campaigns (as mentioned earlier, 
often measured in decades not years), secondly, the intractability of insurgencies who 
draw on their support from the populations and the way this creates different 
characteristics of victory as opposed to that when facing a regular enemy, and 
thirdly, the subsequent futility to harnessing metrics as a means of measuring 
counter-insurgency progress. Unlike in regular warfare there is no discernable point 
of enemy surrender, no victory ceremony, no official declaration of peace. Simplistic 
counting of the number of attacks carried out against counter-insurgent forces, the 
number of civilian deaths, or the number of newly trained indigenous police officers 
may provide quantitative comfort for commanders and politicians, yet they fail to 
assess the qualitative impact counter-insurgency tactics are having on the motives 
behind insurgent violence. Statistics cannot measure the tangible outputs of counter-
insurgency – in other words, the psychological and not just physical impact of 
political, economic and military efforts. It is easy to mistake action for progress.
59
 
Success in counter-insurgency, therefore, is constructed of a subjective interpretation 
of an eradication of insurgent violence, however this is often the result of overt 
political compromise, which questions whether „success‟ is therefore the right word 
to describe a strategic outcome. This certainly holds true in the British cases viewed 
here. 
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The Intelligence Element 
 
At the heart of each civil-military counter-insurgency campaign must lie an efficient, 
decentralised and well-integrated intelligence network. Not only does intelligence 
provide the basis for the launch of pin-point military operations, offering information 
on insurgent location, likely strength and movement, it also aids the political side of 
the campaign, revealing schisms within enemy political leadership, as well as 
establishing the political acceptability or likely civilian acquiescence towards a 
particular operation or policy. In short, intelligence proves itself to be integrally 
inter-connected with the military and political dimensions of any counter-insurgency 
campaign. As Michael Howard has succinctly stated: „Without hearts and minds one 
cannot obtain intelligence, and without intelligence terrorists can never be 
defeated.‟60 Therefore, intelligence must be seen as both a by-product of other 
successfully implemented counter-insurgency tactics (such as hearts and minds, or an 
influential propaganda campaign) as well as a catalyst for direct military, or indirect 
political, action. Yet the frequent failure to establish effective intelligence structures 
swiftly became one of the primary retardants to building an effective strategy across 
numerous British counter-insurgency campaigns. 
 
The primary intelligence gatherers in colonial British counter-insurgency operations 
have been indigenous police forces, who were then assisted by a British-established 
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Special Branch and, on occasions, MI5 and MI6. Recent operations in Iraq still relied 
on intelligence collected by local police officers in conjunction with other military 
sources. The need for combined police-military action in counter-insurgency 
operations stems from the particular need to adapt to the nuances of asymmetric 
warfare among the people, and as a means of bridging the divide between the 
purposes of the two institutions. The gathering of information on suspected or known 
insurgents (and equally crucially their supply and support network) lends itself to the 
methodical and legalist work of minimum force policing. An insurgency can thus be 
undermined outside the conflict zone. However, the combative nature of insurgencies 
requires the use of lethal force – a role reserved for the military. Therefore, the dual 
imperative in counter-insurgency operations of not alienating the indigenous 
population whilst concomitantly subduing and eliminating an insurgent group 
requires the parallel utilisation of effective community policing (necessary for 
intelligence gathering and „population control‟ in a mainly protective sense) and 
targeted military operations that strike at insurgent cells or strongholds. This balance 
is by no means an easy one to find or maintain, particularly given the jealously 
guarded fiefdoms of intelligence, however the clear benefits of co-operation will be 
noted throughout the upcoming case studies, as will the belated nature of its 
implementation.  
 
The essential peacekeeping role played by the police and the military‟s desire for 
„contact‟ intelligence need not be mutually exclusive, especially given the evident 
link between the legitimate conduct of a counter-insurgency campaign as a mode of 
winning civilian „hearts and minds‟ and the absence of aggressive patrolling and 
misguided stop-and-searches as a result of an intelligence vacuum. Security forces 
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are therefore keen to build bridges with a local community in order to foster an 
environment conducive to intelligence gathering within the population, especially 
given the evident importance of localised intelligence. As Frank Kitson stated in the 
1970s: „a lot of low grade information is more use tactically than a small amount of 
high grade material.‟61 However, a paucity of intelligence should not be licence to 
adopt more antagonistic population control measures. The introduction of internment 
in Northern Ireland in the early 1970s proved as much.
62
 Intelligence should 
therefore be used not only to tap into the ethos and motivations of the aggrieved 
community in order to develop a greater understanding of the nature of the threat for 
political means, but also in order to accurately assess the insurgents operational 
capabilities and organisation for practical military means. As one contemporary 
observation of the role of intelligence in operations in Iraq illustratively commented: 
„Without good intelligence, a counterinsurgent is like a blind boxer wasting energy 
flailing at an unseen opponent.‟63  
 
As the role of intelligence in fulfilling military objectives during counter-insurgency 
campaigns is accepted as crucial, Michael Herman has served to remind us that its 
relationship with politics has become close in the post-World War Two era, so much 
so that „intelligence became part of the twentieth century growth of government.‟64 
The collection of intelligence for political consumption has formed a crucial aspect 
in allowing government‟s to assess and interpret the strategic intentions, diplomatic 
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initiatives and military capabilities of enemies and allies alike. We can then see how 
the three factors at the heart of the counter-insurgents‟ dimension of the „Tripartite 
Model‟ unite when politicised intelligence is used to justify military action. No more 
obvious or controversial example is necessary than the infamous „dodgy dossier‟ 
heralded by the Blair government as legitimate reasoning to launch the invasion of 
Iraq in 2003.
65
 The aftermath of this debacle was, and arguably still is, felt in all 
three communities, especially in the international environment fostered in the wake 
of 9/11 whereby, as Len Scott and Peter Jackson have noted, „the relationship 
between politics and intelligence has never been more important.‟66  
 
However, such trends are not new. Western policy during the Cold War was driven 
to a large extent by intelligence analysis of Soviet capabilities, activities and 
supposed intentions in an effort to widen the missile gap and protect spheres of 
influence. What is important to consider is that not only does intelligence form a vital 
crux for political and military decision-making on the grand strategic level, but that it 
is essential when combating sub-state insurgencies also. The importance of 
knowledge of an enemy‟s man and fire-power capabilities, concentration of their 
forces and intended future targets, does not diminish when applied to asymmetric 
warfare. Indeed, it may be deemed more critical given the overtly difficult task of 
infiltrating an insurgent cell, or to collect intelligence on a group so clandestine as to 
be living among the people, to paraphrase Mao, as a fish within the sea. As a result, 
intelligence structures have to adapt to an asymmetric conflict environment 
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accordingly, in terms of its resource and personnel allocation, collection methods and 
organisational set-up.
67
 
 
Practically speaking, there are three methods of intelligence gathering in counter-
insurgency operations, as identified by Keith Jeffrey: overt (collected by uniformed 
controls on the ground), confidential (retrieved largely from detainees under 
interrogation), and clandestine (including undercover or paralegal surveillance). 
These forms of intelligence are collected by both police and military intelligence 
units in order to form one of three types of intelligence, either background 
intelligence to gain a wider picture of the causes of the insurgency, operational 
intelligence that can guide the military side of the conflict, or criminal intelligence 
that is aimed largely at individual insurgents or individuals within their supply 
network in order to bring legal proceedings.
68
 If these methods and typologies of 
intelligence are successfully used in a collective manner, the intelligence community 
can provide the military and civilian administration with what I would term 
„information ammunition‟ – the practical knowledge and insights with which to 
directly or indirectly undermine, subdue and eventually suppress an insurgency. But 
as the case studies will demonstrate, this can only be achieved if the intelligence 
gathering process fulfils several key criteria: intelligence networks must be grounded 
in the local community, with a reliable system of protection and rewards in place for 
indigenous intelligence agents; the intelligence gathering system must be 
decentralised allowing for localised „hot‟ intelligence to be acted upon without being 
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lost in a hierarchy of authority; the police, the military and government intelligence 
agencies must be encouraged to share information at a local and national level, 
although it is acknowledged that this is easier said than done; and finally, that an 
absence of intelligence does not legitimise heavy-handed treatment of the local 
population – accurate intelligence is rarely the product of fear and coercion. The 
British were not quick to realise the necessity of these factors, however the bearing 
of intelligence on the outcome of previous counter-insurgencies has been crucial, and 
Iraq was no exception.   
 
 
The Second Dimension: Insurgent Forces 
 
Insurgent Organisation 
 
Both the organisational structure and function of an insurgent group are important 
factors to analyse in regard to the group‟s overall ability to operate efficiently and 
effectively as a paramilitary and political movement. It is essential for the counter-
insurgent military and civilian authorities to gauge the organisational set-up of the 
insurgent opposition as it impacts upon how operational orders are constructed, 
disseminated and executed, as well as affecting the level of strategic competence 
with which the insurgent group is able to perform, both militarily and politically. 
Nominally, most insurgent groups are comprised of three main organisational 
strands: the insurgents (fighting force); the underground (active political wing who 
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also maintain supply and intelligence network); and the auxiliary (constitutive of the 
latent support base within the wider population).
69
 Yet it is the way these strands are 
structured and their functionality that fundamentally affect the ability of the group to 
achieve its strategic goals as well as shaping the nature of the counter-insurgent 
response. 
 
Structurally, a whole host of questions come into play. Does the group have a 
hierarchical or cell structure? Does it have a decentralised or quasi-autonomous 
leadership? Is the group regionally focussed or does it have a nationwide presence? 
Are there any rival factions or splinter groups that could affect the potency of the 
political message or military operations? How well connected are the political and 
military wings of the group? The answers to such questions, usually provided by 
background intelligence, helps build up a picture for the political and military 
communities that will then aid in tailoring a targeted and appropriate counter-
insurgency response. For example, a district or regional-based insurgency, such as 
the Mau Mau uprising in Nairobi and the surrounding White Highlands and Aberdare 
Mountains, would demand only a concentrated military deployment for the counter-
insurgent force. Furthermore, an insurgent group disjointed by rival factions, such as 
the IRA‟s various guises (Official, Provisional, Real, and Continuity), is therefore 
open to a greater degree of exploitation by security forces that play one splinter 
group off against another, whilst the entire political message of the insurgent cause is 
being undermined and pulled in different directions. The contemporary insurgent 
threat posed in Iraq offers a new set of organisational challenges to the counter-
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insurgent coalition. Rupert Smith helpfully applies botanical phraseology when 
describing Islamist insurgent groups, particularly al-Qaeda, as having „rhizomatic‟ 
nervous systems whereby growth derives from the roots even if the root becomes 
detached from the stem above the ground.
70
 Here, the organisational structure is 
demonstrable of the group‟s wider strategy of transferring their struggle across 
borders and for a prolonged period – the organisation is self-perpetuating, as is the 
cause. This, in part, helps explain the ineffectiveness of many British counter-
insurgency operations in southern Iraq given the organisational potency of the 
multivariate insurgent opponents – arguably the first well-organised enemy the 
British have faced in an asymmetric conflict environment. 
 
Functionally, another set of questions need to be posed in order to assess the 
effectiveness and efficiency the organisational aspects will have on the insurgency. 
What is the level of the insurgent group‟s preparedness for an uprising? Does it 
possess a viable propaganda machine capable of the effective dissemination of the 
political message? Is the political wing of the group a shadow government in 
waiting? Does the group provide alternative public services to the people, such as 
health care, schooling or security? Again, an assessment of such factors will reveal 
the potential potency of the insurgency. It will be seen in the case studies how 
Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA) fighters in Malaya possessed a relatively 
high level of preparedness come 1948 after their recent experiences fighting the 
invading Japanese Imperial Army during World War Two. Therefore, the availability 
of weapons (ironically supplied by their British colonial rulers during the war and 
then turned on them in 1948) and the combat experience of many MRLA guerrillas 
                                                          
70
 Smith, The Utility of Force, p.328. 
45 
 
ensured that the British had much difficulty in controlling MRLA violence in the 
early phases of the campaign and had difficulty gaining the strategic initiative. In 
contrast, the Mau Mau had low levels of preparedness given their lack of formalised 
combat experience and their rudimentary weapons. The preparedness of these two 
groups played a vital role in the achievement of „success‟ (in terms of eluding and 
frustrating the security forces) in the crucial opening stage of their respective 
uprisings. 
 
Insurgent Strategy and Tactics 
 
Broadly speaking, all insurgencies share the same overarching strategic imperative: 
to repel or overthrow an occupying or ruling military and political order in a 
particular country or territory and replace it with a system constructed in their own 
ideological or religious image. Obviously each insurgency is subject to its own 
strategic nuances, but the endgame is usually the same. Tactically, certain methods 
have attained a level of permanence in asymmetric warfare. Many insurgencies share 
a reliance on surprise attacks, constant harassment of the enemy, and an ability to 
fade into the population. As T.E. Lawrence astutely observed: „Our tactics should be 
tip and run, not pushes but strokes. We should never try and improve an advantage. 
We should use the smallest of force in the quickest time at the farthest place.‟71 This 
encapsulates the axiomatic maxims of an insurgency, registering the perennial 
principles of utilising size, speed and distance to your advantage. Insurgent strategy 
and tactics are born out of the particular exigencies of asymmetric warfare. Engaging 
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in armed conflict with a national army with all the states‟ resources at their disposal 
requires the adoption of a nuanced tactical arsenal. As Robert Taber memorably 
describes: „(T)he guerrilla fights the war of the flea, and his enemy suffers the dog‟s 
disadvantages: too much to defend; to small, ubiquitous and agile an enemy to come 
to grips with.‟72 The most widely cited contributions to the evolution of insurgent 
tactics have been the communist-inspired, rurally-focussed works of Mao Zedong 
and Che Guevara. Mao‟s treatise On Guerrilla Warfare was first published in 1937, 
and contains his guidelines for guerrilla tactics and doctrine that fuelled a generation 
of rural uprisings. In perhaps the most pertinent Maoist teaching in regard to 
insurgent tactics, borrowing heavily from Sun Tzu‟s Art of War, Mao urges the need 
for surprise, speed and stealth:  
 
„In guerrilla warfare, select the tactic of seeming to come from the east 
and attack from the west; avoid the solid, attack the hollow; attack; 
withdraw; deliver a lightning blow, seek a lightning decision. When 
guerrillas engage a stronger enemy they withdraw when he advances; 
harass him when he stops; strike him when he is weary; pursue him 
when he withdraws.‟73 
 
Although written to meet the demands of rural revolutionary warfare, Mao‟s 
observations on the tactical art of irregular warfare have gained a perennial quality, 
regardless of the location, ideology or strategy of the insurgent. So too has his belief 
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in the political omnipotence surrounding a military insurgency, castigating those who 
lose sight of „the political goal and the political effects of guerrilla action.‟74 It is not 
just for the counter-insurgent that Clausewitzian truisms regarding war and politics 
ring true. In light of this, it is important to remember that Mao conceived of guerrilla 
warfare as a „strategic auxiliary to orthodox operations‟ and not as an exclusive mode 
of warfare in its own right.
75
 This caveat in the application of revolutionary 
insurgency can help explain why many Maoist „peoples‟ wars‟, including that facing 
the British in Malaya, have failed due to a fundamental misapplication of Mao‟s 
doctrine. Insurgency was never intended to be the only way to achieve strategic 
goals.  
 
Like Mao, Latin American revolutionary Che Guevara also wrote on the application 
of guerrilla warfare, yet in contrast to his Chinese contemporary, Guevara did not 
perceive insurgency as supplementary to conventional warfare, but as a prelude to 
it.
76
 Regardless of differences in perception of the utility of irregular warfare, what 
unites Mao and Guevara‟s work is an underlying message that if insurgent groups 
wish to fulfil their political goals then a military strategy comprising an element of 
irregular warfare, which in itself is constitutive of a tactical repertoire that includes 
ambush, harassment, and agility, must be implemented.  
 
These two prominent insurgent strategists promulgated a way of irregular warfare 
that instigated the era of „classical‟ counter-insurgency that was analysed above. The 
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dissemination of their thoughts amongst revolutionary left-wing circles gave rise to 
the domination of insurgent doctrine by a rurally inspired and peasant-led military 
strategy. However, the increasing urbanisation of developing countries in the mid-
twentieth century ensured that insurgent strategy had to move away from Maoist 
ideals of a protracted „peoples‟ war‟ and Guevara‟s discredited rural „foco‟ theory of 
revolutionary growth, and adapt to the new opportunities offered by urban conflict 
and the application of terrorism tactics. Whereas, for example, the Malayan Races 
Liberation Army, blinded by their misguided adherence to Maoist strategy, failed to 
launch a two-pronged war by attacking rural and urban targets simultaneously, the 
National Liberation Front (NLF) in Yemen took full advantage of a concentrated, 
therefore vulnerable, British military presence in the strategically vital port town of 
Aden by initiating acts of urban terrorism in conjunction with operations in the 
Radfan mountains and the Yemeni desert.  
 
These two examples, however, do raise the important point regarding the impact of 
the conflict environment on the appropriate tactical response. Rural terrain and urban 
areas offer differing opportunities and hindrances for both sides in irregular warfare, 
in terms of an insurgent‟s ability to „hit and run‟ and the security force‟s mobility and 
offensive capacity. Rural campaigns, as launched by the jungle-bound MRLA in 
Malaya or the forest-focussed campaign of the Mau Mau in Kenya, allow insurgent 
groups a natural habitat in which to hide, plan attacks, and receive effective shelter 
from aerial bombardment. The effects of such a conflict environment directly 
impacts upon the strategic feasibility of the insurgent‟s campaign particularly in 
terms of logistical supplies and intelligence, as it forces the group to become self-
sufficient or else coerce local rural communities into providing food and information. 
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The natural camouflage and the vast spaces offered by a rural setting grants an 
insurgent group a degree of ready-made invisibility, therefore nullifying the security 
forces use of large sweeps through sizeable areas of jungle or forest – the counter-
insurgency equivalent of searching for a needle in a haystack. Urban insurgencies 
offer a different form of concealment, one that ensures that indiscriminate or overt 
firepower cannot feasibly be employed by counter-insurgent forces. The ability to 
merge into the wider population provides excellent cover for the insurgents, 
compelling the security forces to adopt small scale „cordon and search‟ operations. 
This, however, brings with it a whole new set of dangers for military and police 
personnel, as the almost daily attacks in Iraq demonstrated, because they make 
themselves static targets at checkpoints or on patrol through the streets for snipers, 
suicide attacks, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The conflict environment, 
therefore, plays a key role in dictating the tactical options available to an insurgent 
group and, particularly in the case of urban insurgencies where the density of 
„occupier‟ or „oppressor‟ military and political personnel provides for „target rich‟ 
surroundings, can also have a bearing on the actual strategic outcome. 
 
Certain other factors must also be taken into account when analysing the strategy of 
an insurgency. Firstly, the strategy must invariably be placed in a temporal context. 
Just as counter-insurgents cannot rely on any pre-conceived strategic notions of a 
quick victory, neither too can an insurgents. In irregular warfare longevity should 
permeate strategic thinking on both sides, but for different reasons. As Charles 
Townshend succinctly states: „In conventional warfare time is expensive to 
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governments; in irregular war it is cheap to their opponents.‟77 Despite the demise of 
Maoist rural uprisings, the protracted nature of insurgencies still remains the same. 
As the conflict in Iraq unfolds it is still clear to see how a counter-insurgent state 
psychologically and logistically prepares itself for the long haul, whereas the psyche 
of the insurgent opposition, not to mention its seemingly endless recruitment cycle, 
sets the conflict up for an intractable and uncomfortable stalemate. Victory has 
always been a nebulous phrase in counter-insurgency. Political face-saving and 
military pride has seen to that. It is Henry Kissinger who perhaps best summed up 
this conundrum during the Vietnam War: „The insurgent wins if he does not lose. 
The counterinsurgent loses if he does not win.‟78 This analysis may be stark but 
encapsulates the way in which the emphasis on attaining all strategic goals lies with 
the counter-insurgent to a far greater degree than it does with insurgents. Continued, 
albeit sporadic, activity at the tactical level will still perpetuate a perception that the 
wider strategic struggle survives.  
 
One key element necessary in propagating an insurgency, as the case studies will 
demonstrate through historical experience, is that the insurgents do not meet the 
counter-insurgents on the latter‟s terms. Asymmetric conflict does not require David 
to meet Goliath on the battlefield, but for David to find innovative and elusive ways 
to nullify Goliath‟s advantages of size and strength without direct confrontation. 
Often, by protracting the conflict militarily, an insurgent group can weaken the 
political resolve of the counter-insurgent nation and, without having won a major 
military battle, ensure a withdrawal of occupying forces due to a collapsed political 
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consensus given the costly longevity of the conflict.
79
 Such occurrences were evident 
in the British withdrawal from Aden in 1967 and, most notoriously, the ignominious 
American retreat from Vietnam during the mid-1970s. Indeed, destroying the 
political will of the counter-insurgent state is often the only recourse to strategic 
„victory‟ open to insurgent groups in the face of overwhelming firepower and 
military technology. This is certainly an element in play in the campaign in Iraq, 
where Islamist insurgents play upon American and British unpopularity to a wider 
audience. The insurgents operating in Iraq today are still bound by some of the 
strategic and tactical truisms alluded to above, yet strategic notions of a Maoist revolt 
in the „classical‟ insurgent form are not applicable to this contemporary pan-national, 
technologically adept movement. For this reason, it is worth analysing the modern 
strategic implications of Islamist insurgency in more depth. 
 
The contemporary global Islamist insurgency, networked through cells with its 
vestiges of technological and operational innovation, has changed perceptions of 
counter-insurgency best practice. With Iraq as its current hub, the insurgency is one 
where traditional territorial concepts of conflict are insufficient. As Stephen Sloan 
notes: „(T)he object is not the use of terrorism as one aspect of a guerrilla war to 
seize state power, but… terrorism as a means of fundamentally transforming entire 
regions.‟80 By capitalising on technological and communication innovations, such as 
the internet, Islamist insurgents have been able to publicise and recruit for their cause 
on an unprecedented scale, turning the prized inventions of the post-industrial, high-
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tech West against itself. In this sense, the insurgent maxim of playing to an enemy‟s 
disadvantages has been aggrandised like never before. Now cell-based groups, small 
and simply structured, can capitalise on the gaping asymmetry of the conflict by 
exposing the West‟s reliance on technology, its complex bureaucratic web, and its 
sacrosanct economic infrastructure. The vastness of cyberspace has granted insurgent 
groups the freedom and knowledge to securely and secretly plan and launch 
operations. Such technological innovations have ensured the decentralisation of 
insurgent operational control from a notional „leadership‟ to individual cells within 
the structure. Although cell-based insurgencies have existed in the past, such is the 
quasi-autonomy of Islamist cells granted by the simplicity of long-distance 
communication and the fundamentally non-territorial nature of their insurgency, that 
complex plans of mass terrorism can be formulated and disseminated with relative 
ease. Long gone are the days when naive insurgents thought, as T.E. Lawrence 
recounted, „weapons destructive in proportion to their noise.‟81 We live in more 
complex times, where insurgencies have attained a sophisticated level of tactical 
savvy in order to attain strategic goals. This is the darker side of globalisation.  
 
 
Indigenous Support 
 
The beating heart of an insurgency is the support received from elements of the 
indigenous population. Passive and active internal assistance sustains the political 
message of the insurgency as well as aiding the military side of the campaign by 
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establishing intelligence networks and building covert supply chains. Quite simply, 
insurgencies instigated in the name of „the people‟ cannot perpetuate their struggle if 
„the people‟ are at best apathetic, at worst out-right opposed to the insurgent cause. 
Key to this is the religious, ethnic and racial cleavages that divide a population. 
Grievances harboured by societal segments can quickly translate into sympathy or 
even activity for the insurgency, especially from disadvantaged, discriminated or 
minority sections of the demographic. However, this is no guarantee for garnering 
support for an insurgency tacitly or explicitly associated with a particular grouping in 
society. The almost exclusive ethnic Chinese membership of the Malayan 
Communist Party did not translate into pan-Chinese Malay support for the uprising 
as it proved to be an essentially ideological and not ethnic insurgency, despite the 
discrimination the Chinese Malay population suffered at the hands of British colonial 
rule. The Mau Mau in Kenya attempted to ignite a rebellion within the widely 
disadvantaged Kikuyu tribe but was undermined by the mystical and atavistic image 
their insurgency exuded. In the Irish case, the IRA played heavily on British 
discrimination against the Catholic community in Ulster as a means of provocation. 
In such circumstances it is imperative that the counter-insurgent state redouble its 
political overtures to minority populations susceptible to the insurgent message, in 
order to stem the broad societal support for the insurgency, and that the military 
maintain an emphasis on „hearts and minds‟ so as not to aggravate the minority 
population with an ethnic or religious affinity to the insurgency.  
 
Popular support holds a vital key to success for the insurgent and counter-insurgent 
alike. Dealing with swathes of a population who passively support the insurgency 
can hinder counter-insurgency operations as communities become reluctant to 
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divulge any information on insurgent activity in their area. Passive popular support 
gifts insurgents a wall of silence that can shelter them from intelligence leaks. 
However, it is mainly upon active popular support that insurgents rely for explicit 
help, including arms resupply, intelligence, concealment and medical attention. 
There are certain perennial factors that appear to motivate elements of the population 
to support an insurgency. As Robert Thompson noted in the wake of his experiences 
in Malaya and Vietnam, three primary dynamics impinged on the domestic 
population vis-à-vis the insurgency: „nationalism and national politics, religion and 
customs, material well-being and progress.‟82 Over half a century after these 
observations were first made, these same criteria can still be applied to contemporary 
counter-insurgency. Not only do populations respond to affects on their own material 
interests (look at the widespread discontent at the American-led coalition‟s struggle 
to reinstate and maintain the Iraqi electricity and water supply), but also they rally 
around corresponding religious militias in the face of opposing faction belligerence 
(hence interpretations that Iraq is now gripped by a de facto civil war between Sunni 
and Shi‟te) as well as rounding against the common enemy, the occupying coalition, 
in the name of Iraqi national pride. Iraq serves as a crucial reminder that an 
insurgency feeds off the support it can find in the population. Not only does it 
provide an ideational purpose in perpetuating the political dynamism and fervour of 
the insurgency, but also a material purpose as militias and gangs build supply and 
intelligence networks amongst the people that they claim to defend and protect. Yet 
it is not just inward that we must look to understand the true extent of insurgent 
support. We must turn our attention to exogenous support in addition to endogenous 
sustenance.  
                                                          
82
 Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency, p.63. 
55 
 
 
 
External Support 
 
Rarely can an insurgency survive and thrive purely on the resources found within the 
boundaries of one particular state. The external provision of additional financing, 
logistical support, and willing recruits to the insurgent cause is therefore critical if an 
insurgent movement wishes to fulfil its strategic goals and achieve a level of tactical 
effectiveness. External support becomes even more important if the insurgent group 
has failed to find a substantive foothold of support within the indigenous population. 
Bard O‟Neill‟s typology of variations of external assistance is extremely useful in 
allowing us to perceive the levels and sort of support on offer. He distinguishes 
between moral support (public statements of solidarity from other states or groups, 
such as those emanating from the powerful Irish-American lobby in the US during 
the „Troubles‟ in support of the republican cause); political support (active 
manoeuvring on behalf of the insurgents on the diplomatic stage, which was a 
particular version of support provided by the Soviet Union to most communist-
inspired insurgencies during the Cold War
83
); material support (the provision of 
military, financial or logistical supplies, for example the overt Egyptian assistance to 
the National Liberation Front (NLF) insurgents fighting the British in South Arabia 
and Aden); and sanctuary (the use of cross-border training facilities, hideouts and 
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operational bases, as Iran has been accused of providing for Iraqi-based jihadists in 
order to weaken their neighbour, attain regional dominance and undermine the US).
84
 
 
The receipt of outside help is often the only way that an insurgent group can hope to 
reduce the disparity of firepower and add to their tactical effectiveness. As Jeffrey 
Record rightly points out: „(E)xternal assistance is no guarantee of insurgent success, 
but there are few if any examples of unassisted insurgent victories against 
determined and resourceful governments.‟85 Outside support therefore becomes both 
a vital facilitator of success for insurgent groups, as well as a focus for the counter-
insurgent authorities who should aim to strangulate supplies and minimise the impact 
of exogenous supplies through tight border control. Jeffrey Record is also astute in 
pointing out the trend within the literature on insurgency and asymmetric warfare to 
assume that the „weak‟ can beat the „strong‟ by accounting for the superiority of 
„such intangibles as political will and strategy.‟86 Although such factors retain a 
substantial degree of importance, material aspects must rank alongside ideational 
ones when analysing an insurgent group‟s ability to inflict military and political 
defeat upon the counter-insurgent authorities. The role of external assistance, in 
terms of arms, money and equipment can go a long way in accounting for the British 
defeat of the MRLA in Malaya, who lacked any help from outside its borders and, in 
contrast, the NLF‟s victory of military and political attrition over the British in South 
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Arabia given the constant stream of Egyptian-provided, Soviet-made weaponry, as 
well as military advisors and high numbers of regular troops to augment the anti-
royalist, anti-British military presence in the region. When we take into account the 
externally supported insurgents in southern Iraq and in southern Yemen, history has 
demonstrated that the British have displayed an inability to adequately suppress 
insurgencies that are in receipt of sizeable outside support. 
 
External assistance has also helped turn the tide in the counter-insurgency 
experiences of other nations, notably the American frustration at Soviet and Chinese 
assistance for the Viet Cong insurgents and the North Vietnamese regular army, 
which invariably helped prolong the military capabilities of the insurgent forces and 
weaken American military and political resolve, as well as the Soviet military 
impotence rendered by the American supply of Stinger surface-to-air missiles to the 
mujahidin resistance in Afghanistan in 1985. External assistance, or the absence 
thereof, must be seen as a factor ranking alongside strategy, organisational structure 
and functionality, and indigenous support as the sub-parts contributing to a holistic 
analysis of the operational effectiveness of an insurgent group, which in itself plays a 
large role in determining the outcome of any such conflict. 
 
 
The Third Dimension: International Context 
International and Regional Pressures 
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No counter-insurgency campaign takes place in isolation, hermitically sealed from 
international scrutiny or the interests of other states. Such conflicts will arouse the 
suspicions or solidarity of numerous nations who perceive an interest in the outcome 
of the campaign. As explained earlier, the external support received by insurgent 
groups can be critical in enabling their uprising to succeed and sets the tone for the 
achievement of their strategic goals. In a similar vein, it is important that the counter-
insurgent state receive favourable international consensus (or failing that, widespread 
apathy will suffice) in order to ground the strategy in international moral and legal 
legitimacy. There are a number of other parties who do not have a direct hand in the 
conflict whose influence is still vital to the outcome. Firstly, the tacit or explicit 
support of the superpowers is always crucial. For Britain after World War Two, as 
their global power waned dramatically in the new nuclear era, this meant gaining 
American backing for counter-insurgency operations. As the US became the self-
styled leader of the post-war West and the nuclear protector of democratic countries 
at the beginning of the new bipolar age, it gathered increasing importance for the UK 
to receive the backing of the US for military deployments as the US-UK „special 
relationship‟ was recast.87 This held several implications, especially for the conduct 
of counter-insurgency operations – a lens through which the „special relationship‟ 
has been historically ignored. American foreign policy rhetoric has consistently 
contained an anti-colonial element to it for obvious historical reasons. Therefore it 
became imperative that Britain not depict the small wars being fought around the 
globe as the last vestiges of a fading power clinging on to its Empire.  
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Britain came out of World War Two a different power to which it had entered it. The 
international order had altered and the „winds of change‟ were blowing through the 
British Empire. Decolonisation had manifested itself as a reality by the late 1940s as 
India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Burma achieved independence. Yet the British were 
keen to engineer colonial independence along their own lines and consequently 
launched belligerent responses to armed insurgencies whose goals differed from the 
acceptable model of a post-colonial, pro-British government. However, to depict 
these conflicts as essentially „imperial‟ would be to overlook the omnipresence of the 
wider ideological struggle that encompassed these conflicts: the Cold War.
88
 
Insurgencies and small wars that contained elements of the broader Cold War 
ideological struggle became the de facto crucible in which the East v. West conflict 
played out. They became conduits for the major superpowers to channel their 
influence in efforts to undermine their rival, draining their economic resources, 
pinning down military resources, and adding to social and political unrest on the 
domestic front.
 89
 Even given the broadly anti-colonial nature of many insurgencies 
Britain fought in the post-war era, such was the pervasiveness of the ideological 
division of the world order that it became hard to resist, in Bard O‟Neill‟s term, „the 
internationalisation of insurgencies.‟90 This is a trend that has grown exponentially in 
line with the growth of modern media coverage of international events. 
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Despite the disparity of insurgent causes that Britain faced, it was impossible to 
escape the influence of wider US-Soviet-Sino conflict. British conviction that the 
Malayan Communist Party uprising in 1948 was a Soviet-inspired conspiracy added 
to the wider international implications of the insurgency. The regional element also 
played a factor given the creation of the People‟s Republic of China in 1949, 
establishing a communist power that possessed the ability to influence regional and 
global events. Thus the Malayan Emergency was able to feed into wider American 
fears of a South-East Asian „domino theory‟.   
 
The Suez crisis of 1956 ensured tighter scrutiny of British foreign policy actions. The 
international condemnation of the joint British, French and Israeli action in Egypt 
undermined American support for British military deployments. The pressure came 
to bear on the British military in Yemen in the 1960s as the Americans placed 
diplomatic pressure on Whitehall to curtail its imperial ambitions, despite the overt 
Soviet sponsorship of the Egyptian-backed insurgents. The US clearly opposed 
British regional influence in the Cold War, yet they did not wish to strengthen the 
hand of communism, causing a dichotomy between their anti-colonial rhetoric and 
their staunch support for anti-communist operations. However, it must be concluded, 
as William Roger Louis has pointed out, that: „American anti-colonialism was 
always reconciled with the needs of security… The crusade against communism and 
the defence requirements of the „free world‟ came first.‟91 To harden such a 
viewpoint we can observe the American abstention from ratifying the United Nations 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in 
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1960 as further evidence of their desire to leave themselves the strategic space to 
assess each colonial case on its merits – in other words, to assess the possibility of a 
communist take-over in the post-colonial vacuum.
92
  
 
The American‟s clearly held romantic notions of the republican struggle in Northern 
Ireland and did exert pressure over British conduct of operations in the province. It 
was therefore little wonder that an American envoy, Senator George Mitchell, was 
selected to marshal the peace process in the 1990s. This follows a pattern of 
American reactions to British counter-insurgency operations that has rested on a 
blend of material and ideational factors, including the political dividend they may 
reap in light of British success (i.e. communism stymied in South-East Asia without 
direct American military involvement); the perceived interference of another power 
in a region they are seeking to bring within their own sphere of influence for 
ideological and economic reasons (i.e. the Middle East); and the channelling of 
opinion of powerful and vocal diasporas on the international stage (i.e. the Irish-
American lobby.)  
 
The importance of material and ideational factors is still at play in contemporary 
counter-insurgency operations in Iraq. However, the War on Terror has witnessed the 
first deployment of British troops to a counter-insurgency conflict as junior coalition 
partners, where their influence is mainly operational rather than strategic. This says 
as much about the role of Britain as a world power as it does about the balance of the 
„special relationship‟. The Americans still bear an influence on British counter-
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insurgency operations, but currently with more strategic control than ever before. 
The influences of other states are thus a vital component in assessing the evolution of 
British counter-insurgency, be it in a Cold War, domestic, or post-9/11 context. 
Globalisation has come to bear on this particular form of warfare. The international 
element therefore provides the third and final constitutive element of the „tri-partite 
model‟, allowing our understanding of British counter-insurgency conflicts to 
become multi-dimensional in effectively explaining the inability to meet strategic 
goals.  
 
 
This, therefore, is the analytical foundation of the thesis, the basis of the critical 
evaluation of the case studies. It is multi-dimensional and is intended to provide a 
comprehensive and detailed explanation and understanding of British counter-
insurgency over the last half a century and allow for a re-interpretation of British 
„success‟ in counter-insurgency. Yet the model remains a straw man unless given 
bones and muscle via the application of historical and contemporary examples. It is 
to be stood up against five case studies, spanning the post-World War Two years, 
when British counter-insurgency found itself widely enacted. The case studies appear 
chronologically, allowing us to evaluate the developments and consistencies in the 
British approach to counter-insurgency – an evolution marked by slow tactical 
learning and a slow burning strategy. 
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CHAPTER 2: Methodology 
 
 This thesis bridges the divide between international relations and international history. 
As such, it utilises a number of methodological tools as a means of harnessing empirical 
information and securing a meaningful mode of presenting the research findings. In 
essence, the reflexive use of primary archival documents, combined with a critical 
appraisal of arguments housed in the secondary literature, are analysed within a 
framework of a comparative, case study-based approach.  
 
Comparative Case Studies: A Methodological Approach 
The utilisation of the comparative method in international relations research shares a 
longevity with the discipline itself. Forming a central plank in the approach to political 
research, comparison is not necessarily a method of measurement in a purely positivist 
sense, but is a tool that be employed to discover the empirical relationship between two 
or more political variables.  
 
Todd Landman identifies four main reasons for utilising a comparative approach: 
contextual description; classification and „typologizing‟; hypothesis-testing and theory-
building; and prediction.
1
 It is firmly within the first of these justifications that this thesis 
is located. The comparative nature of the case studies is intended to offer an empirically 
                                                          
1
 Todd Landman, Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics: An Introduction (3
rd
 edition) (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2008), p.4. 
64 
 
rich description of events in order to contextualise the relative „success‟ of British 
counter-insurgency campaigns over the last sixty years. Despite harnessing a meta-
narrative pertaining to notions of the British being „slow learners‟ and „slow burners‟ in 
the realm of counter-insurgency, it is not proposed to test hypotheses or build theory in a 
positivist sense, nor attempt to posit predictions as to the possible outcomes of future 
campaigns. Instead, a comparative methodology is utilised here as a means by which to 
describe the British counter-insurgency experience across continents, across the last half 
century. 
 
Landman goes on to acknowledge four vital components of any form of comparative 
research, including that of contextual description: cases; units of analysis; variables; and 
observations. By way of explanation, cases are the places or phenomena that are the 
basis of the analysis. Units of analysis are the „objects in which a scholar collects data.‟ 
Variables are „those concepts whose value changes over a given set of units‟, whilst 
observations are „the values of the variables for each unit.‟2 In direct relation to this 
thesis, the Tri-Partite Model encompasses these components to provide a comprehensive 
means of comparative analysis. The case studies selected are the Malayan Emergency 
(1948-60); the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya (1952-60); the insurgency in Aden and 
South Arabia (1962-67); the first decade of the Northern Ireland „Troubles‟ (1969-79); 
and an evaluation of the recent British counter-insurgency efforts in southern Iraq (2003-
09). The units of analysis are the distinct dimensions of counter-insurgent; insurgent; 
and international influence. The variables housed across these units include counter-
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insurgent political, military and intelligence approaches; insurgent organisation, strategy 
and tactics, and levels of internal and external support; and the intensity of global 
political opinion or intervention in the conflict. The primary observations drawn from 
the value of these variables is that the political management and military execution of 
counter-insurgency by the British throughout the cases from the last sixty years has 
revealed a slow lesson learning mentality and the disorganised implementation of a slow 
burning strategy, all of which has been undertaken, up until Iraq, against deficient 
insurgent opponents. Holistically, therefore, this provides a macro-level analysis of the 
evolution of the British approach to counter-insurgency between 1948 and 2009. 
 
Comparative politics has emerged in the last half century as a sub-field of international 
relations (IR) in its own right, with its own peer-reviewed journals and body of scholarly 
literature, to the extent to which it can be interpreted as „intellectually autonomous‟ of 
other branches of IR.
3
 However, it is its utility as a methodological approach that holds 
relevance to both the structure and the epistemological premise of this thesis. As 
counter-insurgency regains its status as the modus operandi of Western militaries, the 
need to critically reassess the last sixty years worth of the British counter-insurgency 
experience becomes premised on the need for a comparative case study based approach.  
 
Arend Lijphart hits the methodological nail on the head when he states that: „the 
principal problems facing the comparative method can be succinctly stated as: many 
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variables, small number of cases.‟4 In short, there is a correlation between the quantity of 
variables or cases and the quality of effective comparative analysis. In an attempt to 
alleviate this perennial methodological problem, the structure proposed in the „Tripartite 
Model‟ goes some way towards regulating the most prominent and reoccurring variables 
in British counter-insurgency based on historical analysis (such as the interconnectivity 
between military, political and intelligence actors) and by applying this uniform model 
across all case studies. This permits a greater opportunity to describe the empirical 
relationships between these variables across time and space, enabling a critical analysis 
of perceived British „success‟ in counter-insurgency campaigns. 
 
Yet any comparative study must be aware of what Richard Rose has labelled its own 
„bounded variability,‟5 mutually rejecting the extremes of assuming universalism and the 
limits of particularism. What is clear is that a comparative trade-off must occur where 
the depth and breadth of the analysis is sufficiently bridged in order to acquire adequate 
mid-range analysis. For this reason, this thesis employs five case studies in order to 
describe how the British approach to counter-insurgency has evolved in the post-World 
War Two era – a manageable mid-range number of cases that take in a broad temporal 
period and geographical variance. Furthermore, a comparative study must also be wary 
of not engaging in the methodological misdemeanours of „conceptual travelling‟ 
(comparing events separated by too much time or incongruence) or „conceptual 
stretching‟ (applying cases to fit circumstances). The cases selected represent a bridge 
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 Arend Lijphart, „Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method‟, American Political Science 
Review, Vol.65 No.3 (1976), p.685. 
5
 Richard Rose, „Comparing Forms of Comparative Analysis‟, Political Studies, Vol.39 No.3 (1991), 
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over the potential travails of such travelling or stretching by forming a linear chronology 
of British counter-insurgency campaigns with no distinct disjunctions across time, and 
the Tri-partite Model attempts to avoid deductive theorising regarding preconceived 
notions of what the historical cases tell us about the contemporary. It also attempts to 
circumnavigate the problem of case selection bias. The temptation to deductively select 
cases that will neatly fit a preconceived hypothesis will inevitably produce flawed 
research. So how can the case selection for this thesis be justified? 
 
The cases were chosen for several reasons. Firstly, the colonial examples represent the 
most significant turning points in British counter-insurgency given their importance to 
both British and wider international military and political developments. The case 
studies selected stand out as the most noteworthy campaigns that are demonstrative of a 
considerable counter-insurgency deployment, each having a sizeable impact upon the 
way in which the British military theorised and practiced irregular warfare. Secondly, 
they offer a well-spread temporal and regional mix. Every decade of the post-war era is 
covered by at least one case study (hence the omission of the Cyprus Emergency, 1955-
59, as Malaya and Kenya provide ample analysis of 1950s counter-insurgency for the 
purposes of this thesis), whilst the five cases are drawn from distinct and varied parts of 
the world (hence the omission of the limited British counter-insurgency deployment to 
Oman in the late 1970s – Aden provides a far more detailed and wider example of 
British counter-insurgency in the Gulf region). The case studies were not picked to 
justify the inclusion of certain factors within the model. Indeed, the model is not rigid 
and holds no pre-conceived notions of which elements are superior to others. It is an 
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inter-active model constitutive of consistently applied variables that can help explain 
why one factor impacted upon the eventual outcome in one case study, yet played a 
relatively minor role in another. Yet, holistically, certain elements of the model, 
emphasised at different points across the case studies, present a picture of a regularly 
inert and inept British response. 
 
The question of internal and external validity is of paramount importance with regard to 
a comparative study. Internal validity relates to the cases that are under scrutiny – in 
other words, are the variables viable? External validity refers to the generalisability of 
the findings in terms of its applicability to other cases. The validity of the comparisons 
within this thesis are guaranteed by firstly the chronological and congruent nature of the 
cases selected and secondly by the potential ability to apply the Tri-Partite Model across 
other national counter-insurgency experiences, to the American, French or Portuguese 
cases for example. The employment of a multiple case study-based approach allows for 
a „controlled comparison‟ to be conducted, enabling the study to identify levels of 
equivalence between variables (in this case, for example, the relationship between the 
level of external funding for an insurgency and the success of the counter-insurgency in 
fulfilling its strategic goals), and to conduct a system of „process tracing‟ whereby 
analysis of the case studies allows us to track the progression by which conditions 
produce outcomes (again in this case, how, for example, did the British army come to 
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conduct its counter-insurgency campaign in southern Iraq the way it did as a result of its 
historical experiences?).
6
  
 
One of the primary advantages of utilising case studies as a research tool is that they 
encompass an array of strategies on the methodological spectrum, covering issues 
regarding research design and empirical information collection, dissemination and 
analysis. Robert Yin has argued that case studies are best applied „when “how” or “why” 
questions are being posed, when the investigator has little control over events, and when 
the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context.‟7 Arguably 
the utility of case studies in the context of this thesis is justified under Yin‟s criteria as it 
takes the recent British conduct of counter-insurgency operations in southern Iraq as the 
culminating point of sixty years of counter-insurgency learning, as revealed through 
asking the „how‟ and „why‟ research questions of: how did the British come to conduct 
their counter-insurgency operations as they have done?; and why has Britain been 
traditionally assumed to be competent or „successful‟ at such operations? 
 
Today is Yesterday Tomorrow: The Relationship Between History and IR 
 
International Relations research is often classified as contributing an „explanation‟ or an 
„understanding‟ of events, phenomena or structures. Whereas „explaining‟ often couches 
                                                          
6
 Steven van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (New York: Cornell University 
Press, 1997), pp.56-64. 
7
 Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods (3rd ed), (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1996), p.1. 
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analysis in positivist law-like hypotheses designed to find causal links, research that 
proffers an „understanding‟ of a particular facet of International Relations, as Ngaire 
Woods argues, delves „into history not as a bank of information which might falsify a 
theory, but as a narrative which permits a greater appreciation of the origins, evolution 
and consequences of an event.‟8 It is in this latter vein that this thesis presents an 
understanding of British counter-insurgency as being haphazardly implemented and 
lacking the success that has traditionally been bestowed upon it. It will be the utilisation 
of historical case studies, woven through the Tri-partite Model framework, which will 
provide the core foundation of the research. 
 
It is clear that this thesis transcends the boundary between international relations and 
international history. These two disciplines have a close relationship, although not 
necessarily a smooth one.
9
 Indeed, they can be considered as „brothers under the skin‟.10 
Methodologically, the two disciplines are similar, with both facilitating the use of 
documents, interviews (for the contemporary historian), and archival work. However, 
the real deviation is on an epistemological level, where the role of „facts‟ and their 
interpretation produces differences over the employment of theory. As E.H. Carr 
asserted, any contemporary attempt to investigate the past „consciously or unconsciously 
reflects our own position in time, and forms part of our answer to the broader question 
                                                          
8
 Ngaire Woods, The Uses of Theory in the Study of International Relations‟, in Ngaire Woods (ed), 
Explaining International Relations Since 1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p.11. 
9
 Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, „International History and International Relations Theory: A Dialogue Beyond 
the Cold War‟, International Affairs, Vol.76 No.4 (2000), p.741.  
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 Stephen H. Haber, David M. Kennedy and Stephen D. Krasner, „Brothers Under the Skin: Diplomatic 
History and International Relations‟, International Security, Vol.22 No.1 (Summer 1997), pp.34-43. 
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what view we take of the society in which we live.‟11 In other words, we project our 
modern condition, our current existence, retrospectively in a pursuit of understanding, 
rendering us unable to truly disaggregate the present from the past. Indeed, it has been 
the quagmire arising from the invasion of Iraq in 2003 that has triggered a parenthetic 
clamour to revisit historical examples of counter-insurgency as a means of helping 
interpret the current crisis, of aiding an appreciation of the contemporary tactical and 
strategic direction, and of placing British political and military conduct in context. 
Historical counter-insurgency is now relevant again as a belated process of asymmetric 
lesson-learning unfolds. Yet as Carr points out, the contemporary need to understand 
elements of the past is not only catalysed by the pressing need to untangle current 
complexities. But with this comes a concomitant impermanence with which the past is 
rendered with utility. Once the coalition has withdrawn from Iraq and the 
contemporaneous „broader questions‟ that Carr found inevitable have been settled, what 
then becomes the role of history? There is a danger that historical analysis becomes 
merely a tool to be utilised only to help retrospectively justify or denigrate an existing 
policy decision. The past therefore becomes evidence offered by the defence or 
prosecution in the intellectual trial of contemporary international relations.
12
 This thesis 
is therefore premised as a bulwark to this fleeting and inexpedient use of history by 
aiming to promote, in E.H.Carr‟s words, „a profounder understanding of both past and 
present through the interrelation between them.‟13 Consequently, this thesis presents 
itself essentially as a work of international history that casts light on contemporary 
strategic studies.  
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 E.H. Carr, What is History? (2
nd
 ed) (London: Penguin, 1987), p.8. 
12
 Woods, „The Uses of Theory‟, p.19. 
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 Carr, What is History, p.68. 
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How then are the disciplines of history and international relations interrelated? To 
crudely characterise, it can be said that for the historian, IR scholars are guilty of 
frequently abusing history to uphold theories, hypotheses or policy recommendations; 
for the IR scholar, historians are largely devoid of theoretical judgement and are caught 
in a cycle of description not explanation.
14
 John Lewis Gaddis borrows from Sigmund 
Freud the phrase „narcissism of minor differences‟ to explain the relationship between 
the two disciplines, because for Gaddis: „Both disciplines fall squarely within the 
spectrum of “non-replicable” sciences. Both trace processes over time. Both employ 
imagination. Both use counter-factual reasoning.‟15 To this list, Geoffrey Roberts would 
also add that both history and IR are increasingly narrative in their content.
16
 Yet for 
Gaddis the primary difference that has generated so much narcissism in both camps lies 
in the use of history for the purposes of prediction and policy relevance – tasks that 
political scientists enthusiastically indulge and ones that historians shy from „like 
vampires confronted with crosses.‟17 However, the intellectual barriers that may have 
enforced the segregation of history and IR in the past have been surmounted in the past 
two decades to the extent that, in Zara Steiner‟s words, academia can no longer ignore 
the presence of contemporary historians or historically-oriented IR scholars who „find or 
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 John Lewis Gaddis, „History, Theory and Common Ground‟, International Security, Vol.22 No.1 
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create patterns that illuminate the past and open up ways to see the present and the 
future.‟18 Indeed, historians should relish the task of informing policy-makers, whose 
ransacking of history to produce decisions via the use of analogical reasoning has done 
much ensure that contemporary political decision-making (or indeed military strategy-
making) is diverted from acknowledging prescient lessons of the past. History, in 
particular military history, is not something merely found in a dusty archive. It should be 
something actively involved in the formulation of contemporary security decision-
making in order to avoid what Gary Sheffield has labelled the „prostitution of 
scholarship‟ by policy-makers.19 
 
Despite the seeming rapprochement between IR and history there still remains a need to 
balance IR scholarship between the essentially ahistorical studies that display a poverty 
of historical consciousness and the works that promote a form of historicism, namely the 
search for positivist law-like trends in historical development. As Donald Puchala 
rightly points out, in IR there „are no privileged pathways to the truth. Instead, there are 
numerous avenues of enlightenment.‟20 History provides one of the most illuminating of 
these pathways. As Hidemi Suganami has argued, there is a need to bring history to bear 
upon IR „in order to deepen its critical reflections on its lines of enquiry, to improve its 
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use of historical material, and to guard against a misuse of history... (D)rawing a rigid 
demarcation line between IR and IH [International History] is senseless.‟21 
 
History‟s traditional contribution to IR has been, in Dennis Kavanagh‟s words, „more as 
a body of knowledge than as a set of methods.‟22 However the utility of history to the 
study of IR expands further to the contextualisation of structural and agential behaviour; 
to raising the awareness of policy consequences via historical parallels; to compressing 
temporal and spatial dimensions in order to imaginatively create abstract investigation 
and comparison in the present; and presenting nuanced examples that caution against 
contemporaneous over-simplification, reductionism or generalisation. Indeed, one of the 
most overt aspects of historical methodology employed in this thesis is the avoidance of 
the social scientist‟s predilection for separating dependent from independent variables 
and (as witnessed in the interconnected Tri-Partite Model) an embracing of an 
interpretation of the interdependence of all variables and an assumption of their 
interweaving influence through time. Resultant from this is John Lewis Gaddis‟s 
observation that: „History is arguably the best method of enlarging experience in such a 
way as to command the widest possible consensus on what the significance of that 
experience might be.‟23 With such a body of counter-insurgency experience in the post-
World War Two era, it is both necessary and illuminating to assess the current strategic 
and operational environment in which the British were functioning in Iraq by ruminating 
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on what exactly the significance of such a body of historical experience, in Malaya, 
Kenya, Yemen, and Northern Ireland, might be.  
 
 
Sources: Documents and Archives 
 
This thesis utilises a range of methodological tools in order to construct an in-depth 
study. Archival sources have been retrieved, in order to gain a foundation of primary 
source knowledge on which to base the thesis. An extensive literature search produced 
an array of secondary documents that helped ground the research in existing 
historiographical and contemporary debate. The accumulative effect of this 
methodological approach has enabled this thesis to encapsulate the nature of debate 
about the evolution of British counter-insurgency and to enable a critical analysis of how 
this has been presented and interpreted in the existing secondary literature and primary 
documents by unpacking notions of perceived British competence at counter-insurgency. 
 
Primary sources are important because they function as a tool to help reconstruct past 
lives, events and processes. They provide a first-hand insight into the decision-making 
process, often at the very highest level, and can be presented as the most accurate 
representation of events as is possible. However, questions over a document‟s 
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authenticity, credibility and reliability must be constantly raised by a researcher.
24
 A 
mere acceptance of the documents contents does not lead to an analytically sound piece 
of research, meaning that a more interpretative method must be adopted in order to avoid 
what E.H. Carr labelled the „fetishism of documents.‟25 Documents are products that are 
not language neutral, that have a persuasive purpose, which must be placed within their 
wider temporal and institutional context.
26
 This is particularly true of autobiographies, a 
primary source that this thesis has utilised in order to gather interpretations of 
eyewitness accounts of events. Memoirs of former prime ministers, foreign and defence 
secretaries „have been used a great deal by historians but have not been given a great 
deal of attention by social researchers,‟27 for reasons of reliability. There is a constant 
and underlying danger that autobiographies are produced with the express purpose of 
conveying an alternative history of events in order to better the authors‟ image, however 
they are extremely useful in helping explain intent and motive.
28
 Consequently, 
autobiographies have been utilised but with a high degree of bias awareness.  
 
The historical nature of many of the case studies employed in this thesis places archival 
research at the heart of the study. Official government accounts of events, discussions at 
cabinet meetings, and even private memos are essential in building up a wider picture to 
assess the political attitudes and reasoning behind the conduct of counter-insurgency 
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campaigns. The National Archives at Kew have been extensively used, in line with the 
thirty-year document release rule, to gather material on operations in Malaya, Kenya, 
South Yemen and for the first decade of the Northern Irish „Troubles‟. Inaccessibility 
and incomplete records are two of the most problematic aspects of a documentary 
research strategy. However, the increasing accessibility of hitherto secret government 
documents, particularly pertaining to military or intelligence operations, has been 
partially alleviated thanks to a series of government schemes in the past few decades, 
including the Open Government Initiative instigated in 1992, and most recently the 2005 
Freedom of Information Act. Although the intelligence agencies are exempt from this 
new wave of archival transparency, the cross-tabulation of intelligence material is 
possible through discussion in other non-exempt government department material, 
especially the Foreign Office.
29
  
 
Yet practical problems have still arisen during the archival research for this thesis. Files 
pertaining to the first decade of the „Troubles‟ in Northern Ireland, for example, are rife 
with redactions given the on-going sensitivity towards building a lasting peace in the 
province. This archival equivalent of letting sleeping dogs lie thus creates significant 
barriers for a researcher attempting to assess British security policy in Ulster in the 
1970s, despite the period now falling outside the standard „thirty year rule.‟ If, as has 
already been observed, counter-insurgency is a form of warfare that is „100% political‟, 
then the control of releasing documents in relation to such campaigns is, in itself, a 
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highly politicised affair. Redactions at the National Archives relating to Britain‟s 
counter-insurgency campaigns thus leads the researcher into a Rumsfeldian vortex of 
pondering the content of archival „known unknowns‟ (for example, Joint Intelligence 
Committee assessments on Northern Ireland) and, more crucially, the „unknown 
unknowns‟ of events or discussions as yet unidentified. However, it is important to 
caution against regarding the content of archival documents as sacrosanct or somehow a 
„true‟ or „accurate‟ picture of events. The positionality of cabinet members and civil 
servants must not go unnoticed when analysing the reliability of a document, thus 
fostering within the researcher a critical eye for content reflexivity.  
 
Additional issues arising from this thesis included the problem of source material for the 
contemporary case study of Iraq, for which there exists no such pool of primary, elite-
level, material upon which the „historical‟ case studies are founded. There was thus an 
inevitable methodological shift from the archive-based research of the first four case 
studies to reliance upon newspaper reporting of events on-the-ground in Basra and on 
decisions and discussions taking place in Whitehall. This use of first-hand reporting of 
events by journalists, whilst useful in plugging the gap left by the absence of 
unclassified Ministry of Defence documentation on the campaign, is of course utilised 
with the same critical caveats placed upon archival documents themselves, namely an 
awareness of author positionality, potential political agenda and bias.  
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What is clear is that in regard to archival documents there has been an overt use of elite 
accounts of events. Documents written by former prime ministers, cabinet members or 
civil servants ensure an elite interpretation of meetings, agreements and the entire 
decision-making process has become the norm. The major consequence of such an 
approach is a top-down bias within the research that privileges the accounts of the 
political and military elite above the interpretations of, for example, a newly-enlisted 
sapper patrolling the streets of Belfast, or an engineer constructing a New Village for 
relocated squatters on the jungle-fringes of Malaya.
30
 This remains an unfortunate yet 
ultimately unavoidable methodological conundrum that reflects the elite level at which 
counter-insurgency strategy, both politically and militarily, is constructed. For this 
reason it is essential for archival researchers to be wary, as Caroline Kennedy-Pipe has 
observed, of „collapsing the state into the archives and thereby equating the “state” in a 
simplistic manner with the “bureaucracy”.‟31 However, certain levels of analysis issues 
are compensated by the Tri-Partite Model‟s premising of the actions of non-state actors 
(the insurgent) in relation to the state (the counter-insurgent) at the heart of the analysis.  
 
Holistically, therefore, the model is able to conduct a macro-level analysis of the 
evolution of post-World War Two British counter-insurgency by accounting for agential 
and structural developments across the level of analysis spectrum. This is aided by the 
utility of a comparative case study approach that is historically-informed and 
methodologically reflexive in its use of primary source archival documents.
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CHAPTER 3: Rethinking the Malayan Emergency, 1948-60: The Counter-
Insurgency Archetype? 
 
 
The British response to the 1948-1960 Malayan Emergency is widely considered to be 
the first modern counter-insurgency and is often regarded as the archetype of a 
successful operation by scholars and practitioners alike.
1
 This chapter adopts the „Tri-
partite Counter-Insurgency model‟ to explain why British operations in Malaya laid the 
foundations of a counter-insurgency paradigm that required the concomitant utilisation 
of military, intelligence and political means to ensure an eventual defeat of the 
insurgents. It also questions the notion of Malaya as an archetypal model of counter-
insurgency success. British „victory‟ must be contextualised with regard to the effects of 
several external factors, namely the fortuitous economic dividend resulting from the 
Korean War, the misapplication of guerrilla warfare tactics by the Malayan Communist 
Party (MCP) and their lack of popular support within Malaya and from outside sources. 
The chapter contends that a managed political withdrawal, in the context of 
decolonisation, was always an essential component of ensuring indigenous compliance 
for the Emergency and that twelve years to eradicate an isolated insurgent group is a 
campaign record not as deserving of the academic salutations it has parenthetically 
received.  
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The role of agency, namely the impact of General Sir Gerald Templer, within this 
structural model will also be accounted for, arguing that the agent-centric tendencies 
within elements of the „crowded historiography‟2 of the Malayan Emergency fail to 
appreciate the impact of external factors that greatly facilitated eventual success. 
Furthermore, it is demonstrated that the controversies surrounding British conduct in 
Malaya, such as detention without trial, abuse by British troops upon detainees, and the 
parallel use of „hearts and minds‟ tactics are still relevant if not contentious in 
contemporary security studies. Ultimately, this case study holds that the lessons of the 
Malayan Emergency are perhaps over-exaggerated given the favourable conflict 
environment and „trial and error‟ nature of strategic design. Although laying the 
foundations for future campaign conduct, we can witness during the Malayan 
Emergency the protracted construction of a slow burning strategy that would create the 
conditions by which an increasingly isolated and dwindling band of insurgents could 
extend their uprising for twelve years before the political and military conditions 
presaged an end to the Emergency. This is not the impression requisite of an archetypal 
counter-insurgency campaign. 
 
Background to the Declaration of the Emergency 
The Chinese had been immigrating to Malaya since the sixth century, and by the mid-
twentieth century formed nearly forty per cent of the total Malayan population of 6.3 
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million.
3
 Yet they remained socially and politically ostracised, particularly after the 
British officially secured Malaya with the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824. Employed 
mainly as rural labourers and miners, the ethnic Chinese were denied full citizenship in a 
country that by the late 1940s was the world‟s largest rubber producer. In 1947, Malayan 
rubber was the British Empire‟s best earner, totalling sales of US$200million compared 
to Britain‟s entire exported goods value of US$180million.4 The colonial metropole thus 
had good reason to ensure order in this prosperous part of the periphery. Yet political 
reform in Malaya in the immediate post-war period, necessitated by growing indigenous 
demands for a greater degree of governance, was to prove ill-thought out and ineffective. 
Humiliated by their defeat at the hands of the Japanese in the dense jungle of Malaya in 
World War Two, the British attempted to reorganise the political structure of their 
returned colony in the late 1940s. An initial constitution was established under the 
provisions of the Malayan Union in 1946 but was almost immediately disbanded due to 
vociferous opposition from the majority ethnic Malay population whose traditional 
rulers were still subjugated by a constitutionally superior British governor. An 
alternative settlement was eventually reached. In February 1948 the Federation of 
Malaya was inaugurated, which safeguarded the position of the regional sultans and 
restricted the citizenship rights of non-Malays, thus securing tacit acquiescence from the 
politically and economically dominant ethnic-Malays. This restriction further alienated 
the Chinese community not only from their Malay neighbours but from their British 
rulers. Some sought solace in the doctrine of communism, an ideology that had divided 
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China since the beginning of the civil war in 1927, and which was finding appeal among 
the diaspora. Established in 1930, the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) had endured a 
short and largely unsuccessful infancy in which their seven thousand strong war-time 
militant grouping, the Malayan People‟s Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA), failed to hold 
back the invading Imperial army. Indeed, the MPAJA was to a large extent funded and 
armed by the British in an attempt to maintain control of the colony. The equipment 
provided by the British in World War Two would eventually be used against them as the 
MCP turned its guerrilla tactics against the returned colonial ruler in 1948. Yet this was 
a gradual process, as post-war political settlements incrementally marginalised and 
radicalised elements of the Chinese-Malay population. Indeed, one of the leaders of the 
MCP, Chin Peng, was awarded the OBE for his war-time escapades alongside the 
British elite Special Operations Executive (SOE) unit, Force 136, before becoming one 
of the most elusive figureheads of the insurgent movement. 
 
The racial tensions unleashed by the Federation constitution curtailed the legitimate 
options open to the predominantly ethnic Chinese MCP – of the 12,000 members in 
February 1947 all but 800 were Chinese.
5
 Combined with a crackdown on the wider 
leftist and trade union movement by the British authorities, the MCP‟s recourse to 
violence hardened. A violent flurry of attacks in 1948 on white settlers and rubber 
plantations – the symbols of perceived imperial control and exploitation – primed the 
conditions for a wider insurgent uprising. The historiography of the Emergency has been 
split about the immediate origins of the insurgency, particularly the extent to which it 
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was a long-term contrivance of the MCP, whether it was part of an international 
communist conspiracy, or whether it was a reaction to colonial aggression. Undeniably, 
the dogma of communism prepares its adherents for the eventual takeover of power, yet 
the MCP was not „part of the Kremlin‟s world-wide campaign against the Western 
powers,‟ as initially depicted by the British government.6 What emerges instead is a 
picture of a communist party fuelled by the frustration of internal strife, angered by 
racial inequalities and spurred by ideological fervour. 
  
As unrest grew, the MCP‟s newly formed Malayan People‟s Anti-British Army 
(MPABA) – an acronym deliberately chosen for its echoes of resistance against the last 
imperial invader - resorted to tactics of arson and murder directed towards British 
economic interests, especially rubber plantations. This should not lead to conclusions 
that Britain only leaped to the defence of their Malayan possession in the face of MCP 
aggression primarily to protect their economic resources. As Nicholas White points out, 
„the degree of collusion between the British government and British business was 
limited. Government was often just too dispersed, representing too many varied 
viewpoints, to support British business in Malaya with definitive policies…‟7 Indeed, 
British estate and plantation owners in Malaya – those on the front line of the insurgency 
and prime MCP targets - were generally dissatisfied with counter-insurgency defences 
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and the security offered to themselves and their commercial interests by the authorities.
8
 
As the violence against British and settler targets spiralled, the colonial administration 
was forced to act, and on 19 June 1948 the High Commissioner, Sir Edward Gent, 
declared a Federation-wide State of Emergency, typifying a surprised reaction at an 
insurgency that the military, political and intelligence communities had failed to foresee.  
 
 
The Political Management of the Malayan Emergency 
The political impetus behind the initial counter-insurgency campaign was instantly 
limited. The failure of the authorities to prevent the escalation of MCP violence in the 
run-up to the declaration of the Emergency resulted in a loss of faith in Sir Edward Gent 
by the 12,000-strong ex-patriot community in Malaya. He was recalled to London in 
order to resign just two weeks after the insurgency broke out. The three month 
interregnum between Gent‟s death and the appointment of Sir Henry Gurney as his 
successor in October was a period of confusion and floundering for the British. 
 
One crucial way in which the political authorities tried to regain control of the situation 
and contain the insurgency through legalistic means was via the introduction of 
draconian Emergency legislation. One of the most important and controversial measures 
to be passed was Emergency Regulation 17D in January 1949, which provided for both 
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mass detentions without trial and wide-scale squatter relocation operations. One in ten of 
the Malayan population were squatters, eking out a living on the jungle fringes. These 
people were strategically imperative to the counter-insurgency strategy, as the MCP 
cajoled them into providing food and information. In the first nine months over 6,000 
people had been forcibly removed in an attempt to undermine the Min Yuen (People‟s 
Movement), the clandestine recruitment and supply network of the MCP who covertly 
operated within squatter communities. By March 1950 that figure had risen to over 
11,500. Relocation operations were to be given far more cohesion and order with the 
advent of the Briggs Plan, which will be analysed in detail later. The second implication 
of 17D was the ability of the authorities to arrest and detain without trial suspects 
thought to be co-operating or actively participating with the MCP. The legislation 
enabled the police to hold individuals for six months without trial, soon rising to one 
year, and then eventually two years. Just one month into the insurgency and around 
1,500 people were being held under such decrees.
9
 Here we see the historical use of 
detention without trial as a vital component of the politico-legal side of counter-
insurgency strategy. It is not a new controversy. Instant population control, decreed by 
sweeping laws, has long been an element of British strategy, and Malaya provides an 
ideal case in point.  Other Emergency regulations included the ability to restrict transport 
movement on the roads, the power to hold all non-capital offence crimes in secret, and 
crucially, the right to register the entire population and issue identity cards. Despite the 
sweeping nature of the Emergency regulations in late 1950 the government was forced 
to repel calls, mainly from the European planters, for the implementation of martial law. 
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After weighing up the relative advantages, it was decided that the existing legislation 
and the continuation of civilian rule was sufficient.
10
 Regulation 17D was eventually 
abolished in autumn 1953, after the insurgency had been brought under control, but not 
until 29,828 suspects had been detained and questioned without recourse to due legal 
process.
11
 In mid-1950 the British government even considered establishing a massive 
detention centre on Christmas Island in the Indian Ocean as a means of speeding up the 
repatriation process for Chinese detainees whilst simultaneously eliminating security 
threats on Malayan soil, although the plan never came into fruition.
12
 By the end of the 
Emergency, 226 MCP members had been executed for taking part in guerrilla activities 
that resulted in the death of members of the British or Malayan security forces.
13
  
 
One of the most interesting aspects of the British response was not one of military 
resources or intelligence accuracy, but one of semantics. As has been noted in some 
quarters, the historiography of the Malayan Emergency has largely failed to focus on the 
political language in which Malaya was couched by the political, military and 
intelligence communities. As Phillip Deery, one of the few to rectify this omission, 
points out, Malaya is an excellent case study for analysing normative counter-insurgency 
semantics as it „clearly shows the British government grappling with this issue of 
political terminology within the broader context of anti-Communist propaganda‟.14 One 
of the consequences of Whitehall word-watching was the decision to label the 
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insurgency in Malaya an „Emergency‟ rather than an outright „war‟. This belies a deeper, 
hardened financial and political appreciation of the situation. In a state of war private 
insurance companies could forfeit payments to rubber plantation and tin mine owners for 
damage or loss of property, meaning that compensation responsibility fell on the 
government. In the context of the dollar deficit of the late 1940s, this was a financial 
load the Attlee government was unable and unwilling to bear. By the 1950s, UK 
investment in Malaya tipped £10million, representing, in the eyes of Whitehall, a colony 
that was as economically significant as India had been before independence.
15
 For these 
reasons, the initial phrase chosen to label MRLA guerrillas was „bandit‟ – a politicised 
epithet implying lawlessness, illegitimacy and lack of popular support. However, in May 
1952 the term was dropped because, as Deery notes, „the gulf between image and reality 
was too wide‟.16 „Communist Terrorist‟, or more commonly „CT‟, was now the preferred 
moniker, largely because it helped contextualise the MCP within the perceived threat of 
international communism. However, the debate about semantics remained a political 
sideshow to the main task of defeating the insurgents through a combination of military 
deftness, accurate intelligence and politically-motivated „hearts and minds‟ operations. 
This, however, would prove an ideal-type counter-insurgency paradigm that would 
prove somewhat removed from actual strategic and tactical implementation. 
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Political String-Pulling and the Managed Withdrawal 
It was not just the military and intelligence communities that had to adopt a nuanced 
strategy geared towards undermining the insurgency. British politicians, and there 
representatives in the Malayan administration, bore the responsibility of ensuring that 
the MCP were out-manoeuvred on the political front. Ultimately, this would involve the 
stage-managed independence of Malaya and the hand-over of power to a moderate and 
acceptable post-colonial regime. In this sense, decolonisation was actually utilised as a 
counter-insurgency tool.  
 
One of the first political pressures put on the Attlee government at the immediate 
outbreak of the Emergency was the need to reassure the Malayan and British people that 
his government was committed to defeating the communist insurgency despite the initial 
difficulties faced by the security forces. In the House of Commons in April 1949, the 
Prime Minister stated: „His Majesty‟s Government have no intention of relinquishing 
their responsibilities in Malaya until their task is completed… We have no intention of 
jeopardising the security, well-being and liberty of these peoples, for whom Britain has 
responsibilities, by a premature withdrawal.‟17 It appears through later statements made 
by Attlee that even before Churchill and Eden‟s realisation that Malaya must have self-
government, a politically stage-managed withdrawal was an integral part of ensuring 
that the insurgency could be fatally undermined by decolonising Malaya and 
establishing it as an independent democracy. As early as March 1950, Attlee had stated 
                                                          
17
 Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Vol.463, 1948-49, March 21-April 14 (13 April 1949) 
Col.2815. 
90 
 
to the Commons: „[I]t is our firm intention to implement the policy [in Malaya]… of 
steady democratic progress towards self-government within the Commonwealth.‟18 The 
Attlee administration does not receive enough plaudits for its far-sighted conclusions 
that in order for Malaya to have a safe and secure future, it must be self-governed. 
Decolonisation was not just an irreversible post-war reality, but in this sense could 
actually be used to achieve a military withdrawal from a campaign that was proving a 
drain on the Treasury and Malayan economic resources.
19
 In this context, Churchill‟s 
1951 Conservative administration receives an overt amount of praise. For those like A.J 
Stockwell, the turning point in Malaya came with the return of Churchill to office, 
arguing that in conjunction with Oliver Lyttelton at the Colonial Office, Churchill 
ensured that „military vigour and political sense‟ was brought to the counter-insurgency 
campaign.
20
 This, though, places too much emphasis on the power of an ailing Prime 
Minister whose domestic problems overshadowed a conflict on the edge of the fading 
Empire. Even the last major biography of Churchill, written by Roy Jenkins, does not 
deem the Emergency worthy of indexing, so little was Churchill actually concerned with 
the day-to-day running of the campaign.
21
 Overtly agent-centric accounts of British 
victory that accredit individuals on the ground in Malaya, such as Templer, are 
contentious enough, but to endorse Churchill as turning around the Malayan Emergency 
is misty-eyed bulldog romanticism. 
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As the military side of the counter-insurgency campaign was virtually over by 1955, it 
became clear that the political side held the key to actually sealing an end to the 
insurgency. In December of that year a „backchannel‟ was opened between the newly 
elected Alliance government and the MCP in the jungle-edge town of Baling on the Thai 
border. The MCP revealed that they wished to end their struggle with the granting of an 
amnesty, as well as seeking political legitimacy for the MCPs programme at the next 
election. The government delegation, led by Chief Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman, 
dismissed these demands (unsurprising, given the level of briefing he had received from 
the British beforehand). As a consequence, negotiations disintegrated and no deal was 
reached, but the very conduct of this meeting in itself demonstrated a willingness to 
ensure a managed political end to the conflict, and reveals a historic legacy of the British 
opening a „backchannel‟ with insurgents in order to try and attain a negotiated settlement 
long before the controversies surrounding secret talks with the IRA in the 1970s. 
 
By early 1956 Malaya was set on a course for independence. A conference in London 
set the date of 31 August 1957 as independence, or Merdeka, day. The interim period 
would see a gradual withdrawal of British personnel and the fledgling Malayan 
government take up more powers as the British ceded them. This would ensure a smooth 
full transfer of power the following year, when the Union Jack was lowered in Kuala 
Lumpur on the exact date set eighteen months earlier. By ensuring that Malaya became a 
sovereign state on its own terms, Britain undermined the entire MCP insurgency by 
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doing exactly what it least expected them to do. As Robert Thompson astutely observed: 
„[Chin Peng] started a war to kick out the British Imperialists – and now there aren‟t 
any. We‟ve not been kicked out – we‟ve left, head high, and it‟s the British who gave 
Independence to Malaya, not Chin Peng.‟22 Such other attempts at undermining an 
insurgency can be witnessed in the numerous efforts to establish devolved government‟s 
at Stormont in Northern Ireland, and most recently the creation of an elected post-
Saddam government in Iraq. The devolution of powers to indigenous authorities paves 
the way for a military withdrawal – but a successful devolution only comes when the 
military campaign has been satisfactorily concluded. 
 
 
The Military Response to the Malayan Emergency 
 
Two days before the Emergency was declared, Lieutenant-Colonel John Dalley, head of 
the Malayan Security Service, wrote a memo stating: „At the time of writing there is no 
immediate threat to internal security in Malaya…‟23 Internal intelligence analysis had 
completely misinterpreted the intentions and strength of the MCP and as a result all 
branches of authority in Malaya were unprepared for the beginning of the insurgency. 
The intelligence services had little gauge of MCP numbers or organizational structure, 
largely because pre-Emergency intelligence had focussed on the potential threat of 
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Malay nationalism.
24
 The Malayan police were in an equal state of unreadiness, lacking 
adequate weaponry, communication equipment, vehicles and personnel. The army was 
also unprepared to fight. Counter-insurgency, at this stage, was not a central operational 
tenet of the British army, despite recent experiences in Palestine. This cause was not 
helped by a psychology of arrogance on behalf of the military hierarchy. On 6 July 1948 
Major-General Bower, the General Officer Commanding (GOC) Malaya, declared in a 
broadcast: „I have had experience fighting red terrorists in Greece and India, and I can 
tell you this is by far the easiest problem I have ever tackled.‟25 This belief was to prove 
unfounded as the British constructed a campaign designed in increments, often 
haphazardly, which eventually created a „minimum force/maximum output‟ military 
strategy based on local intelligence, all of which was politically managed and controlled 
from London. Yet this was all slowly implemented, with gradual effectiveness, negating 
the impact that a swift military response would have had on an infant insurgency. 
 
 
At the outset of the Emergency there were just ten battalions of troops in Malaya – three 
Malay, two British and five Ghurkha – totalling no more than 4,000 combat-ready 
troops.
26
 Significantly, this was almost the same number of MCP guerrillas who had 
taken to the jungle after the Malayan police, some 9,000 strong in 1948, had made initial 
raids on known communist encampments. By the end of August 1948 up to 4,500 people 
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had been arrested, not only for MCP membership but as part of a general crackdown on 
the entire left, including the trade unions, in an attempt to prevent any kind of solidarity 
action by movements sympathetic to the MCP cause.  
 
The army still appeared to be in a World War Two mindset, fixed on a conventional 
approach of large sweeps through the jungle that were heard long in advance by the 
guerrillas. The thick jungle of Malaya, which covered around 80 per cent of the entire 
country, rendered traditional army weaponry and tactics useless. Air monopoly meant 
little until the SAS began to use parachute jumps as a means of troop deployment, as 
close combat became the only means of engagement with the enemy. This insurgency 
was to be a steep learning curve for the British, and represents the genesis of their slow 
learning, slow burning legacy in counter-insurgency campaigns. 
 
The Briggs Plan 
Thankfully for the British, despite the short-comings of their initial strategic planning, 
the insurgents displayed an unwillingness to attack guarded targets. The MPABA had 
retreated into the jungle in late 1948 to undergo a self-enforced period of reorganisation, 
training and tactical revision in the wake of the initial British response. They emerged 
from the jungle as the renamed Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA), a name 
change arguably instigated to ensure a more catchall base of support. By the end of 1949 
MRLA offensives rose to an average of 400 a month compared to 100 in the spring of 
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that year.
27
 By early 1950, as John Coates as stated, „the tide of insurgency began to 
flood out of control‟.28 The number of incidents directed against colonial capitalist 
interests, their workers, and British army troops rose to 221 in February alone, hitting a 
peak of 571 in October the same year. It was this rapid increase in attacks that sparked 
calls, again especially from the ex-patriot planting community, that a military Director 
of Operations be appointed to co-ordinate the military side of the counter-insurgency 
campaign.   
 
Lieutenant-General Sir Harold Briggs was appointed to this new post on 3 April 1950, 
and he immediately embarked on a swift nationwide tour to build up a picture of the 
state of the British campaign. His findings were formalised in a subsequent report, 
known simply as the Briggs Plan, which was delivered to the authorities in May 1950.
29
 
The essence of the plan was the belief that the insurgency could be defeated if the 
terrorists were cut off from their support base. By severing the link between the MCP 
guerrillas and the Min Yuen, the insurgent campaign would be cut off from its food and 
information supply. This could be achieved via a more coherent and systematic 
resettlement campaign then the previously „haphazard and inefficient‟ scheme for the 
squatters.
30
 Entirely new Resettlement Areas were to be constructed, with new huts built 
for squatters who were granted the land deeds for their plot. Sanitation and medical 
facilities were provided for these newly constructed communities. However, it must be 
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remembered that they functioned as a tool of population control and coercion. Despite 
being depicted as a central tenet of the „hearts and minds‟ campaign, the movements of 
those re-housed in Resettlement Areas were severely restricted outside the barbed wire 
perimeter fence. The forcible resettlement of hitherto rural and isolated squatters into 
self-contained social units, where the political framework was defined by the 
government, resulted in a coercive acquiescence towards the British agenda for 
Malaya.
31
  
 
Between 1950 and 1960 more than 500 resettlement areas were built, 400 of which were 
constructed in the first two years, witnessing the movement of over 400,000 people – 
four-fifths of the entire amount relocated during the entire Emergency.
32
 However, 
victory never seemed assured after the initiation of resettlement. MRLA activity and 
numbers (8,000 by 1951) continued to grow and intensify, peaking with the audacious 
assassination of the High Commissioner, Sir Henry Gurney, on 6 October 1951. This 
added to an increased sense of British despondency. By early to mid-1951 progress in 
„clearing‟ areas of insurgents was slow and political hopes of a military success had 
faded. This view is reflected in the cabinet discussions held at the time. The Defence 
Minister, Emmanuel Shinwell, lamented the „little, if any progress‟ being made33; the 
Chief of the Imperial General Staff, General Slim, aired his views that the „situation in 
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Malaya is still far from satisfactory‟34; and Briggs himself, who was brought before the 
cabinet twice, was forced to admit that his plan was „proceeding far too slowly.‟35 His 
resettlement plan may not have functioned as effectively as was hoped, but that was not 
the extent of Briggs‟ contribution. He had laid the foundations for eventual future 
success and had ensured that the military strategy employed in Malaya took account of 
the political nature of the conflict. This acknowledgment was evident in one of his first 
actions as Director of Operations. The establishment of the Federal Joint Intelligence 
Advisory Committee in May 1950 centralised and co-ordinated intelligence collection, 
evaluation and dissemination. In the same vein, Briggs oversaw the creation of the 
Federal War Council to ensure cross-service co-ordination and liaison for the counter-
insurgency campaign, including civil, police and military figures. District and State War 
Executive Committees (DWECs and SWECs) were also set up to implement plans 
locally.
36
 The accumulative result of these initiatives was to greatly improve the 
administrative ability to deal with operations effectively and vastly improve the 
intelligence on which military decisions and political priorities could be made. Despite a 
lack of total success, Briggs should be accredited with launching „the insurgent 
organization on an irreversible slide towards destruction.‟37 Yet it still remains indictable 
that it took over two years into the insurgency before a comprehensive strategy was fully 
enunciated. Again, we can see the germinal origins of twentieth-century slow burning 
British counter-insurgency planning manifest itself. 
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In the early years of the Emergency security force operations were characterised by 
„search and destroy‟ missions based on a dearth of intelligence.38 Indeed, the majority of 
British troops who served in Malaya were young men on compulsory national service 
with no combat experience. Even among the older hands there were few with jungle 
experience. From this rather unpromising start, the British military were slow to shift 
tactical and operational gears. So why the common perception of Malaya as an 
outstanding exemplar of counter-insurgency success? According to John Nagl, the 
British succeeded in Malaya, specifically in contrast to the American failure in Vietnam, 
because the British army had an organisational culture akin to a „learning institution‟, 
whereby the army quickly adapted to counter-insurgency conditions and changed tactics 
accordingly.
39
 The array of operational experiences the British army has undergone, 
from limited to total war, has arguably led to a greater degree of pragmatism in its 
military outlook. A dogmatic adherence to rigid military doctrine has been absent.  
However, this does not explain, nor should it detract, from the languid application of 
appropriate irregular warfare tactics and the absence of swift strategic design.  
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By 1950 the number of battalions in Malaya had risen from ten to just thirteen, nearly all 
of which were under strength.
40
 In 1953 the number had reached twenty-four, perhaps 
one of the most important additions being that of the reconstituted Special Air Service 
(SAS). Malaya marked the first outing of the reformed Special Forces unit since the end 
of World War Two. An ad hoc group of war veterans and army regulars had formed the 
first British fighting force in Malaya known as the Ferret Force. This was superseded by 
Brigadier Mike Calvert‟s Malayan Scouts, an SAS group that was better equipped for 
jungle-based counter-insurgency. By 1955 the number of SAS troops operating in 
Malaya numbered some 560, divided into five squadrons.
41
 Utilised as a complementary 
unit to the wider military effort, the SAS fulfilled a narrow, yet crucial, tactical role in 
Malaya and would continue to do so in future counter-insurgencies. However, reliance 
on Special Force success does little to fulfil the pervasive policing and security role 
required of the regular military in counter-insurgency campaigns. Despite this, those 
close to the SAS attribute the turning of the tide of the Emergency to the introduction of 
the regiment. General Sir Peter de la Billiere, a new recruit in Malaya and future 
Director of the SAS, asserts that it was the SAS „who alone had the ability to patrol for 
long periods in the deep jungle to which the terrorists had retreated.‟42 Although such a 
view contains an element of truth, such a narrow and proudly regimental assessment 
risks allowing the SAS to take the glory for the patient, steady soldiering of the 
mainstream British army, the painstaking intelligence-gathering process, and the 
political emphasis on the „hearts and minds‟ approach. Nevertheless, Malaya would 
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prove just how important Special Forces operations would become to British strategy in 
future counter-insurgency campaigns.  
 
Arguably, before Briggs‟ shake up of the administrative system that called for closer 
civilian-military ties, the army had failed to adopt an appropriate structure for low 
intensity conflict, had failed to set realistic goals in terms of the time scale of operations, 
and did not acknowledge that command needed to be shared with civilian politicians. 
The combination of troop shortages and lack of strategic cohesion resulted in what 
Richard Stubbs has pointed to as a fundamental security paradox, whereby the security 
forces „were clearly unable to protect the bulk of the population, especially those in the 
more remote rural areas, from guerrilla pressures, but at the same time they expected full 
co-operation from those people in rooting out the communists.‟43 By the spring of 1950 
the MRLA were recruiting more members than were being killed or captured as the 
police seemed impotent to halt the murder of civilians. As a result of this much debate 
has been created regarding the issue of „tie-down ratios‟ between British troops and 
MRLA insurgents. Richard Clutterbuck is keen to point out that many commentators 
who cite „tie-down ratios‟ in order to depict the overwhelming strength of British 
numbers fail to take into account that just over half of a battalion‟s strength is made up 
of actual combat troops, with the rest providing logistical support and supply tasks. Up 
until 1952, Clutterbuck argues, the ratio of insurgents to actual combat troops was 
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evenly matched (4,000 each in 1948, 8,000 by 1951).
44
 As the Emergency gradually 
turned in the British favour in 1952 only then did the British develop a 2:1 majority 
ratio, much lower than other estimates that fail to take into account such calculations.
45
 
Again, this contributes to a wider picture of inadequate strategic planning. Yet such 
deficiencies would be robustly addressed with the arrival of General Gerald Templer. 
 
 
The Templer Effect 
The figure of Sir Gerald Templer divides the historiography of the Malayan Emergency 
more than any other issue. Reviled by some for being little more than „an enthusiastic 
Boy Scout‟46 who presided over a „temporary dictatorship‟47, he was in equal measure 
revered by others as a man whose „energy, infectious enthusiasm and drive‟48 earned 
him the epithet „the Tiger of Malaya.‟49  
 
The death of Gurney and the retirement of Briggs soon after created an opportunity for 
the new Conservative government to unify the civilian and military command under one 
post in an attempt to strengthen the counter-insurgency effort. Templer was eventually 
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appointed as dual High Commissioner and Director of Operations in February 1952. 
Upon his arrival in Malaya he openly committed himself to the central tenets of the 
Briggs Plan as the mainstay of this own tenure in office. However, Templer succeeded 
where Briggs‟ own plan was floundering due to his injection of urgency into the 
campaign. As Anthony Short puts it: „In a word, Templer can be said to have energised 
the situation‟.50 Yet inspirational leadership has its flipside, and Templer‟s no-nonsense 
approach in some quarters created a negative backlash as some communities resented 
increasingly stringent food rations, curfews and detentions that Templer had instigated. 
Templer was acutely aware of the need to utilise local intelligence and win round local 
populations as the key to victory in the insurgency. As John Coates observes, Templer 
„grasped firmly that he was engaged in a contest for government with the MCP and that 
the war would be lost if it were left to the soldiers and the police.‟51 To this extent, 
Templer acknowledged that if political progress, through constitutional concessions, 
were to be made then the rural Chinese population must be part of the process, ensuring 
that the voting franchise was extended to the ethnic Chinese. Furthermore, Malay chief 
executives were installed in every state in an attempt by Templer to foster the emergence 
of moderate political movements, especially as independence became increasingly 
likely. The United Malays National Organization (UMNO) and the Malayan Chinese 
Association (MCA) were the two most prominent groupings, particularly the latter as it 
aimed to become a non-communist alternative for the Chinese community. This political 
strategy was to be a potent one in undermining the MCP‟s insurgency. The UMNO and 
the MCA united to form the Alliance Party in 1954, and in the first federal elections that 
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were held in June 1955 they won 51 of the 52 seats. The new Chief Minister, Alliance 
leader Tunku Abdul Rahman, was eager to quicken the pace of full independence, 
however, the British security forces, aided by an increasingly growing Malayan army, 
still had to kill-off the military side of the campaign before the cessation of colonial rule 
could be achieved. 
 
Undeniably, the counter-insurgency campaign swung massively in favour of the British 
as the MRLA crumbled into a dwindling force of beleaguered guerrillas. During 
Templer‟s time in post between 1952 and 1954, insurgent incidents fell from 500 to 
fewer than 100 a month.
52
 But one of the main questions is the extent to which Templer 
himself can personally take the credit for this outcome. His bold leadership style, his 
appreciation that there should be an intricate marriage between normal and Emergency 
government activities, and his emphasis on „hearts and minds‟ within the Chinese 
population all helped strengthen British confidence and helped build a more coherent 
counter-insurgency campaign, from a military, political and intelligence perspective. 
John Nagl asserts that: „It is difficult to overstate the impact that Templer… had on the 
course of the Emergency.‟53 Arguably, the opposite is true: it is easy to overstate 
Templer‟s role. His high profile and blustering style may have made him the personal 
embodiment of success, however, Templer was in fact improving and modifying tactics 
established by Briggs. It was Briggs who had first initiated a much-needed overhaul of 
the intelligence system, had first introduced a professional propaganda campaign, and 
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had made political overtures to the Chinese population. In this sense, Karl Hack‟s 
argument that the counter-insurgency campaign had already reached its turning point 
before Templer‟s arrival has credence.54 Templer has been credited with too much. For 
example, the MCP‟s October Directives (discussed fully in the next section), which 
reverted MRLA tactics away from guerrilla attacks to political education in October 
1951, were not made public until December 1952. The resulting lull in MRLA violence 
between these dates (from 6,000 incidents in 1951 to 3,700 in 1952) was thus wrongly 
perceived as a side-effect of Templer‟s strong and effective leadership.55 Yet, neither 
should this argument be seen as an attempt to wholly shift credit away from Templer to 
Briggs. Agent-centric accounts are unrewarding in terms of allowing us to see the wider 
picture, the percolation of initiatives and changes throughout the military, intelligence 
and political structures. Furthermore, they fail to take into account decisions and actions 
taken by agents external to the British counter-insurgency outfit, as the October 
Directives episode proves. We must be pragmatic about the role of Templer in relation 
to counter-insurgency success in Malaya. As John Coates rightly points out: „one must 
not overestimate the contribution of one man… (despite the fact that he) succeeded 
beyond anyone‟s expectations.‟56 As the arguments surrounding Templer demonstrate, it 
is essential that we avoid being what I would label „internally agent-centric‟ and fail to 
account for the actions, for example, of indigenous forces. 
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Use of the Indigenous Troops and Police 
The local population plays an essential role in any counter-insurgency campaign. 
Intelligence gathering is made easier by the natural trust between indigenous forces and 
local communities. Furthermore, indigenous forces understand the often complex tribal 
loyalties and relationships that frequently determine access to information or decision-
making, all of which, despite language skills and „hearts and minds‟ emphasis, will 
always remain alien to outside forces. John Nagl goes as far as to suggest that „on their 
own, foreign forces cannot defeat an insurgency; the best they can hope for is to create 
the conditions that will enable local forces to win it for them.‟57 The British authorities 
were to become acutely aware of this necessity.  
 
In order to boost troop numbers and immediately strengthen the counter-insurgency 
campaign, a Special Constabulary was established, largely as a means of providing 
security for Malaya‟s approximate 3,000 rubber estates. Initial hopes of recruiting up to 
15,000 men were soon surpassed as nearly 24,000 had enrolled by September 1948, 
reaching a peak of 41,000 by late 1952.
58
 However, the almost exclusive Malay make up 
of this force combined with the lack of security offered to Chinese owned estates, 
aroused resentment and mistrust amongst the Chinese community. This was exacerbated 
by the Manpower Regulations of February 1951, which required young Chinese men to 
enrol for service in the police force. This highly controversial and unpopular measure 
                                                          
57
 Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, p.xiv. 
58
 Short, The Communist Insurrection, pp.124-125. 
106 
 
prompted many to evade the authorities, some even by returning to China. Eventually 
just 2,000 Chinese were drafted into the police under these regulations. Nevertheless, the 
special constabulary was crucial in fulfilling a low-key security role that would free up 
regular army troops for larger operations. 
 
Briggs was aware of the need to ensure the support of the non-communist Chinese 
population and to involve them in the counter-insurgency campaign. A Home Guard 
organisation was developed, which simultaneously played upon the fears the Chinese 
population had of being intrinsically stereotyped as communist guerrillas, whilst 
distinguishing the Guard from normal security forces, thus undermining views that 
members were traitors voluntarily aiding the British occupiers. Resettlement areas were 
encouraged to establish a Home Guard unit, and once the District Officer became 
assured of its loyalty they were distributed with shotguns. Units would then report the 
names and movements of those in their area in an attempt to identify possible Min Yuen 
activists. In larger towns, domestic Chinese auxiliary police units were formed. 
However, both forces were chronically short of arms, and were largely out of police 
control. Even 400 Chinese were recruited to become detectives in the regular police. 
Although pay incentives were given, by Briggs‟ own admission they were of „poor 
quality‟.59 By 1953, however, the ranks of the Home Guard had swelled to 250,000 
eighteen to fifty-five year olds, most of whom were Malay, but an extra 50,000 Chinese 
were enlisted on the orders of Templer to ensure a non-communist influence on their 
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fellow Chinese.
60
 However, the training and effectiveness of the Home Guard units has 
led Anthony Short to conclude that: „the presence of Home Guard was not necessarily to 
be equated with the security of a New Village‟, despite being responsible for the 
protection of seventy-two New Villages by the end of 1953.
61
 An overhaul of the Home 
Guard in 1956 saw the remnants of the units being stood down and placed on unarmed 
duties, however, the experiment with armed civilian units was an essential one as it 
demonstrated that the British trusted the Malayans enough to guard themselves and their 
communities from the insurgent threat therefore depicting counter-insurgency as a 
nationwide team-effort. 
 
Another essential demographic group that the British needed to win round were the 
jungle aborigines, the orang asli, whose importance to the counter-insurgency campaign 
increased when a revised government estimate of their numbers leaped from 34,000 to 
somewhere between 68-100,000. There jungle dwellings placed them in a natural 
proximity to the insurgents and maintained the ability to pass food and supplies should 
they be willing. The British response was to employ aborigines as intelligence gatherers, 
made possible by the construction of so-called jungle forts where British forces were 
based and able to liaise with aborigines as to MRLA movement in the jungle. Groups of 
jungle natives who had been resettled were returned to their original dwellings as early 
as 1951 in order to fill erstwhile intelligence vacuums in the jungle. Their natural jungle 
craft and survival skills made the aborigines more adapt at tracking insurgent movement 
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than British security forces, an acknowledged reality when by 1956 aborigines formed 
armed auxiliary police units and were sent to track MCP couriers through the jungle. In 
the final years of the Emergency a 300-strong aboriginal unit known as Senoi Pra’ak 
(„Fighting People‟) killed more insurgents than the rest of the security forces 
combined.
62
 Indigenous help was thus essential in low-key and prominent ways. 
 
Although superior manpower is obviously important, strength in numbers does not win 
an insurgency alone. Military flexibility and innovation is also essential, either when 
reacting to an attack or when taking the offensive to the enemy. The British belatedly 
acknowledged this in Malaya by adopting a number of tactical measures. The 
establishment of the Far Eastern Land Forces Training Centre (FTC) – commonly 
known as the Jungle Warfare School – helped foster, for the first time in the British 
army‟s history, a counter-insurgency military ethos. The doctrine that emerged from the 
school was enshrined in the ATOM manual (officially titled „The Conduct of Anti-
Terrorist Operations in Malaya‟), which effectively became the British army‟s counter-
insurgency handbook. Such tactical innovations, combined with increased cross-branch 
liaison with the intelligence and political communities introduced by Briggs, ensured 
greater steps towards formalising a British approach to counter-insurgency campaigns. 
Implicit in this was an acknowledgement of the prolonged temporal context of counter-
insurgency. Indeed, the Operations Research Section (ORS) of the Director of 
Operations staff estimated that it took approximately 1,800 hours of patrolling to catch 
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one insurgent in Malaya.
63
 This ratio required not only an ethos of patience within the 
military, but also the cultivation of an effective intelligence network. 
 
 
‘Malaya is an Intelligence War’64 
In the years prior to the Emergency, intelligence was „Britain‟s Achilles heel‟.65 
Intelligence agencies, especially the Malayan Security Service (MSS) were unprepared 
for the MCP‟s adoption of revolutionary guerrilla warfare. The intelligence and security 
agencies jealously guarded their own fiefdoms. Co-operation was lacking in the early 
Emergency years, even to the extent that the director of the MSS, John Dalley, was 
refused permission to attend meetings of the Joint Intelligence Committee of the Far 
East.
66
 The reorganisation of such a chaotic intelligence system was thus initiated in 
August 1948, whereby the MSS was scrapped and its responsibilities passed to Malaya‟s 
newly created police Special Branch. However, Special Branch‟s effectiveness was to be 
compromised by a lack of resources and manpower. At its inception it had just twelve 
officers and forty-four inspectors. Briggs began his tenure as Director of Operations by 
initiating another intelligence review in 1950, which included a recruitment drive for 
Special Branch. By 1953 they had 123 officers and 195 inspectors, most of whom were 
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ex-patriots with experience in other British colonies, mainly Palestine.
67
 Conscious  of 
the importance of intelligence to winning the Emergency, General Sir John Harding, 
Commander in Chief of the Far East Land Forces, conceded in 1950 that: „Our greatest 
weakness now is the lack of early and accurate information of the enemy‟s strengths, 
dispositions and intentions.‟68 Aware of the intelligence short-comings, Briggs 
established a federal Intelligence Advisory Committee to improve the co-ordination of 
intelligence on the insurgents in May 1950. Sir William Jenkin was appointed Director 
of Intelligence (DOI) in August that year, charged with police, but not military or 
intelligence operations – a move perhaps reflecting the initial inclination of the political 
authorities to turn to special military operations rather than to the intelligence services as 
the first weapon to beat the insurgents. It would take until 1952 for both the political and 
military communities to realise that intelligence held the key to „winning‟ in Malaya. 
General Templer, himself a former Director of Military Intelligence, acknowledged as 
much when he stated upon his arrival in 1952 that the Emergency „will be won by our 
intelligence system.‟69  Yet this represented a distinct case of closing the door once the 
horse has bolted.  
 
The arrival of Colonel Arthur Young as Commissioner of Police in April 1952 saw 
Templer grant Special Branch more independence. In the same month Jack Morton, 
formerly the MI5 station chief in Singapore, became DOI and oversaw the long-needed 
amalgamation of police and military intelligence. Furthermore, Templer ensured the 
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placement of Military Intelligence Officers in Special Branch in order to identify and 
disseminate operational intelligence regarding immediate insurgent movements, 
particularly that generated from surrendered enemy personnel (SEP). This union of 
police and military intelligence brokered long-standing differences in intelligence 
priorities that had previously hindered the counter-insurgency effort. As Sir Henry 
Gurney observed as far back as February 1949: „In this sort of thing troops are useless 
without police.‟70 This was to be a lesson that the British would have to re-learn in 
subsequent insurgencies despite the delayed appreciation of the axiomatic nature of such 
inter-agency co-operation. 
 
By 1957, the intelligence services were employing four main tactics in Malaya: agents 
within the Min Yuen; non-communist informers; air reconnaissance over cleared areas; 
and SEP intelligence.
71
 The importance of this strategy was not lost on the political 
elites. In 1955, in the wake of an Empire-wide report into British intelligence 
capabilities by General Templer, the Colonial Office established its own Intelligence and 
Security Department manned by MI5 officials. In three years fifty-seven visits were 
made to twenty-seven colonies, during which local Special Branches were established 
and specialist training given to local intelligence officers. By 1957 1,866 police officers 
were seconded to intelligence duties across the British Empire, excluding Malaya.
72
 
Such an expansion of numbers and training across colonies would prove vital not only as 
Britain embarked upon a retreat from Empire in the shadow of colonial insurgencies, but 
                                                          
70
 TNA, CO 537/4750, „Personal and Confidential memo from Sir Henry Gurney to Mr Creech-Jones, 
Colonial Secretary‟, 28 February 1949. 
71
 Aldrich, The Hidden Hand, p.510. 
72
 Ibid, p.517. 
112 
 
also in the wider Cold War context as the „value of residual Empire‟ became apparent.73 
Indeed, much of this value was placed upon enduring intelligence networks, particularly 
in the strategically sensitive region of East Asia. British success in Malaya thus took on 
a wider significance, in military, political as well as intelligence terms.  
 
Intelligence was always the starting point for every military and police operation, and 
the majority of this intelligence was gleaned from surrendered enemy personnel. Many 
SEP were „turned‟ by the British and placed in the newly created Special Operations 
Volunteer Force (SOVF), established by Templer in July 1953. Some of these „running 
dogs‟ – as ex-communist informers were known – provided on-going advice as to the 
intentions and tactics of their former colleagues. Some SEP were deployed on lecture 
tours as part of an orchestrated propaganda campaign in order to display signs of 
rehabilitation and dissuade other ethnic Chinese from joining the ranks of the MRLA. 
Far more dangerously, other SEP were returned to their old guerrilla units and planted as 
agents. This was a high risk strategy, especially given the notoriously brutal MCP 
internal security units who ran so-called „traitor-killing camps‟ to eliminate the enemy 
within.
74
 Significant cash payments and the threat of execution were usually enough to 
turn a SEP from an informant into an agent, coercively fostering what Tim Harper has 
labelled „a confessional kind of politics‟75 that epitomised the life and death bargaining 
so symptomatic in counter-insurgencies. By May 1954 there were twelve SOVF 
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platoons, totalling nearly 300 men, who had managed to kill twelve insurgents and prove 
their worth as a source of intelligence and assassination. When questioned about the 
military discipline of SOVF units, General Templer retorted: „To hell with drill. We 
want them to handle weapons and lay ambushes.‟76 As the tide turned against the MRLA 
the number of SEP offering aid to the British increased to a peak of forty a month by 
1957.
77
 The one thing more useful than a dead insurgent was one willing to switch sides. 
As head of Special Branch Guy Madoc succinctly stated: „Defeating the Emergency 
depended on intelligence.‟78 This dependence was complimented to a large extent by the 
attempted employment of politicised „hearts and minds‟ operations, which was as much 
a coercive process as it was a conciliatory one.  
 
‘Hearts and Minds’ and Propaganda 
It is eminently more practical in a counter-insurgency to encourage the guerrillas to 
surrender their arms and divulge information simply than to kill them. That is why the 
psychological battle against the insurgents and the „hearts and minds‟ campaign 
conducted towards the wider population to steer them away from insurgent propaganda 
was as important as the military and intelligence battle. The biggest difficulty in this 
respect was persuading the ethnic Chinese that their interests were best provided by an 
independent Malaya rather than a communist state. This must be seen in several 
contexts: firstly, the recent and rapid independence granted to India and Burma; and 
secondly, the establishment of the People‟s Republic of China and the official 
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recognition this communist government received from the British in January 1950. The 
impact of this last factor will be discussed in relation to its effect on the insurgents later. 
However, it certainly made the wording of anti-communist propaganda a more delicate 
process thereafter. According to Susan Carruthers, the propaganda tactics employed 
during the Emergency „reveals much about the British government‟s determination to 
manage the presentation of terrorism in a fashion which accorded with its own political 
objectives.‟79 To this extent, the authorities had a dual-track approach to propaganda: it 
must induce insurgents to surrender, and it must dissuade the public from sympathising 
with, or joining, the insurgents.  
 
One of the earliest propaganda tools was the simple distribution of anti-insurgent leaflets 
- 50 million in 1949 alone.
80
 The effectiveness of this method is witnessed by the MCP‟s 
directive that made it an offence punishable by death for one of their members to so 
much as pick them up off the jungle floor. In the early stages of the Emergency, 
propaganda was the responsibility of the Department of Public Relations, which had a 
staff of 200. However, questions were raised over their approach. Not only were there 
concerns about the overtly Western style to psychological warfare, but also worries 
about the emphasis on written pamphlets in a country where low literacy rates were rife 
among the target rural population. To professionalize the propaganda campaign, Briggs 
oversaw the creation of the Emergency Information Service (EIS) based in Kuala 
Lumpur in June 1950 to manage and disseminate propaganda at a federal level. Yet the 
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arrival of General Templer in 1952 saw him merge the EIS with other existing 
propaganda bodies to form the Department of Information in an attempt to rationalise 
propaganda distribution. Under Alec Peterson (whose 1952 report on the organisation of 
Information Services in Malaya provided the framework for restructuring
81
) the unit 
initiated a huge increase in the quantity of pamphlets being distributed – 93 million in 
1953, rising to over 100 million in 1956.
82
 Clearly, the initial phase of the government‟s 
propaganda campaign relied heavily on the printed press. Aside from pamphlet 
distribution, a key component was utilising the Malayan tradition of newspapers being 
read aloud in public to maximise the spread of the government‟s message. This is 
significant given that in 1951 the government published over five million copies of 
newspapers or periodicals.
83
 Yet by the end of that year it became obvious that radio 
now held a sway over a population reaping the financial dividends of the Korean War 
boom. Private listener licences leaped from 35,000 in 1949 to 110,800 in 1953, whilst 
over the same period the number of community receivers installed in resettlement areas 
rose from 32 to 1,400.
84
 Radio could reach those rural communities where the battle for 
hearts and minds became crucial. Another key tactic in this front of the counter-
insurgency campaign was the use of „voice aircraft‟, which would fly over the jungle 
broadcasting messages to the insurgents, urging them to surrender. As the war began to 
turn against the MRLA after 1952 and morale severely dipped, the effectiveness of this 
method became obvious. In 1955, questioning revealed that 100 per cent of surrendered 
enemy personnel stated that they had heard propaganda being broadcast from voice 
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aircraft, many of whom agreed that what they heard played a large role in their decision 
to surrender and offer intelligence.
85
  
 
Inducement of insurgent surrender was also attempted by the implementation of a 
controversial, yet ultimately successful, rewards policy by the colonial authorities. 
Monetary payment was offered in order to encourage the divulging of information on 
insurgent location or future operations. This was not a widely welcomed policy, either 
politically or militarily. The morality of paying considerable sums of money to „turned‟ 
insurgents was raised by police and government officials, in particular after one high 
profile incident during Operation Cobble in 1956 when a Min Yuen member turned 
police informer, leading to the ambush and killing of three insurgents – information for 
which the informer was paid M$12,000, seventeen times the average annual Malayan 
income.
86
 Initiated by Hugh Carleton-Greene, head of the Emergency Information 
Service (EIS), and significantly expanded by General Templer, the rewards policy had 
constituted a sliding scale of payments for information depending upon the rank of the 
insurgent captured or killed – ranging from M$2,000 for a rank and file insurgent up to 
M$60,000 for Chin Peng, the Secretary-General of the MCP.
87
 By June 1952 the policy 
had distributed M$2million in reward money, with a tangible number of people coming 
forward with information, leading to direct operational results. As Kumar Ramakrishna 
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concludes, the rewards policy was „a psywar [psychological warfare] weapon of 
considerable potency‟ even if it was „a most moral expedient.‟88 
 
It had been argued in some quarters that the „hearts and minds‟ strategy operating in 
Malaya was not a conscious and deliberate move by the political and military 
authorities, but a strategy that „evolved slowly and gradually out of the basic good nature 
of the soldiers involved.‟89 Such claims point, for example, to the unprompted medical 
treatment captured insurgents would receive from British troops and the dividends it 
would produce in terms of their consequent compliance and willingness to surrender 
information. This „benevolence argument‟, however, is undone by firstly assuming that 
the British counter-insurgency campaign rested on gentlemanly conduct, and secondly 
for failing to take into account that for every one insurgent who received medical 
treatment there were far more CTs and non-CTs galvanised by there experiences through 
forcible resettlement or detention without trial. A politically-motivated and instigated 
„hearts and minds‟ propaganda campaign had to be initiated from the top down in order 
to assuage some of the side-effects of other counter-insurgency tactics. To this extent, as 
Richard Stubbs rightly points out, the British adoption of both a „coercion and 
enforcement‟ strategy and a „hearts and minds‟ strategy „should not be considered in 
terms of a dichotomy but rather as two poles of a continuum.‟90 Both were essential in 
„cajoling‟ sympathisers into becoming informers whilst also inducing guerrillas to 
surrender. The two approaches provided a carrot and stick to British strategy, which 
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would come to have a profound effect on the MRLA and the indigenous Malayans. It 
would simply be too introspective to assert eventual victory over the MCP solely to the 
actions of the British military, political and intelligence communities alone. Their 
strategy was vital in contributing towards victory, however there were further external 
factors that must be taken into account if the insurgent defeat is to be fully and 
adequately explained. This helps fend off what has been a historiographical tendency to 
lay the credit for victory at the feet of certain British individuals, such as Templer or 
Briggs, without acknowledging that their initiatives only had the impact they did due to 
external factors such as the level of MCP support within the indigenous Malayan 
population, the external level of funding and solidarity the MCP was receiving; their 
organisational structure; and the particular Maoist rural guerrilla strategy they adopted.  
 
 
MRLA Organisation 
The Malayan Races Liberation Army was organised in a classic Maoist manner, 
constitutive of two main strands – the MRLA jungle-bound fighting force and its support 
and supply wing, the Min Yuen (People‟s Movement).91 When the Emergency broke out 
in 1948 around 9,000 communists were associated with the insurgency. Up to 3,000 
guerrillas took to the jungles to undertake attacks, ambushes and training, whilst the 
remainder served in a support capacity on the periphery of the jungle in order to fund, 
feed and arm the uprising.  
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Nominally led by Chin Peng, leader of the Malayan Communist Party, the initial 
incarnation of the insurgent movement, the Malayan People‟s Anti-British Army was 
organised into eight regiments. Yet after initial operational difficulties the MPABA 
retreated to the jungle to undergo a period of reorganisation and training. The group 
emerged as the MRLA in 1949 as a far more decentralised insurgent group, now based 
primarily upon semi-autonomous units of around fifty insurgents who were responsible 
for undertaking attacks within their particular rural area.
92
 Aside from the organisational 
changes wrought by the 1948-49 rejuvenation, perhaps the more significant implication 
was its eventually enhanced tactical potency. 
 
MRLA Strategy and Tactics 
It took the MRLA nearly a year after their re-emergence from the jungle in 1948-49 to 
assess their guerrilla tactics. A directive captured by the authorities revealed that in June 
1949 the insurgents had decided to concentrate two-thirds of their entire force over three 
areas in northern Malaya, with the remaining third allowed to form quasi-autonomous 
ten-man „killer squads‟, roaming across the south of the country.93 British security forces 
adopted their own tactics and troop deployments accordingly. However, one of the main 
strategic failings of the MRLA at this point was that it placed too much emphasis on 
terrorism at the expense of propaganda and political education. Consequently, they 
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failed to cultivate a wide base of ideological loyalty even among the Chinese 
demographic. 
 
By late 1951 the initial impetus given to the MCP by Mao Zedong‟s rise to power in a 
communist revolution in China had almost irretrievably slipped away. Another strategic 
revision had to be undertaken. Despite the chance assassination of the High 
Commissioner Sir Henry Gurney in October 1951, the MCP issued what would be 
known as the October Directives, which demonstrate an appreciation on behalf of the 
party hierarchy that victory would not be possible given previous strategy. The 
Directives subordinated military operations in favour of aggressive political activity 
amongst members that attempted to be inclusive of non-Chinese ethnicities. In short, it 
attempted to „expand and consolidate the mass organisations‟ to compliment their acts of 
terrorism.
94
 Yet it seemed too little too late. The accumulative effect of Briggs‟ 
resettlement programme, the impact of heightened British propaganda and Templer‟s 
effective organisational restructuring had taken the initiative away from the MCP. Thus 
perhaps the one factor that negated the slow and inept British response was the equally 
inept insurgency the MCP was attempting to prosecute. By the spring of 1953, Chin 
Peng relocated the command of the MRLA over the Thailand border in a move that 
tacitly acknowledged that the insurgency was crumbling. 
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A critical explanation for this turning tide arguably is the MRLAs „misapplication‟ of 
guerrilla strategy. In eagerly applying a Maoist approach to Malaya, the MCP 
misguidedly „saw the Malayan situation as analogous to the Chinese. Further, the MCP 
ignored or misread Mao‟s caution that “revolution must follow local laws and conditions 
to be successful.”‟95 Undoubtedly, the ethnic divide in Malaya made it even more 
difficult for the MCP to promulgate ideological revolution along Chinese lines, and this 
makes it even more unfathomable that, as the tide turned against them and their strategic 
short-comings became obvious, they did not abandon Mao‟s rural revolutionary maxim 
of using the villages to surround the towns and launch a renewed urban insurgency. 
Malaya had one of the highest levels of urbanisation in any South East Asian country
96
, 
and there were lax levels of security at government offices in Kuala Lumpur. 
Furthermore, Chinese-Malayans – the backbone of the MCP – were the majority ethnic 
group in ten of Malaya‟s fifteen largest cities, housing 43 per cent of Malaya‟s entire 
Chinese population.
97
 An urban campaign would certainly have caused more political 
and economic disruption for the British and further stretched the under-resourced 
military, however, the MCP had become so obsessed with mere survival that it failed to 
implement an effective strategic overhaul or undergo tactical innovation. The need to 
survive, as Sam Sarkesian points out, „forced the MCP and its armed elements deeper 
into the jungle, where they became increasingly vulnerable to British military 
operations.‟98 And at this point, the internal meets the external. The MCPs lack of 
support from an external benefactor, such as China or the USSR (as shall be shown 
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later) combined with a lack of grounding within the indigenous population and a failure 
to adopt strategy to the political and military situation played directly into the hands of 
the British. As a consequence, a inept insurgent opponent explains the outcome of the 
Malayan conflict as much as eventual British tactical measures. 
 
 
Internal Support for the MRLA 
The communist insurgency in Malaya was not a popular uprising. The lack of sizeable 
internal support for the MRLA can be explained firstly, by their lack of financial 
resources to harness the use of mass publication leaflets or radio transmitters, and 
secondly, and perhaps most crucially, because their political base was restricted, for 
ethnic and political reasons, to a small percentile of the entire Malayan population. 
Simply, they lacked popular support. The ideological roots of the MCP‟s insurgency 
were not based on widespread national disgruntlement with colonial rule, with high 
unemployment, or ethnic tensions. In short, the MCP‟s insurgency demonstrates, as a 
general rule-of-thumb, that a narrow, dogmatic political insurgency not immersed in 
common grievance is doomed to be restricted to minimum internal support and face the 
full backlash of the native majority. As Phillip Deery has noted, by the time the 
Emergency was declared, „the MCP was losing its grassroots support in urban areas 
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largely because of the assault on its key “front” organisations by the colonial 
authorities... The party‟s strength in rural areas... was limited and undependable.‟99 
 
Specific to the Malayan case, it is also important to remember that another factor 
restricting the expansion of MCP popular support was that the majority of Malayans 
were Muslim who found offence in the atheist tenets of communism. Furthermore, as 
Richard Stubbs acknowledges, in the context of the Korean War boom as Malayan tin 
and rubber became essential to the war effort there, „trying to organise a revolution is 
not easy in times of full employment‟.100 There was no financial incentive for non-
communist Malays to support the insurgency. Holistically, therefore, what emerges is an 
insurgency critically under-supported within the boundaries of the territory it aimed to 
control. It was to find little recompense in external support either. 
 
 
External Support for the MRLA 
Initial British suspicions fell upon the Soviet Union as being behind a Southeast Asian 
conspiracy to instigate communist revolutions, including within Malaya. The basis of 
this view stemmed from the MCP‟s involvement in the Calcutta Youth Conference for 
international communist parties in February 1948 where the Cominform purportedly 
instructed the MCP to initiate an insurgency. Yet this interpretation is based on 
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circumstantial evidence and fails to take into account the internal status and 
deliberations of the MCP itself. Furthermore, the international communist conspiracy 
argument does not take into account Chin Peng‟s attempts to prevent the disintegration 
of the MCP in the wake of the revelation that his predecessor, Loi Tek, had been a 
British agent.
101
 If the Soviet Union had instigated the insurgency it remains odd that no 
Soviet arms, funding or military-political personnel were sent to ensure success. This 
would have almost certainly been an imperative, especially if the USSR wanted to 
ensure that a future communist Malaya fell under their influence and not, after 1949, that 
of Mao‟s China. It also fails to take into account the anti-colonial element. The MCP, 
like other anti-colonial insurgent groups, would likely have been influenced by India and 
Burma‟s recent independence from Britain. The metropole was not invincible.  
 
With no Soviet arms, the MRLA received no other sources of external support either. 
Significantly, there was no input from the Chinese Communist Party, before or after 
Mao‟s victory in the civil war. In late 1949 even the CIA was forced to admit that they 
had „no evidence of material support from the Chinese Communist Party‟, referring only 
to CCP „interest‟ in the Emergency.102 This is indicative of the Malayan Communist 
Party‟s fringe status in the international communist movement. It carried little weight 
and attracted little attention. As such, it therefore did not draw a sizeable external 
support network. This is perhaps one of the most critical disablers of the insurgency. As 
British counter-insurgency strategy reached a belated level of coherence by the end of 
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General Templer‟s leadership, the MRLA found itself increasingly isolated with a 
significantly curtailed ability to remain in contact with the Min Yuen, who in turn found 
it increasingly difficult to come by supplies. The absence of an external sponsor to 
provide rearmament, financial aid or political protection hindered the MRLA to the 
extent to which it lost the ability to maintain a level of tactical potency that had so 
shaken the colonial authorities in the early years. They became more vulnerable to 
precision jungle patrolling, especially after the introduction of the SAS. External support 
always supplies oxygen to the lifeblood of an insurgency. Without it, the communist 
insurgency in Malaya simply suffocated. 
 
  
The International Dimension 
At the outbreak of the Malayan Emergency in 1948 international attention was fixated 
upon Europe as the nascent Cold War manifested itself across the continent. The 
Truman Doctrine of „containment‟ dominated Western security dialogue as geo-strategic 
concerns overshadowed a seemingly minor colonial uprising in the corner of a moribund 
Empire. As the MCP instigated its insurgency in Malaya, the Berlin Blockade 
heightened superpower tensions; the Soviet‟s undertook a coup to overthrow the 
government of Czechoslovakia; the Marshall Plan to revive Europe‟s economy was 
divisively promulgating anti-communism across the continent; whilst the Iron Curtain 
was fast shutting itself between East and West. As a result, events in Southeast Asia 
were simply not on the strategic radar of the United States in 1948, who, despite the 
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extant presence of armed communist uprisings in the region, were in Ritchie Ovendale‟s 
words „unwilling to contemplate any major effort... American naivety and selfishness 
were particularly evident.‟103 But the Korean War would change that attitude. 
 
The Korean War catalysed American entry into partnership alongside Britain and France 
in assuming responsibility for the security of Southeast Asia.
104
 Military intervention in 
Korea also crystallised American conceptions of a regional „domino theory‟ whereby 
one communist takeover would trigger its neighbours to fall the same way. Malaya thus 
became part of the wider American picture of states susceptible to succumb to 
communism and the Emergency was soon deemed important enough to warrant the State 
Department‟s attention. Interestingly, the Americans appear to have been concerned 
about Malaya in the context not of the MRLA triumphing in its own right but 
specifically in relation to the way in which the Soviet Union or China could use it as a 
regional foothold. Indeed, it appears to have been Chinese and not Soviet influence after 
1949 that the Americans feared most. As the Director of the Philippine and Southeast 
Asian Affairs Office at the State Department, William S.B. Lacy, enunciated: „Malaya is 
likely to be invaded whenever the Chinese feel that they have digested Indo-China and 
Thailand.‟105 The State Department seemed almost perplexed by the lack of input or 
interference in Malaya from Moscow: „With its very large production of gold and with 
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what must be its huge quantities of weapons, it would seem the Soviet Union could do 
far more than it has done for the Communists in Indo-China, Burma, Malaya, the 
Philippines, etc.‟106 What emerges, therefore, is the international dimension of the 
Malayan Emergency being contextualised strongly within a Cold War framework. 
Latent American anti-colonialism was eclipsed in foreign policy terms by the ubiquity of 
anti-communism. To the Americans, Malaya was a small piece of a wider game that 
swung Washington‟s support behind the British counter-insurgency campaign and muted 
criticism of perceived British imperial reassertion (arguments that were in any case 
nullified when independence for Malaya became a political weapon to undermine the 
insurgent cause). American acquiescence to the British counter-insurgency efforts 
removed any significant diplomatic obstacles to the prosecution of the Emergency, 
allowing a fundamentally colonial campaign to be openly interpreted by Washington as 
an essential battle against communist expansionism.  
 
 
Reflections on Malaya 
The much-heralded US Army and Marine Corps counter-insurgency field manual FM3-
24 praised the British conduct during the Malayan Emergency as a historical campaign 
that „provides lessons applicable to combating any insurgency.‟107 However, as Hew 
                                                          
106
FRUS, „Memorandum by Mr Charlton Ogburn to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern 
Affairs (Rusk)‟, 15 January 1951, Vol. VI (1951), Asia and the Pacific (Part 1), p.6. 
107
 FM3-24: US Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2007), p.235. 
128 
 
Strachan points out, „the Americans... more than the British, have held up Malaya as a 
model.‟108 This chapter has called for a reappraisal of conceptions of Malayan „success‟ 
and attempts to redress the conventional agent-centric historiography of the Malayan 
Emergency, which concentrates primarily on British figures and fails to account for 
other factors. British counter-insurgency strategy alone was not enough to „win‟ the 
Malayan campaign. It was successful not solely for its own belatedly discovered merits 
but also because it favourably interacted with an insurgent group lacking in popular 
support and without external solidarity. The socio-economic conditions were not ripe 
enough for the MCP to advance with a widespread revolution, despite the misreading of 
the situation by the MCP politburo, whose flawed application of Maoist guerrilla 
strategy played into the hands of the British. Malaya acted as a crucible for British 
counter-insurgency strategy on a number of levels. It demonstrated that intelligence-
gathering networks must be efficient, cohesive and unified. This is essential as the 
groundwork for military operations, which themselves must be based on an ethos of 
minimum force, maximum output. Simply, the British did not storm into the jungle all 
guns blazing. Patience was a military virtue. Politically, Malaya displayed how the 
process of decolonisation necessitated a stage-managed withdrawal but only at a point 
when the military battle against the insurgents had been won. As far back as the first 
pieces of Emergency Legislation in 1948, the campaign in Malaya proved that some 
things have not changed in the way Britain deals with threats to its national security 
interest. Detention without trial, the necessity of „hearts and mind‟ amongst the local 
populace, and controversies surrounding abuse by British troops (most notoriously, the 
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execution of twenty-four unarmed detainees at Batang Kali on 12 December 1948), have 
a long heritage, and it is essential to place contemporary debates surrounding these 
issues in their historical context.
 109
 Yet the political management of Malaya was 
insubstantial in the crucial early years. As outgoing Colonial Secretary James Griffiths 
remarked to his incoming successor Oliver Lyttelton after the 1951 election, Malaya 
„has become a military problem to which we (the government) have not been able to find 
the answer.‟110  So despite the slow burning politico-military strategy, what makes 
Malaya stand out in counter-insurgency terms was the way in which it eventually came 
to form the basis of future practice. Politically this would be based on close civil-
military decision-making by decentralised committees whilst being militarily grounded 
in the necessity of sub-platoon units in launching localised intelligence-led operations in 
order to attain greater tactical nuance and operational effectiveness.
111
 By the official 
end of the MCP uprising in 1960 the blueprint for future British counter-insurgencies 
had been written. The efficacy of this blueprint, however, remains vastly overstated. 
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CHAPTER 4: The Malayan Roots of Mau Mau: Transferring Counter-Insurgency 
Lessons, 1952-1960 
 
 
As British efforts to stage-manage the retreat from Empire and uphold Cold War 
military commitments unfolded across south-east Asia in the early 1950s, it is easy to 
overlook the conflict that Frank Kitson labelled „a sideshow amongst sideshows.‟1 
Declared four years into operations in Malaya, the Kenyan Emergency utilised counter-
insurgency tactics that built upon the lessons learned in the Far East and were applied in 
the effort to defeat the mysterious movement known as Mau Mau.   
 
The focus of critical analysis in this chapter will be the extent to which strategic and 
tactical direction in Kenya was based on the developing counter-insurgency campaign in 
Malaya and the enactment of slowly-imbibed lesson-learning from south-east Asia. The 
early phases of the Kenyan Emergency lacked coherence and direction. Yet as the 
belated dividends of General Briggs‟ actions and the renewed sense of purpose lent by 
General Templer in Malaya began to turn the tide for Britain against the Malayan Races 
Liberation Army (MRLA) after 1952, such strategic and tactical imperatives as forcible 
resettlement to new villages, detention camps, supply network cut-off, and the use of 
surrendered enemy personnel as double agents, were implemented by the British 
authorities in Kenya with clear operational dividends. Kenya, in short, was a slow-burn 
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strategy. Once the British gained strategic clarity in Kenya, largely thanks to lessons 
from Malaya, the Mau Mau found themselves prosecuting an increasingly isolated 
insurgency. As in Malaya, eventual British „success‟ has to be contextualised against the 
background of a small insurgent movement lacking in overt popular support and any 
external aid. Intelligence agencies were also slow to react at first, but organisational 
restructuring witnessed in Malaya also became a model for Kenya, reaping quick 
rewards by improving the system of intelligence collection and dissemination. The 
political community, however, were not willing to acknowledge that experiences in 
Malaya could help counter-insurgency operations in Kenya. Any comparison between 
the two was discouraged given the political propensity to view Mau Mau as a 
disorganised, savage rabble that could be easily defeated. Yet propaganda in both 
insurgencies retained the same themes, namely the delegitimation of the insurgent group 
by highlighting their atrocities and perceived savagery. As a case study in counter-
insurgency lesson-learning, Kenya demonstrates the maladroit abilities of the British to 
learn quickly, and typifies just how an eventual counter-insurgency „victory‟ and belated 
operational and strategic clarity were able to be realised in large part due to the 
deficiencies of the insurgent opponent. This case study exhibits how a nascent tendency 
for slow learning and slow burning that emerged in Malaya became fully established in 
Kenya and began a linear trend in British counter-insurgency conduct. 
 
Perhaps more than any other insurgent group in British post-war colonial history, the 
Mau Mau has been subject to rigorous and heated historiographical debate surrounding 
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its origins, meaning and legacy.
2
 Traditionalist interpretations, primarily encapsulated by 
the works of Kenyan scholar Louis Leakey during the Emergency itself, depicted Mau 
Mau as an atavistic cult shrouded in mysticism.
3
 Yet the 1960s gave rise to a revisionist 
historiographical trend that shifted interpretation of the group away from tribal 
primitivism and towards an understanding of a rational and modern uprising fought for 
national liberation unshackled by previous European ethnocentric analysis.
4
 Since the 
crest of the revisionist wave broke in the 1960s, Mau Mau has been comparatively 
under-researched as a source of counter-insurgency analysis, especially in terms of 
historical and military literature, until the early twenty-first century when a series of 
books revisiting the Kenyan Emergency offered new critical interpretations of British 
conduct between 1952 and 1960.
5
 The on-going debate about Mau Mau has given rise to 
what Bruce Berman has labelled the historiographic „paradox of Mau Mau‟, where 
contending schools of thought have common foundation in divergent explanations of the 
three overarching themes of nationalism, ethnicity and modernity.
6
 Indeed, the dispute 
over both the continuing implications of the meaning of Mau Mau in Kenyan history and 
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British execution of its counter-insurgency campaign were crystallised in October 2006 
when a group of surviving Mau Mau veterans launched a lawsuit against the British 
government demanding an apology for brutal atrocities committed during the 
Emergency and an out-of-court financial compensation settlement.
7
 Contemporary 
interest in Mau Mau was further sparked by revelations in late 2008 that the then US 
President-elect Barack Obama‟s Kenyan grandfather had been arrested and allegedly 
tortured by the British for being a suspected Mau Mau member.
8
 Yet in terms of the 
extrapolated meaning pertaining to counter-insurgency, the Kenyan example has not 
consistently been placed in the context of lesson learning. If Malaya drew up the 
counter-insurgency blueprint, Kenya represented the first opportunity to put those plans 
into action elsewhere. Archive material and elements of existing secondary sources 
reveal an untapped angle from which to view the British defeat of Mau Mau: namely its 
strategic, operational and tactical roots in the Malayan Emergency and the delay in 
producing an effective transferral process. 
 
Origins and Background to the Mau Mau Insurgency 
 
The roots of Mau Mau lie in the Kikuyu tribe – one of forty-two tribes or ethnic 
groupings in Kenya. The politicisation of the Kikuyu stemmed from severe pressure 
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placed on their tribal lands in the 1920s by a parallel occurrence of a marked population 
increase and the claim to large swathes of Kikuyu land in the central highlands of Kenya 
by European settlers who employed Kikuyu labour to tend the land as de facto tenant 
farmers. This was to provide a catalyst for militancy within elements of the Kikuyu, who 
had seen during the early twentieth century their tribal practices and political 
organisations, namely the Kikuyu Central Association (KCA), suppressed and 
manipulated by the colonial authorities and the missionary churches. For implications 
further down the line, it also provoked a mass migration of landless and angry Kikuyu 
from the White Highlands to the urban centre of Nairobi, channelling an influx of 
radicalised rural sentiment into a new urban environment. As a consequence of these 
developments, significant segments of the Kikuyu tribe were faced with poverty and 
unemployment accentuated by a lack of land and over-population.  
 
In 1940 the colonial authorities proscribed the KCA, interpreting it as a challenge to 
colonial power, forcing those members who had not been arrested underground. 
Between 1944 and 1946 a successor movement, the Kenya African Union (KAU), 
emerged, quickly building a membership of over 100,000 under the leadership of Jomo 
Kenyatta. By instinct a moderate reform movement, schisms soon appeared within the 
KAU as the radical remnants of the KCA began pressing for more subversive action. 
The underground KCA leadership subsequently altered its recruitment strategy in order 
to become a viable mass movement of its own. It was during this organisational shift 
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that the mysterious group known as Mau Mau first emerged.
9
 This militant and 
mercurial movement was thought to have been responsible for a number of agitations 
against colonial rule in the late 1940s and were understood to administer oaths of 
allegiance to its members (the particulars of which subsequent British propaganda would 
disseminate in salacious detail.)
10
 Their intentions, much like the movement as a whole, 
remained porous, ensuring that Mau Mau was concomitantly labelled reformist, 
nationalist, anti-colonial and Kikuyu supremacist. No coherent manifesto was ever 
expounded, adding to the movement‟s image as dark and irrational.11 Fearing what they 
did not quite understand, the proscription of membership to Mau Mau was decreed by 
the colonial authorities in August 1950.  
 
Yet despite the move to quash the movement by legal manoeuvrings, violence and 
disruption perpetrated by Mau Mau continued, fuelled by the intransigence of both 
London and Nairobi to instigate political reform of the almost exclusively European 
settler representation on Kenya‟s Legislative Council. Attacks on the homes of European 
settlers and Kikuyu loyalists were undertaken alongside the symbolic mutilation of their 
cattle. The Governor of Kenya, Sir Philip Mitchell, only months away from retirement 
by early 1952, proved unwilling to curtail this spike in rural violence and demonstrated 
particular obstinacy in refusing to tackle this growing problem. Even the Colonial 
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Secretary, Oliver Lyttelton, in a telegram to the Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, a 
month before the Emergency was declared, announced that he „did not take a very 
alarmist view of the situation in Kenya.‟12 Mitchell left his post in June 1952, as the 
emergence of a nascent insurgency fomented. Astonishingly, Mitchell‟s departure 
triggered a four month interregnum before London posted a new Governor to Kenya, Sir 
Evelyn Baring, in October.
13
 Upon arrival Baring quickly acknowledged the danger of 
the situation, citing the existence of a „planned revolutionary movement‟14, and in an 
attempt to curb the mounting levels of rural violence and urban disquiet he declared a 
State of Emergency on 20 October 1952. It was to mark the beginning of a counter-
insurgency campaign that received relatively little public attention in Britain, yet was to 
demonstrate a military attempt at transferring asymmetric lessons from other theatres of 
operations, often with a decidedly un-nuanced level of force. 
 
 
The Political Response to Mau Mau 
 
Within twenty-five days of Governor Baring declaring a State of Emergency up to 8,000 
arrests had been made in a massive military and police operation codenamed Jock 
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Scott.
15
 This represented an attempt to decapitate the KAU and the KCA in a direct 
effort to stifle the momentum of Mau Mau. A further crackdown on the wider trade 
union and nationalist movement was also instigated in a political endeavour to cripple 
any solidarity from groups perceived to have sympathies with Mau Mau‟s seemingly 
anti-colonial strategy. Yet as an antithesis to the interpretation of the Emergency as a 
consequence of Mau Mau violence, revisionist arguments, notably from Donald Barnett, 
posit that it was in fact a cause of escalated militancy. Barnett contends that the move to 
outlaw the affiliations of large swathes of both the Kikuyu and wider nationalist 
population alienated a far greater degree of Kenyans than before the Emergency.
16
 The 
fact that the colonial authorities estimated that up to ninety percent of the Kikuyu 
population of 1.5 million had taken at least one of the seven stages of Mau Mau oaths 
can aid an understanding of the draconian, catch-all detention policy. Yet this estimate 
was exaggerated and led to an unsubtle political approach in distinguishing the 
insurgents from the ethnic community from which they emanated.
17
 The political 
element of the counter-insurgency strategy was therefore flawed from the outset. 
 
Yet the political response to Mau Mau cannot be reduced to reference to imperial 
reassertion. There were numerous, often competing, interests and influences that 
intertwined during the Emergency, namely that of the European settlers, the Kikuyu 
„loyalists‟, the colonial authorities, and the British government itself. It is from the 
interaction of these interests that emerged the political reaction to the Mau Mau 
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insurgency.
18
 There does appear to have been a distinct disparity between the attitudes 
and inclinations of the colonial authorities in Kenya and the political officials at 
Westminster. The colonial response at the declaration of the State of Emergency had 
been to significantly increase the sentences for apparent misdemeanours or perceived 
Mau Mau-inspired crimes and instigate collective punishment. However, as David 
Anderson points out, „Churchill was not impressed by the “special pleading” from 
Nairobi for this or that power… Lyttelton (Colonial Secretary), too, thought that the 
latest proposals smacked of heavy handedness, even of vengeance and retribution.‟19 Yet 
as the Emergency unfolded the Kenyan campaign weighed little on the mind of Prime 
Minister Churchill, with most political direction in London emanating from Colonial 
Secretary Oliver Lyttelton.
20
 Despite the activism in the face of stories of British 
brutality (see the next section on the military response) by the trio of Labour MPs 
Barbara Castle, Fenner Brockway and Leslie Hale, even on the opposition benches „no 
one in the leadership of the party really wanted to rock the boat over Mau Mau…‟21 
Counter-insurgency in Kenya was simply unwarranted of political attention in London, 
dismissed as an uprising by local savages, easy to put down, and thus crystallising 
Kitson‟s interpretation of Mau Mau as a „sideshow‟ in the grander scheme of 1950s 
British foreign and defence policy. Yet as an example of counter-insurgency lesson-
learning, and as an illustration of how often the most interesting illuminations on a topic 
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appear when light is shone in the darkest corners, Kenya needs to placed under the 
scrutiny of the historical microscope. 
 
The colonial authorities‟ depiction in both Nairobi and London of Mau Mau as primeval 
savages enabled them, in Bruce Berman‟s words, „to fight a nasty guerrilla war with 
good conscience.‟22 This illustration of the insurgent enemy was cemented by a carefully 
constructed political propaganda campaign. The campaign within Kenya itself resorted 
firstly to outright censorship, banning a long list of publications including the 
communist Daily Worker, and then secondly to more „positive‟ forms of propaganda 
designed to further the political and military ends of the counter-insurgency campaign. 
This type of propaganda, as in Malaya, derived from a multiplicity of requirements, 
including the mutual need to delegitimise the insurgent cause whilst stemming the flow 
of sympathisers to the forests and placating the fears of the settler community.
23
  As in 
Malaya, this final task of ensuring settler compliance was often undermined by mistrust 
and a feeling on their behalf that „outsiders‟ from London did not understand the 
mentality or behaviour of the „natives‟. The settler-government relationship was not 
eased by the prospect of Kenyan independence (discussed in full detail below.) These 
difficulties were further exacerbated by a Kenyan Information Service in a „state of 
neglect and disorder.‟24 Propaganda was the vague responsibility of a disparate number 
of agencies with no centralised control or message. It took until February 1953 for the 
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Kenyan and British authorities to appoint a unifying Director of Information, Brigadier 
William Gibson.  
 
Whitehall‟s propagandists were eager to ensure that the Kenyan Emergency was not 
depicted as a carbon copy of the Malayan Emergency. They were concerned by late 
1952, four years into operations in Malaya, that any comparisons with what were 
perceived at that time to be a stalled and protracted campaign against a porous enemy 
were counter-productive. A.C.E Malcolm, the Head of the Information Policy 
Department (IPD), was keen that propaganda material should „substantiate the thesis that 
Kenya is not, repeat not, going to develop into “another Malaya”… On the face of it 
there is altogether too much similarity for the propagandists‟ convenience.‟25 Such a 
view, however, must be placed in the context of a pre-Templer strategic vision in 
Malaya, when Whitehall disgruntlement at progress in the colony was volumous. The 
Director of the Information Service, Charles Carstairs, duly attempted to highlight the de 
facto Kikuyu civil war unfolding given the high number of loyalist Kikuyu Home Guard 
units and the mainly African victims of Mau Mau violence. Yet, as Susan Carruthers 
rightly observes, such an emphasis would, counter-intuitively, ensure that:  
 
„the basic themes of propaganda on Mau Mau were identical to those on 
Malaya: that the victims of terrorism were of the same ethnicity as the 
terrorists; that the terrorists did not enjoy external support, nor were they 
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a legitimate nationalist movement; and that Britain was doing much to 
promote the social and political advancement of the colonial 
inhabitants.‟26 
 
Again learning from their Malayan experience, propaganda was quick to delegitimise 
the Mau Mau by labelling them „terrorists‟ in public discourse and by playing heavily 
upon imagery of Mau Mau barbarism and depictions of a movement driven by atavistic 
savagery fundamentally incapable of engaging with the „civilising‟ process of 
colonisation. However, the issue of civility cannot exclusively be levelled at Mau Mau 
given the politicised process of detention, „rehabilitation‟, and resettlement initiated by 
the colonial authorities. 
 
In July 1953 the Kenyan government initiated a programme of rehabilitation for former 
or captured Mau Mau. This process, informally dubbed „the Pipeline‟, was put in place 
at some 100 detention camps for suspects, which by the end of the Emergency in 1960 
had seen some 80,000 Kikuyu men and women pass through their barbed wire gates. 
This reformatory programme was designed to convert the perceivably warped Mau Mau 
into progressive Kenyan citizens via a combination of re-education, Christian teaching, 
and manual labour.
27
 This official process was often interspersed with unofficial 
„cleansing ceremonies‟ whereby the authorities attempted to purge the influence of 
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mystic seers and the Mau Mau oaths from the detainees in rituals carried out by Kikuyu 
elders nicknamed „Her Majesty‟s Witchdoctors‟.28 Yet the scale of detention in Kenya 
was drastically out of proportion to what was witnessed in Malaya. By 1954 there were 
some 64,000 detainees awaiting interrogation, compared to a maximum of just 1,200 at 
the height of the Malayan Emergency.
29
 This politicised process of detention placed a 
massive strain on the intelligence agencies, especially the police Special Branch, to 
screen those who were interned in the camps. The fate of many detainees lay in the 
hands of Kikuyu gikunia – loyalist informants who were paraded in front of lined-up 
suspects covered head-to-toe in sack cloth with small eye slits in order to anonymously 
identify supposed Mau Mau. 
 
In the months preceding the official rehabilitation policy announcement the colonial 
authorities in Kenya sought guidance on its formulation. Governor Baring turned to 
General Templer for assistance. The Malayan experience had already provided Kenya 
with the template for its Emergency Regulations for detained persons (the Emergency 
[Detained Persons] Regulations of 1952 and 1953 were lifted from Malaya‟s Emergency 
[Detained Persons] Regulations of 1948).
30
 In June 1953 Baring requested the dispatch 
of an officer from Malaya to advise on Kenyan rehabilitation policy vis-à-vis Mau Mau 
detainees. Templer, already stretched with manpower in Malaya, eventually agreed to 
train Thomas Askwith, the Commissioner for Community Development in Kenya, who 
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was sent to Malaya in August 1953.
31
 Askwith, perhaps the foremost colonial expert on 
Kenyan impoverishment with a liberal paternalist zeal for reform, toured Malayan 
detention camps and rehabilitation centres and was briefed by Templer on the Malayan 
approach. Askwith‟s recommendations on the back of this visit were to provide the 
substance of Kenya‟s official rehabilitation policy, notably the emphasis on re-education 
not punishment and on a clear distinction in treatment towards insurgent sympathisers 
and insurgent fighters.
32
 However, it is clear from first-hand accounts
33
 and from recent 
in-depth historical research
34
 that such a distinction was arbitrary. 
 
Yet it is not just in the rehabilitation process that controversy lies. The application of an 
extensive resettlement programme drastically overshadowed the scope of a similar 
process undertaken in Malaya. Between June 1954 and October 1955 over 1 million 
Kikuyu were forcibly resettled into 854 new villages. As in Malaya, this programme was 
designed to disrupt the activities of the insurgent supply network by placing vulnerable 
communities on the forest fringe under closer scrutiny and monitoring. Although 
ostensibly modelled on the Malayan version (which themselves were not without their 
critics or controversial moments), the Kenyan villages were, as David Anderson has 
argued, „little more than concentration camps to punish Mau Mau sympathisers.‟35 The 
land rights and farming opportunities offered to the resettled Malayans were not 
extended to their Kenyan counter-parts.  
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So what about the much vaunted British approach to winning the „hearts and minds‟ of 
indigenous populations in counter-insurgency campaigns? In Kenya such an approach 
was severely lacking, perhaps the one major signature approach in Malaya neglected 
upon transfer. Any remnants of a „hearts and minds‟ strategy in Kenya focussed 
primarily on the „minds‟ of Mau Mau detainees through forced rehabilitation 
programmes and cleansing rituals. The only perceivable „carrot‟ identifiable in the 
political suppression of Mau Mau lay with a £7 million development and reconstruction 
programme designed to fund schemes involving road, hospital, school, housing and well 
construction projects. Perhaps the most important distribution of this money was an 
additional £5 million allocation for agricultural improvement schemes, aimed to 
alleviate one of the primary grievances of the Kikuyu.
36
 However, the benefits of this 
scheme seem to have been dwarfed by the degenerate effects of several factors. Firstly, 
the detention and rehabilitation process was mired with widespread ill-regard for 
detainees‟ welfare. This undoubtedly acted as a radicalising catalyst for the relatives and 
friends of those interned. Secondly, the absence of impartial jurisprudence renders the 
politico-legal effort to counter Mau Mau callously brutal. Between 1952 and 1958 up to 
3,000 Mau Mau suspects stood trial on charges relating to the insurgency. Of these, one 
third of the suspects, some 1,090, would be hanged after being found guilty. In David 
Anderson‟s words: „In no other place, and at no other time, was state execution used on 
such a scale as this.‟37 This leads to a third assumption, namely that the traditional 
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colonial master-subject relationship that had been approached arguably with a degree of 
paternal respect in Malaya, was conducted in Kenya with subjugation and belittlement. 
Whereas alternative political avenues were sought for the ethnic Chinese in Malaya, no 
serious effort was made to co-opt non-Mau Mau Kikuyu voices into the political 
process. This can only lend itself to the conclusion that Africa represented something 
different in the mindset of the British political class. Psychological assumptions 
regarding the „civilising process‟ were not part of the mainstream discourse in Malaya, 
nor indeed in subsequent counter-insurgency campaigns in Cyprus (on-going during the 
Mau Mau uprising) or Yemen. This assumption therefore goes some way to explaining 
how the military repression of Mau Mau was British counter-insurgency implemented 
with an iron fist. 
 
 
The Military Response to Mau Mau 
 
The initial military bulwark against the Mau Mau insurgency consisted of just three 
battalions of the King‟s African Rifles, with manpower equivalent to just a third of 
estimated Mau Mau numbers. Governor Baring, wary of the inadequate military 
resources at his disposal, requested to London that a military Director of Operations, 
akin to the Malayan version of Briggs and then Templer, be appointed in Kenya to direct 
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and supplement the military campaign.
38
 The Chief of the Imperial General Staff 
(CIGS), General Sir John Harding, initially refused, yet by January 1953, as the 
insurgency took a hold, he partially relented and Major-General William Hinde was 
appointed Chief Staff Officer to His Excellency the Governor. Hinde maintained an 
emphasis on policing in order to uphold law and order, with the military only fulfilling 
an auxiliary role. Yet he maintained this approach even as Mau Mau violence continued 
to escalate – a problem compounded by poor intelligence and an as-yet unclear counter-
insurgency strategy. In the face of claims of Hinde‟s lacklustre approach to the 
campaign, the CIGS himself intervened in 1953 to increase British military strength in 
Kenya by two brigades and two additional battalions
39
 (including a battalion of the 
Lancashire Fusiliers and later on a battalion of the Black Watch), bringing the military 
presence to some 10,000 troops, who were backed up by 20,000 Kenyan police officers 
and a further 20,000 Kikuyu Home Guard.
40
 Criticism of Hinde‟s handling of the 
campaign, especially from the white settler community who felt exposed to increased 
violence by his intransigence, reached a crescendo in spring 1953 and he was replaced 
by Lt-General Sir George Erskine in May. Erskine‟s appointment signifies the moment 
at which the British started to take the Mau Mau insurgency seriously, reflected in the 
decision to upgrade Erskine‟s role to General Officer Command (GOC) East Africa 
Command.  
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Erskine‟s appointment also reversed the previous military tendency to have ignored the 
emergent successful lessons of the Malayan campaign. As Thomas Mockaitis has 
argued, Erskine‟s arrival saw military operations in Kenya take on a distinctly Malayan 
hue, including the reduced use (if not total abandonment) of large-scale sweeps through 
the forest, an increase in police resources, and a heightened level of civil-military co-
operation.
41
 Indeed, the most overt display of Malayan military lessons percolating the 
Kenyan campaign was the publication of the 1954 „Handbook of Anti-Mau Mau 
Operations‟, distributed to officers in Kenya (although, again, it must be noted that this 
came two years into the campaign – a crucial time lag given the proliferation of Mau 
Mau violence since 1952). This manual borrowed the wording and the operational 
premise of its Malayan precursor, the „Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya (ATOM) 
Manual‟, and represents a clear intention to deliberately transfer the tactical and 
operational lessons from Malaya to Kenya.
42
 Indeed, Erskine sent a telegram to the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Far East Land Force acknowledging that the ATOM Manual 
„has been much used as a basis for trg [training] in anti-Mau Mau ops. All available 
copies have been passed to the units concerned…‟ He goes on to request that: „if it is 
still the current “bible” it would be appreciated if more copies could be fwd 
[forwarded].‟43 
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However, there was a severe disjuncture between the theory and the practice of Malayan 
lessons in the Kenyan case. Firstly, military operations in Kenya were carried out on a 
scale not seen in Malaya, undertaken in both urban and rural environments – a scenario 
not borne out in Malaya. Secondly, there is widespread evidence that the seemingly 
sacrosanct Malayan imperative of „minimum force‟ in counter-insurgency was not 
merely ignored but was flagrantly flouted. In sum, as one observer has noted, the 
authorities in Kenya „imported the Malayan model wholesale… without the sensitivity 
or restraint.‟44  
 
Firstly, let us deal with the concomitant undertaking of urban and rural operations. The 
presence of a radicalised and organised urban segment of the insurgency contrasted with 
the reified groupings that took to the forests. The threat posed by the Central Committee 
in the capital Nairobi, the perceived executive body of Mau Mau, drove the colonial 
military and political authorities to instigate a large and ruthless urban operation to 
neuter Mau Mau‟s urban potency. Operation Anvil was the largest urban cordon-and-
search operation ever undertaken by the British military up to that point.
45
 On 24 April 
1954, 25,000 troops and police officers sealed off the entire city of Nairobi, rounded up, 
and screened the city‟s entire African population of 30,000 in holding centres in order to 
detain suspected Mau Mau sympathisers and activists. 16,538 were detained for further 
questioning after initial screening and 2,416 were deported to the Reserves.
46
 The effects 
                                                          
44
 Wade Merkel, „Draining the Swamp: The British Strategy of Population Control‟, Parameters, Vol. 36 
(Spring 2006), p.41. 
45
 Anderson, Histories of the Hanged, p.200. 
46
 TNA WO, 236/18, „The Kenya Emergency, June 1953-May 1955: A Report by General Sir George 
Erskine‟. 
149 
 
of Operation Anvil were two-fold. On a social and ethnic level the indiscriminate nature 
of the round-up conveyed how unsubtle the British approach to the various African 
ethnic groupings was. The British had demonstrably failed to distinguish Mau Mau from 
the wider population who did not support their insurgency, and consequentially 
displayed an arrogance that could have endangered that widespread apathy towards Mau 
Mau by mounting such a forceful catchall operation. However, the strategic dividend of 
the operation was sizeable. It crippled Mau Mau‟s organisational capabilities in Nairobi, 
their only urban base, and severed the ability of the urban Mau Mau to supply or 
influence the rural campaign. Yet it came at the price of alienating large swathes of the 
originally anti-insurgent indigenous population. The un-nuanced nature of Operation 
Anvil, the first major post-war urban counter-insurgency operation undertaken by the 
British Army, puts future urban operations conducted in Yemen and particularly 
Northern Ireland into context and helps develop a lineage for the British approach to 
urban campaigning in a low-intensity conflict environment that stretches into recent 
operations in Basra and southern Iraq.  
 
The rural campaign proved to be equally slow in reaching a level of operations 
effectiveness. Small scale sweeps through the forest and foothills of Mount Kenya 
typified the rural military approach in the early years of the Emergency. It was not until 
1955, three years into the campaign, that the first major rural operation, Operation 
Hammer (complementing the urban „Anvil‟), increased the impetus of the campaign in 
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the forest area.
47
 Capitalising on the improved road infrastructure into the Aberdare 
mountains, British commanders led 10,000 troops through the forest region in a massive 
show of rural force with the aim of detaining up to 2,000 suspected Mau Mau insurgents 
hiding there. The operation lasted little over a month and resulted in just 161 insurgents 
killed, captured or surrendered, forcing General Erskine to damn the operation with faint 
praise: „I did not expect spectacular terrorist casualties, neither were they achieved.‟48 
Deemed a disappointment on an operational level, the military attempted to reinvigorate 
the rural campaign with Operation First Flute. Using a similar number of troops to 
Hammer, First Flute was conceived to engage a 3,000-strong insurgent grouping in the 
wider Mount Kenya area. By April 1955, two months into the operation, just 277 Mau 
Mau had been killed or taken prisoner – a figure Erksine claimed constituted 15-20 per 
cent of insurgents thought to be operating in the south and south-west region of 
Kikuyuland.
49
 Yet perhaps one of the most pertinent lessons of rural operations in 
Malaya that was not heeded in Kenya was that contact with insurgents takes time, 
patience and endurance. Calling off operations that initially appear to be reaping little 
reward, as happened in Kenya, as opposed to the acceptance of operational longevity in 
Malaya, can arguably be put down to the colonial interpretation of Mau Mau as an 
atavistic irritant and not a well-versed, well-disciplined, well-organised insurgent enemy 
(despite the fact that the MRLA in Malaya fitted none of these criteria either). The 
expenditure of significant military resources to the rural campaign was not in keeping 
with the pervading political position that Mau Mau constituted a nuisance, albeit a 
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vicious one, that could be put down with ease. Again, this depicts a discernibly leaden 
approach to counter-insurgency, adverse to swift adaptation. The only considerable 
contribution to the rural campaign was unsurprisingly a low cost one: the utilisation of 
„pseudo gangs‟. 
 
Pseudo Gangs were constitutive of surrendered or captured enemy personnel. Initially 
utilised as trackers or guides for the British army, former Mau Mau were soon seen as an 
essential component for intelligence gathering and for bringing about „contact‟ with 
insurgent units still in the forests. There is some contention as to who pioneered the use 
of pseudo gangs in Kenya, yet undeniably the two foremost proponents of the technique 
were Captain (later General Sir) Frank Kitson, and Detective Superintendent Ian 
Henderson. By Kitson‟s own admission, „there was in fact nothing original about the 
(pseudo gang) idea itself, variations of which have been used in countless wars 
throughout history.‟50 Indeed, it was a method employed, albeit to a lesser extent, in 
Malaya, where Special Operation Volunteer Forces (SOVFs) formed by captured and 
surrendered insurgents returned to the jungle to track down their former comrades. 
However, the use of the pseudo gang technique in Kenya perhaps receives more 
attention than in previous conflicts because it had not hitherto played a significant role in 
the strategic outcome of a conflict, especially of the low intensity variety. Frank Kitson 
established a Special Methods Training Centre for the express purpose of 
professionalising the „turned‟ surrendered or captured insurgents into capable and 
reliable allies in the counter-insurgency fight. This Centre, and the pseudo gang method 
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as a whole, was sanctioned by General Erskine in June 1954, formalising the importance 
of the technique to the military hierarchy.
51
 In May 1955 Erskine‟s successor as 
Commander-in-Chief, Lt-General Gerald Lathbury, attempted to increase the use of 
pseudo gangs by establishing five Special Forces Teams, each consisting of ten ex-
insurgents and commanded by a European – a manifestation of his belief that pseudo 
gangs were „the most effective weapon against the terrorists.‟52 The police also found 
the pseudo gang method conducive to producing tangible results. As Ian Henderson 
recalls in his account of his fabled pseudo gang effort to track down senior Mau Mau 
leader Dedan Kimathi, once surrendered or captured, former insurgents seemed to resign 
themselves to co-operating with the pseudo gangs, fearful of retribution from their 
former comrades and of similar treatment at the hands of the authorities should they not 
prove helpful: „A hostile gang fighting against us yesterday became a tamed gang 
fighting for us today. We were not exactly converting these desperate men, but we were 
certainly recruiting them.‟53 Luise White, in an attempt to illuminate the practice of 
pseudo gang operations through gender literature, infers that pseudo gangs were engaged 
in a „masquerade‟ tantamount to cross-racial „drag‟ – a reference to the practice of white 
British soldiers blacking their faces and wearing wigs in an attempt to pass themselves 
off as Africans on pseudo gang operations.
54
 Although the social, and indeed 
psychological, implications of „blacking up‟ for military purposes may raise eyebrows, 
White‟s interpretation does not address the consequences of pseudo gang actions, 
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namely the large intelligence dividend and the ability to locate and disband insurgent 
units too elusive to be tracked down by regular army units, and implies a pacifism to a 
form of warfare defined by its very ingenuity in the face of an asymmetric gap. 
 
One of the foremost challenges to state armies engaging in warfare in that asymmetric 
gap is to adhere to conceptions of „minimum force‟. Held up as one of the central planks 
of success in Malaya, it would be natural to assume that along with the raft of tactical, 
operational and structural designs that were gradually transferred by the British from 
Malaya to Kenya in the mid-1950s a concerted effort would have been made to uphold 
and conform to the notion of minimum force. This was not to be the case. Even before 
the critical historiographical turn, facilitated by new archival material, occurred in the 
early twenty-first century, academic opinion on the British conduct in Kenya has been 
uniformly damning – arguably only assessments of conduct in Northern Ireland match 
the Kenyan case for indictments of widespread disregard for civilian rights. Indeed, 
Thomas Mockaitis has pointed to what he labels „the “Black and Tan” phenomenon‟ at 
work in Kenya, given the excessive use of force by the security forces on suspected 
insurgents and their purported supporters.
55
 Caroline Elkins has gone as far as to 
describe the British campaign against the Mau Mau as „state-sanctioned terror,‟56 whilst 
John Newsinger has depicted British operations in Kenya as being of „unprecedented 
ferocity.‟57 The epicentre of much of this criticism lies with the treatment of detainees at 
interrogation camps (dealt with in detail in the next section), indiscriminate raids and 
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round-ups that failed to distinguish Mau Mau from Kikuyu, or indeed Mau Mau from 
African (as encapsulated in Operation Anvil), and tales of British soldiers severing the 
hands of dead Mau Mau in lackadaisical and disrespectful efforts to match finger prints 
at police stations some distance away. Even the American Consul-General in Nairobi, 
Edmund Dorsz, felt compelled to report back to the State Department in October 1952 
that: „Arbitrary methods used by the police are also playing into the hands of the Mau 
Mau by alienating the good-will of the law-abiding Africans.‟58 In short, perversions 
away from minimum force practices perpetuated cycles of violence and reduced the 
counter-insurgency campaign‟s societal support base. This particular lesson, far from 
being learnt slowly , was arguable never imbibed at all in Kenya. 
 
When he first arrived in Kenya, Major-Gen. Hinde cited minimum force as an essential 
component in operations conducted against Mau Mau: „We must heed the example of 
Malaya and ensure that repressive measures do not result in an unbridgeable gap of 
bitterness between us and the Kikuyu.‟59 When Sir Evelyn Baring informed Colonial 
Secretary Oliver Lyttelton of rumours of „inhuman methods‟ being employed by the 
security forces in Kenya, Lyttelton expressed that he was „determined to do all possible 
to prevent such excesses and to deal with them of allegations are substantiated.‟60  In his 
memoirs, Lytellton put „isolated incidents of atrocities‟ down to „the breakdown of the 
quality of mercy under strain, or to panic in men of low intellectual capacity or low 
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personal courage.‟61 However, in such a climate of fear, many allegations were left 
uncorroborated due to a widespread unwillingness to speak out against the police, Home 
Guard or army. The prevalence of beatings, torture and killings by British armed forces 
and, to a greater extent, the Kikuyu Home Guard in seemingly unaccountable corners of 
the Kenyan forest or detention camps (most infamously the deaths of eleven unarmed 
internees at the Hola Camp on 3 March 1959
62) ensured that, in Huw Bennett‟s words, 
„fear became a strategic lever for combating the insurgency.‟63 British colonial 
perceptions of entering the savage African heart of darkness ultimately ended up 
justifying savagery of a different form: one that claimed it was fulfilling a „civilising 
process‟ and one that was overlooked because it wore a uniform. 
 
 
The Intelligence War Against Mau Mau 
 
As far back as 1950, when Mau Mau had first emerged, the British had authorised the 
monitoring of the group and even attempted to infiltrate it in order to reap intelligence 
on its aims, membership and strategic intentions. This intelligence did partially aid the 
conduct of Operation Jock Scott, however the arrest and trial of high profile nationalist 
and trade union leaders, such as Jomo Kenyatta, with at best an ambiguous relationship 
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with Mau Mau, demonstrates how inadequately the intelligence penetration of the group 
had been.
64
 Randall Heather has argued that the intelligence agencies in Kenya were 
„woefully unprepared‟ to face an insurgency, yet their saving grace was that Mau Mau as 
an insurgent group was also ill-prepared for a significant confrontation.
65
 
 
The colonial intelligence structure was fragmented and its agencies were given little 
attention or resources by the colonial administrators.
66
 At the outbreak of the 
Emergency, Kenyan Special Branch consisted of just four officers (none of whom were 
African) and very few African rank and file (none of whom were operational in Kikuyu 
areas due to a lack of resources).
67
 Even by General Erskine‟s own admission, the 
intelligence section in Kenya initially constituted a „skeleton force.‟68 The daily duty of 
maintaining law and order in Mau Mau-threatened areas rested with the Kenya Police 
and the Kenya Police Reserve, a notoriously no-nonsense unit consisting of mainly 
white settler reservists. In the face of pre- and early Emergency intelligence failings, 
newly arrived Governor Sir Evelyn Baring acknowledged the need for a fundamental 
restructuring. Whitehall dispatched the Director-General of MI5, Sir Percy Sillitoe, in 
                                                          
64
 Even the American‟s were unconvinced of claims that Kenyatta was the ringleader of Mau Mau. A 
declassified State Department intelligence report asserts that: „there is no substantial proof that he 
originated or directed the movement… (N)either the evidence submitted during the trial nor accounts of 
his activities during the movement‟s formative period definitively establish his guilt.‟ Declassified 
Documents Reference System (DDRS), Department of State, Office of Intelligence Research, „Intelligence 
Report (No.6307): The Mau Mau – An Aggressive Reaction to Frustration‟, 12 June 1953. 
65
 Heather, „Intelligence and Counter-Insurgency in Kenya‟, p.62. 
66
 Even the Colonial Secretary, Oliver Lyttelton, was damning of the „weakness of the intelligence 
service‟ in Kenya and argued that „many security and remedial measures could have been taken earlier if 
the Colonial Office had been kept informed by the local governments.‟ Lyttelton, The Memoirs of Lord 
Chandos, p.393. 
67
 Heather, „Intelligence and Counter-Insurgency in Kenya‟, p.62. 
68
 TNA, WO 236/18, „The Kenya Emergency, June 1953-May 1955: A Report by General Sir George 
Erskine‟. 
157 
 
November 1952 to review the intelligence set-up in Kenya and construct a report 
recommending changes. Sillitoe‟s report forwarded changes that would bring Kenya in 
line with the Malayan intelligence system. A national Intelligence Committee was 
established to centralise the collection and analytical process, to be chaired by an 
Intelligence Advisor to the Governor (a departure from the Malayan model, whereby a 
Chief of Intelligence oversaw the entire process with a more hands on role). Although 
Sillitoe‟s plan of action was heeded, it took some time before the changes were 
implemented, and even longer before the benefits could be reaped.
69
 Randall Heather 
has argued that two factors prevented the Kenyan intelligence authorities from learning 
from Malaya in the early stage of the Emergency. Firstly, there was a pervasive belief 
within the colony‟s political elite that Mau Mau would be defeated quickly, therefore 
negating the need for intensive intelligence work. Secondly, there was a desire 
emanating from London that Kenya was to be treated differently from Malaya and that 
comparisons between the two conflicts were undesirable.
70
 On this latter point, a series 
of telegram exchanges between the War Office and the GHQ Middle East Land Forces 
(who had ultimate responsibility for East Africa) only several months into the 
Emergency reveals an eagerness within the military and political hierarchy „to avoid 
even the appearance of direct comparison with Malaya.‟71 
 
However, certain structural changes were enacted that enhanced the efficiency of 
intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination in Kenya. Intelligence Committees 
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were established in 1953, on a district, provincial and national level to ensure a more 
effective and widespread flow of intelligence. Yet these committees only served to 
disseminate police and Special Branch intelligence. There was still a shortfall in military 
intelligence that would lead to „contact‟ with insurgent units, despite the appointment of 
52 Field Intelligence Officers (FIOs) in early 1954.
72
 In order to breach this gap (which 
was in part filled by pseudo-gang operations) Joint Army Police Operational Intelligence 
Teams (JAPOIT) were formed in and around Mau Mau strongholds.
73
 Although a step 
forward, intelligence collection still remained focussed on the political rather than the 
military activities of what the police jokingly referred to as the „Mickey Mau‟s‟.74 Yet as 
insurgent violence intensified the need for operational intelligence increased – one of the 
most pertinent lessons to emanate from Malaya. Accordingly, army officers were 
seconded to Special Branch teams in the field to garner „hot‟ intelligence on Mau Mau. 
However, a lack of manpower and adequate training ensured that results were 
stultified.
75
 This was compounded at the national level by a lack of co-ordination. The 
head of Special Branch was not obliged to report to the military Director of Operations, 
resulting in an absence of military-intelligence liaison. Lt.Gen. Lathbury duly noted this 
divide and made moves to locate military intelligence within Special Branch and 
ensured that the Director of Intelligence Services had to report direct to the Director of 
Operations. Yet this was enacted three years into the Emergency, and brought a belated 
coherence to the process. 
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The capture, arrest and interrogation of senior Mau Mau leader General China (real 
name Waruhiu Itote) in January 1954 was, in the words of David Anderson, „the first 
intelligence breakthrough of the war.‟76 Itote divulged sensitive operational material to 
Assistant Superintendent Ian Henderson, the Kikuyu-speaking police officer who did 
much to pioneer the pseudo-gang technique.
77
 Yet as he awaited trial, Itote was offered 
an extraordinary deal, hatched by Henderson and approved by Governor Baring. On the 
proviso of waiving the death sentence, Itote was to return to the forests surrounding 
Mount Kenya and organise a mass surrender of the insurgent units situated there in 
conjunction with the Chief Native Commissioner (the only African in the Kenyan 
cabinet). Although Operation Wedgwood was to end in failure, Itote‟s efforts were not 
the first attempt at inducing the surrender of Mau Mau insurgents. The first offer to 
relinquish the death penalty for those who gave themselves up (disseminated, as in 
Malaya, by Voice Aircraft flying over the forests) in August 1953 induced just sixty-six 
surrenders.
78
 The failure of Operation Wedgwood in April 1954 marked a hiatus in 
surrender attempts until February 1955 when similar offers to the 1953 proposals were 
offered, again with scant response.
79
 This succession of surrender offers, designed 
primarily to appeal to the reluctant, forced or wavering insurgents (given the widespread 
colonial belief that most insurgents were coerced into taking Mau Mau oaths), were 
approved by General Erskine and angered the white settler community as they, as John 
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Lonsdale puts it, „thwarted the lust for revenge.‟80 Bloodlust aside, the efforts did 
succeed in securing the surrender of over 1,000 insurgents by 1955
81
, who offered a 
potential intelligence gold-mine in terms of revealing the size, movement and 
operational intentions of their former units. Yet perhaps the one major point of note in 
regard to the Kenya surrender offers in relation to the schemes established concurrently 
in Malaya, was the lack of financial inducement offered to Mau Mau. Members of the 
Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA) were, as discussed in the previous chapter, 
lured to hand themselves in for the promise of a lump sum upon their surrender. No such 
scheme (successfully employed in Malaya, though not without controversy) was 
replicated in Kenya despite the perceivable stagnancy of existing surrender efforts and 
the political unwillingness to draw Mau Mau into a protracted and potentially bloody 
campaign. Explanations for this must lie firstly in the colonial interpretations of Mau 
Mau‟s atavism (at least the communist MRLA had a perceptibly rational ideological 
premise) and secondly with an arguably subjugatory view the colonialists had of 
Africans being unwilling or unable to better themselves economically, unlike their more 
prosperous and advanced counterparts in Asia. Gathering intelligence on Mau Mau 
would come at a price, but evidently not at any significant financial cost. The authorities, 
in the absence of any fundamental intelligence breakthrough, were largely reliant on the 
internal deficiencies of Mau Mau to undermine and stall the insurgency from within – a 
fortunate circumstance given the torpid and blunt nature of the British strategy. 
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The Organisation of Mau Mau 
 
Mau Mau was constituted, as most „classical‟ insurgent groups tended to be, of an armed 
and a support wing. The militant Land and Freedom Armies were responsible for 
mounting insurgent attacks, whilst the Passive Wing attempted to ensure a supply of 
weapons and food to the guerrillas. By early 1952, before the Emergency officially 
began, a Kikuyu War Council had been established in Nairobi to co-ordinate an arms 
procurement scheme. By August of that year KAU militants (the nominal Mau Mau) 
were infiltrating rural areas in preparation for an insurgency. By the end of that year it 
was estimated that Mau Mau was in possession of 400-800 modern weapons. By the end 
of 1953 they had acquired nearly 300 more. These weapons had to be split between an 
insurgent group boasting a membership of between 12-15,000.
82
 This means that at any 
given time a maximum of only 15 per cent of insurgents possessed firearms, with 
estimates of a further 30-40 per cent brandishing homemade weapons as they served in 
self styled batuni (platoons).
83
 
 
However, the organisation of Mau Mau was to be fractured by a series of political and 
military divisions, perpetuating the incoherent strategy discussed above. There was 
never a single political or military leader of Mau Mau, despite the efforts of British 
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propaganda to single out Jomo Kenyatta as the insurgent puppet master. As David 
Anderson points out, „each leader did pretty much as the fancy took him… (E)ach tried 
to impose a more rigorous structure of command, but none succeeded…‟84 Indeed the 
cult of personality, as a consequence of a fractured leadership, helps explain why small 
forest groups attached their allegiances to larger groups led by guerrillas with 
widespread reputations. This led to a pattern of integration and explains the 
organisational phenomena of large insurgent clusters in remote areas.
85
 As the 
insurgency escalated in early 1953, the militant wing of Mau Mau split into three semi-
autonomous operational teams, who were often in dispute with each other: Dedan 
Kimathi led the guerrillas in the Aberdare Mountains; General China took command of 
the grouping around Mount Kenya; whilst a Central Committee controlled operations in 
Nairobi. Although this committee was nominally the executive authority of the 
insurgency, it was widely acknowledged that decision-making really lay with the forest 
leaders. This provides an interesting insight into the relationship between the rural and 
the urban elements of the insurgency. Unlike in Malaya, where the MRLA failed to 
make any in roads into fomenting an urban revolt, the Mau Mau‟s concomitant presence 
in town and country presented an additional challenge to the security forces and political 
authorities. Far from proving a dichotomous insurgency, there does appear to have been 
„positive interaction between Nairobi‟s urban militants and the rural activists.‟86 Indeed, 
it was the mutual discontent of landless agrarian Kikuyu and the radicalisation of 
Nairobi‟s urban Kikuyu in the face of deteriorating social conditions that catalysed the 
insurgency into a parallel urban and rural uprising. Although the number of armed Mau 
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Mau in Nairobi itself never reached more than 300, there was tangible popular support 
for the insurgents in the city that David Anderson has gone as far as to label „Mau Mau‟s 
beating heart.‟87  
 
However, by 1955 the Mau Mau insurgency was internally divided by a split within the 
political leadership. The two factions, the peasant-orientated Kenya Riigi group and the 
middle class Kenya Parliament, became quickly irreconcilable over the political 
endgame of the insurgency. This organisational rift dealt a blow to the Mau Mau cause 
as a whole and provoked widespread disillusionment amongst the armed insurgents. 
This was reflected in a huge decrease in Mau Mau volunteers, a trend accentuated by the 
intensification of the British counter-insurgency effort. Intelligence estimates put Mau 
Mau membership by early 1955 at around 6,000. By the end of the year, the figure had 
dropped to just 1,500. 
88
 This crystallised the Mau Mau insurgency as one undermined 
by perennial organisational fragmentation, militarily and politically, which only 
aggravated the discrepancies of fostering an ill-conceived strategy.  
 
Mau Mau Strategy and Tactics 
 
Just as the origins of Mau Mau are shrouded in mystery, so too were their strategic 
objectives. Not inspired by any specific ideology, it is difficult to pin down with any 
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accuracy the political and military manifesto of Mau Mau given the absence of any 
literature and the prevalence of mysticism surrounding its actions. Yet such was the 
porous nature of Mau Mau that the movement survived the initial attempts to stamp it 
out, with armed groups taking to the forest shortly after the declaration of the 
Emergency, as an embryonic insurgency developed. The insurgents operated in four 
main areas in the Kikuyu areas of Kenya: the Aberdare Mountains; Mount Kenya; the 
capital Nairobi; and the Kikuyu tribal reserve to the north. There is scant evidence to 
suggest that the unit leaders operating in these different areas were in close 
communication or formulated shared strategic goals. Therefore, it perhaps makes more 
sense to refer to multiple Mau Mau strategies, each revolving around a set of localised 
initiatives, rather than a holistic unifying strategy.  
 
In terms of their level of preparedness for launching their insurgency (unintentional 
though this might have been, especially given the question of whether it was a cause or a 
consequence of the declaration of Emergency) it should be remembered that unlike the 
communist insurgents in Malaya who had developed a wealth of combat experience 
fighting the Japanese in World War Two, Mau Mau fighters had no formalising military 
or paramilitary experience (although a small number had fought in the King‟s African 
Rifles during World War Two). This in part helps explain their tactical preference for 
small-scale attacks against white settlers and Kikuyu loyalists in isolated communities 
with little or no security force protection. Indeed, the most defining Mau Mau atrocity of 
the entire insurgency would reinforce such tactical preferences. On 26 March 1953 up to 
1,000 Mau Mau insurgents attacked the predominantly loyalist Kikuyu village of Lari, 
165 
 
killing over 100 villagers and burning their homes. The Lari massacre marked a turning 
point for Mau Mau for a number of reasons. Firstly, it demonstrated that operational 
planning, no matter how primitive, was still possible despite the arrest and incarceration 
of its purported leaders. Secondly, it demonstrated that the primary strategic „enemy‟ in 
Mau Mau‟s eyes were not necessarily the white settlers but loyalist Kikuyu‟s. Indeed, 
despite being depicted in propaganda as an anti-white movement, Mau Mau killed just 
32 white settlers during the Emergency, compared to the deaths of 1,821 fellow 
Kikuyu.
89
 Thirdly, it acted as a stark warning to the colonial and British security forces 
that complacency regarding the abilities of Mau Mau to stage large scale attacks was 
misplaced and that „victory‟ would not come easily. Fourthly, the fact that an audacious 
raid by insurgents against the police station in the village of Naivasha, just thirty miles 
from Lari, occurred at the same time yet independent of the Lari attackers demonstrated 
the strategic reification of Mau Mau. As a result of this fragmentation, Mau Mau was not 
to achieve a level of cogency either as a political or a paramilitary movement. 
 
The main cluster of Mau Mau offensive action occurred between October 1952 and July 
1953, necessitated by the requirements of newly formed insurgent groups to fight for the 
acquirement of supplies and weapons (the premise behind the Naivasha raid).This was 
permitted by the thinly spread density of the colonial and British security forces. Attacks 
waned after July 1953 as the military engaged in a series of offensives against Mau 
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Mau-controlled forestry, which disrupted insurgent supply lines.
90
 By 1955, weakened 
by the capture of several key leaders including General China, Mau Mau‟s strategic 
incoherence became amplified in the face of a more aggressive counter-insurgency 
approach by the British military. The strategic confusion surrounding Mau Mau does 
stand in contrast to the MRLA‟s more defined communist and anti-colonial goals. Yet 
there are more commonalities between the two insurgent groups than there would first 
appear. Bruce Hoffman and Jennifer Taw have pointed out five fundamental similarities. 
In both instances the insurgents: 
 
„(1) Were part of a clearly defined minority group in an ethnically stratified 
environment. 
(2) Used violence as a means of controlling the population. 
(3) Attacked primarily in rural or jungle areas. 
(4) Based the majority of operations within the country rather than in 
neighbouring countries. 
(5) Received little or no support from outside powers.‟91 
 
These similarities go some way to help us understand why so much strategic and tactical 
import was conducted by the British between the two campaigns (although issue must be 
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taken with their third point, given Mau Mau‟s presence and activity in Nairobi). But the 
British were fortunate that not only was Mau Mau strategically confused but it was 
restricted by a limited amount of support not just within Kenya but within Kikuyu tribal 
areas. 
 
 
Internal Support for Mau Mau 
 
Sympathy for Mau Mau within Kenya was generated by a set of real and mythical 
injustices emanating from elements within the Kikuyu tribe against the white settlers 
regarding grievances over land rights. Yet the popular appeal of the Mau Mau was 
stunted from the outset by a series of factors un-conducive to the spread of a nascent 
insurgency. Mau Mau did not embody the hopes and frustrations of the African 
population in Kenya. Furthermore, it did not even embody the feelings and sentiments of 
the entire Kikuyu tribe from which the movement originated. Educated, more urban tribe 
members, although sharing anti-colonial sentiments, were repelled by the feral tactics 
and mystical oath-taking of Mau Mau. This sociological divide between the Kikuyu 
ensured that Mau Mau would lack an appeal across the strata of Kikuyu, depriving the 
insurgency of not only a political vanguard, but also a tier of paramilitary strategists, 
leaving the movement weak and fatally constrained.
92
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The colonial authorities certainly exploited the schism between the loyalist Kikuyu and 
those who pledged their allegiance to Mau Mau. Kikuyu Home Guard units were at the 
centre of the counter-insurgency campaign in rural areas, providing law and order and 
capturing Mau Mau. The innovative implementation of pseudo-gang operations pitting 
former insurgents against their erstwhile comrades, combined with the fluid status of 
some Kikuyu from reluctant Mau Mau to staunch loyalist as a result of a mercurial 
balance of power in some communities, ensured that, in Daniel Branch‟s words, „the 
Mau Mau war was no simple dispute between coloniser and colonised.‟93 Although 
reference to a de facto Kikuyu civil war given the death toll amongst loyalist Kikuyu‟s 
overlooks the need in counter-insurgency to alienate the insurgents from the societal 
group from which they stemmed with an increased emphasis on turning their ethnic or 
religious brethren against them (for example, the Malayan campaign made use of 
surrendered enemy personnel in operations and sought to increase Chinese recruitment 
to the police force) it does highlight the alienated and disputed nature of Mau Mau‟s 
insurgency even within its own tribal group. Revealingly, during his interrogation by 
Special Branch, General China showed no remorse that the Mau Mau rising had 
instigated inter-Kikuyu violence, and appeared to revel in the need to eliminate the 
loyalist elements: 
 
„Q. Why does the Mau Mau concentrate on attacking its own tribe? 
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A. If you want to go away in a car and you find the back tyre is punctured, 
you have to stop and mend it before you can go on.‟94 
 
With limited internal support that spilled over into internecine violence, Mau Mau was 
further restricted in its actions by a paucity of external support also. 
 
 
External Support for Mau Mau 
 
Mau Mau was perhaps the most isolated insurgent group to fight the British in the post-
war era. Internally alienated from widespread support given its narrow tribal appeal, 
Mau Mau was further limited in garnering logistical aid by the caprice of Kenya‟s 
geographical location – with the exception of Ethiopia, the country was surrounded on 
all borders by countries controlled by colonial powers (Uganda and Tanganyika by 
Britain, and Somaliland by Italy). Notions of Mau Mau heading a vanguard of pan-
African nationalism are understandably sidelined. Solidarity may have been abound for 
the seemingly anti-colonial nature of Mau Mau‟s insurgency, yet no evidence has 
surfaced of militant nationalist groups from other African countries supplying Mau Mau 
with arms, finance or other aid, despite the prevalent rumour „bandied about by the 
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settlers… that Mau Mau was directed from the Soviet Embassy in Addis Ababa.‟95 So 
worried was the Foreign Office by these unsubstantiated rumours that it issued 
guidelines for counter-arguments to put pay to this persistent story.
96
 Interestingly, the 
deputy Governor of neighbouring Uganda reported to Sir Evelyn Baring in January 1954 
the presence of approximately 80 Kenyans in Uganda who intelligence sources believed 
had taken the Mau Mau oath.
97
 Fearful of an attempt by Mau Mau to secure cross-border 
support or supplies, the colonial authorities in Uganda screened 1,074 members of the 
Kikuyu tribe who lived in the country and served 198 of them with Detention and 
Removal Orders for implication in Mau Mau activities by July 1954.
98
 No evidence 
exists, however, of any successful or significant external supplies emanating from 
Uganda despite the deportations. 
 
Despite the fervent claims of those on the right-wing in Britain, who in Bruce Berman‟s 
words „saw a Russian agent behind every thorn tree‟, the colonial authorities in Kenya 
„well knew that there was no Soviet support or encouragement for Mau Mau,‟ in large 
part due to the colonial depiction of Mau Mau has an alienated and backward tribal 
uprising.
99
 On 4 May 1953, the British Embassy in Moscow informed the Foreign Office 
that „developments in Kenya have been receiving constant but not leading attention in 
the Central Soviet press.‟ The telegram, dismissive of Soviet overlordship of Mau Mau, 
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goes on to note that references to Jomo Kenyatta, who the British perceived as the leader 
of the insurgency, were „noticeably ungarnished with the epithets and phrases usually 
applied to persons or groups who enjoy Moscow‟s direct benediction.‟100 In any case, 
the Soviet policy, instigated under Nikita Khrushchev, of supporting African liberation 
struggles was not initiated until the 1960s, by which time Kenya had already been 
granted independence. Caroline Elkins has argued that Governor Evelyn Baring 
„despaired that Mau Mau was not communist. Had it been, the British government 
would have given them a blank cheque to suppress the movement, as it had done with 
General Templer.‟101 The only indication of external communist support came from a 
clique of Indian intellectuals, linked to Kenya via the sizeable Asian population in the 
colony, but „in all probability there was minimal, low-level support and nothing 
more.‟102 Despite General Erksine‟s declaration that „the Indian Government verbally 
and to a small extent financially, encourages nationalism amongst African politicians, 
particularly Kikuyu ones,‟103 the Deputy Governor of Kenya felt confident enough to 
inform the Colonial Secretary that „there is no evidence of any such (external) assistance 
being given‟ to the Mau Mau.104 The lack of external support in part helps explain Mau 
Mau‟s reliance on homemade weaponry, namely the hand crafted panga knife. Taking 
all this evidence into account we can build a picture of Mau Mau as an insurgent 
movement physically isolated in the dense forests, politically isolated by the narrow 
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tribal appeal of their cause, and internationally isolated by the lack of external support 
that constituted more than vocal solidarity.  
 
 
The International Context of the Campaign Against Mau Mau 
 
By the time the official counter-insurgency campaign was launched in 1952, American 
anti-colonial ideals had been relegated to mere rhetoric, given new president Dwight 
Eisenhower‟s priorities of interventionist anti-communism - itself an aggrandised 
version of the Truman Doctrine. In any case, British depictions of Mau Mau as a savage 
tribal cult helped stem any potential American opposition to colonial suppression and 
shored up American support for a gradual process of Kenyan national development. The 
„sideshow‟ interpretation of Mau Mau within the wider scheme of 1950s British foreign 
and defence policy is mirrored when placing it in the context of 1950s international 
relations. The death of Stalin and the wary relations between the new Soviet 
nomenclature and the new warrior-politician President in Washington ensured that a 
tribal uprising in a small corner of Kenya represented a ripple in the grander ocean of 
geostrategic Cold War thinking. As A.S Cleary observes, when both countries did 
acknowledge the events unfolding in Kenya, American views „ranged from seeing the 
spectre of international communism… to seeing them a primitive yet genuine 
manifestation of African nationalism… The Soviet Union, in general… (thought) Mau 
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Mau was either an anti-imperialist revolt or a figment of the imperialists‟ lurid 
imagination.‟105 
 
It does though remain an interesting point as to why the British never played the 
communist card in Kenya. Crying foul of communist interference would certainly have 
enlisted the overt support of the Americans and would have ordained Western 
legitimacy upon the crack-down. However, such an invitation would arguably have 
generated an impression that the British could not deal with a rebellion in a corner of 
their Empire and projected an image of an incapable and weak world power. In any case, 
the Americans themselves were well aware, as a December 1953 National Intelligence 
Estimate put it, that: „The Mau Mau terrorist movement in Kenya presents an excellent 
target for Communist exploitation; however, we have no conclusive evidence of 
Communist influence in the movement.‟106 Therefore, the constant portrayal to the 
outside world by the British of the barbarous image of Mau Mau in both political and 
cultural propaganda
107
 ensured that „together with faith in the adequacy of the British 
response… the United States consistently distanced itself from the revolt.‟108 
Consequently, the fight against Mau Mau was able to be disengaged from the wider 
global ideological tumult as a means of emphasising the peripheral nature of the Mau 
Mau insurgency. 
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Reflections on the Kenya Campaign 
 
Maybe Frank Kitson was right. Maybe Kenya did represent a „sideshow‟ amidst the 
wider circus of 1950s international relations. Yet its value as a case worthy of study is 
not diminished by its peripheral nature, firstly because of its value as an example of 
partial and slow counter-insurgency lesson transferral, and secondly due to the long 
under-exposed darker side to the eventual defeat of the Mau Mau uprising. The official 
death toll of „combatants‟ on each side was put at around 13,500. Of this figure, 11,503 
were supposed Mau Mau insurgents – a disproportionate number given that Mau Mau 
was estimated to only have 12,000 members at its peak. British and settler police and 
army fatalities numbered 63. The largest burden of the counter-insurgent forces was 
taken by the Kikuyu Home Guard, who suffered 1,920 killed.
109
 These figures reveal 
several characteristics of the counter-insurgency campaign in Kenya. The Home Guard 
fatality ratio to that of British soldiers discloses how the colonial authorities were 
complicit in allowing tensions within the Kikuyu community to be manipulated, 
rendering the conflict a de facto civil war as a means of reducing the „white man‟s 
burden‟. More illuminating is the Mau Mau death toll. At best, it merely exposes Mau 
Mau‟s woeful inability to have waged a successful insurgency given their lack of 
resources, training and support in the face of overwhelming fire and manpower held by 
the colonial authorities. In short, it was an annihilation waiting to happen. At worst, it 
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reveals a disproportionate and indiscriminate level of violence undertaken by the 
counter-insurgent forces who wantonly eliminated an inferior combatant with little 
adherence to notions of minimum force. The suppression of the Mau Mau did not 
require an overt military effort on behalf of the British armed forces, and the levels of 
troop deployment only ever constituted a relatively small-scale campaign, yet Kenya‟s 
distinction in the lineage of British counter-insurgency stems from several sources. It 
marks the first occasion in the post-war period that counter-insurgency lessons could be 
transferred from one theatre of operations to another, via a combination of 
organisational, tactical and personnel conveyance. This was to prove a piecemeal 
process. Furthermore, it also represented the first occasion in the post-war era where the 
British army had to plan and conduct concomitant urban and rural counter-insurgency 
operations. This would later have ramifications in Cyprus, Yemen and ultimately 
Northern Ireland (where Frank Kitson, who cut his counter-insurgency teeth in Kenya, 
would get to put his ideas into action on a grander scale). 
 
It could be argued that Mau Mau was doomed from the start. With no coherent strategic 
plan, a fractured leadership, limited resources, a narrow domestic appeal and no external 
support, Mau Mau were perhaps the most ill-equipped insurgent enemy the British have 
had to face in the post-war era. This conceivably ensured that the decidedly overzealous 
implementation of lessons from Malaya went beyond traditional notions of operational 
„success‟ and crossed into darker territory of violence undertaken with impunity. Unlike 
the Malayan tin and rubber plants, Kenya contained no significant resources of 
importance to the British Empire. Combined with the relatively low cost of the Kenya 
176 
 
campaign and the constricted appeal of Mau Mau‟s message, London was therefore not 
forced to rethink the entire premise of its colonial presence in the country as a result of 
the insurgency. Although David Percox is partially correct in arguing that „at no stage 
did the British counter-insurgency campaign in Kenya constitute part of a Colonial 
Office plan for decolonisation‟, it does miss the broader point that it was the politically 
and militarily acceptable outcome of the campaign that enabled an eventual process of 
stage-managed decolonisation, independent of the Mau Mau catalyst, to take place in 
1963 as a result of the Lancaster House summit of 1960 – the year the Emergency was 
officially revoked. Controlling every last vestige of the relinquishment of control over 
the Kenyan body politic, the Police Commissioner Richard Catling ordered in the weeks 
running up to formal independence that all police files on Kenyan tribal leaders, Kenyan 
politicians and public figures (files filled with innuendo, rumours and lies to discredit 
their reputation) should be burned before the British handed-over control in order to hide 
the methods of discrediting potential opponents to colonial authority, insurgent or not.
110
   
 
Although lasting eight years, all major counter-insurgency operations were ostensibly 
over within four. On 13 November 1956, Lt-General Lathbury officially announced the 
withdrawal of the British army from operations in Kenya, satisfied that Mau Mau was 
sufficiently defeated and law and order adequately restored.
111
 That it took the British 
four years to eradicate this severely deficient insurgency is in itself an indictment of the 
efficacy of the British strategy at large. The renewed historical interest in these four 
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years has given the study of the Mau Mau a new lease of life, and has opened up new 
avenues through which to explore this most Hobbesian of counter-insurgency 
campaigns: one that was indeed nasty, brutish and relatively short. 
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CHAPTER 5: ‘The Primacy of Politics: British Counter-Insurgency Operations in 
Aden and South Arabia, 1962-67’ 
 
 
The campaign in South Arabia between 1962 and 1967 represented the most distinct 
turning point in the lineage of British counter-insurgency since World War Two. It 
presented a disjuncture in terms of how counter-insurgency was planned, executed, and 
ultimately concluded. This chapter observes five primary factors, contained within the 
framework of the Tri-partite Model, as to why British military operations in South 
Arabia and the protectorate of Aden changed the rules of the asymmetric game whilst 
still displaying overt traits of slowly applied lessons and the slow implementation of a 
coherent military strategy before it was politically curtailed. Firstly, it marked for the 
first time in contemporary British counter-insurgency operations the complete 
supremacy of political priorities over military necessities, above and beyond the inherent 
politicised exigencies of counter-insurgency strategy. The political decision to publicly 
announce a withdrawal from South Arabia and Aden before the military objectives had 
been achieved denoted a seismic shift in the civil-military relationship over strategic 
planning in an asymmetric conflict environment. Secondly, counter-insurgency 
operations were politically motivated not solely by unfolding events on the ground but 
were partially driven by unfulfilled vendettas and vengeful ploys for redemption 
emanating from Whitehall. The spectre of Suez provided a strategic straightjacket for 
operations in South Arabia. Britain‟s 1956 humbling by Colonel Nasser became a 
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primary reference point for the political considerations surrounding the Yemen 
campaign, for both hawks, who saw Yemen as an opportunity to purge the memories of 
Suez‟s humiliation, and for the doves, who held Suez up as a cautionary tale of 
imperialist meddling in Arab affairs. Thirdly, the British army had not hitherto fought an 
insurgent group with such an overt level of supplies and solidarity from an external 
source. The permeation of Nasser‟s influence, munitions, and troops into Yemen 
sculpted the political and military nature of the conflict. Whereas in Malaya and Kenya 
the paucity of external funding and weaponry significantly hindered the longevity of the 
insurgency, in Yemen the constant stream of Egyptian arms ensured that a military 
victory for the British could not be guaranteed with the assurance it had in previous 
conflicts. Fourthly, never before had the international political dimension played such a 
significant part in shaping British thinking. Pressure from the United States and the 
United Nations weighed heavily in the minds of those controlling policy on Yemen, 
whilst the Six Day War between Israel and its Arab neighbours in June 1967 impacted 
upon Nasser‟s ability and willingness to divert Egyptian military resources to unsettling 
the British presence in South Arabia. Finally, South Arabia represented for the first time 
in the post-World War Two era an example of the British conducting a sizeable portion 
of their counter-insurgency operations covertly, with official political denial they are 
taking place. This was a by-product of both the delicate international situation and of the 
secretive Whitehall scheming to undermine Egyptian influence. The application of the 
Tri-Partite Model will help unravel the significance of these inter-twined themes and 
signify the relevance of the factors that impacted on the outcome of this one campaign to 
the broader sweep of British counter-insurgency experience. 
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The campaign in the Yemen has amassed a body of literature that has attempted to 
deconstruct the military and political exigencies of this most extraordinary of conflicts. 
The literature falls into two broad categories. The first is the depository of books that 
emerged in the immediate aftermath of the humiliating retreat. Senior political figures
1
, 
military commanders
2
, journalists who had closely covered the story
3
, and military 
analysts
4
 were quick to deconstruct the failings of the British campaign.  The intrigues of 
authorising covert mercenary missions and the political hubris that engendered „defeat‟ 
in South Arabia led to a second wave of literature to emerge in the early twenty-first 
century, as the West again involves itself in counter-insurgency in the Middle East. At 
the forefront of this new generation of literature on the dimensions of the conflict is 
Clive Jones‟ work on the military machinations of the politicised covert war waged in 
Yemen and its intelligence aspects.
5
 Aside from Jones‟ important work, a smattering of 
other books analysing the overt military campaign
6
, and the political and social 
implications of the insurgency
7
 have reawakened interest in this campaign that began 
with the most secret of involvements and ended with a most public withdrawal. 
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Background to the Insurgency 
The port of Aden had become a British possession in 1839 when the town was occupied 
and utilised as a trading post on the way to the Indian sub-continent by the East India 
Company. It was held as a Protectorate until 1 January 1963 when it eventually merged 
with the Federation of Yemen (an agglomeration of sultanates, sheikdoms and tribal 
entities) to form the Federation of South Arabia (FSA) – although, crucially for political 
control of the coming counter-insurgency campaign, the FSA was not a British colony 
per se, but was run by an indigenous Federal Council under the auspices of the British, 
who were allowed to keep their military bases.
8
 The strategic importance of Aden to the 
British was underlined in 1960 when it replaced Cyprus as the British Army‟s General 
Headquarters (GHQ) of Middle East Land Forces (MELF) in the wake of the EOKA 
insurgent campaign on the island. Therefore, next to London and Singapore (GHQ of 
Far East Land Forces, FARELF) Aden represented one of the triumvirate of locations 
critical to Britain‟s global military presence. Yet it was not just military efficacy at stake 
in the protection of the FSA; the British were also keen to shield their economic interests 
in this most inorganic of federations, notably the large British Petroleum (BP) refinery in 
Aden.
9
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Importantly, the entire campaign must be placed in the wider context of the Yemeni civil 
war. On 26 September 1962 a coup by a group of left-wing army officers inspired by 
Nasser‟s ideals of Arab nationalism, overthrew the Imam of Yemen, Mohammed al-
Badr, sparking an internecine conflict between the royalist FSA and the breakaway 
Yemen Arab Republic (YAR). It was to be in the crucible of the Yemeni civil war that 
the British would first forge their interventionist policies, steeled by a desire to augment 
the capabilities of the pro-British royalists in the face of the Egyptian-backed 
republicans. Yet it was not until 1963 that republican dissidents from the FSA initiated 
an insurgent campaign inside Yemen itself, penetrating the soft underbelly of British 
control. The urban campaign in Aden, at first instigated by the YAR and Egyptian-
sponsored insurgent group the National Liberation Front (NLF), must be seen as a 
parallel yet distinct conflict to that being undertaken as part of the civil war. British 
efforts to defeat the NLF represented the overt plank of the counter-insurgency 
campaign, triggering the deployment of troops to the streets of Aden and a formalised 
intelligence-gathering and interrogation network. Yet it was the concomitant rural 
campaign in the Arabian hinterland that formed the covert plank of British involvement. 
The secret deployment of mercenary SAS units to train, equip and fight alongside FSA 
troops amidst the civil war, as well as the more aggressive use of air power, was 
designed to undermine the Egyptian influence over the YAR. We may talk of „the South 
Arabian campaign‟, but we are faced with two distinct elements to it: the covert 
involvement in the civil war, and the overt efforts to dispel insurgents from Aden and 
the FSA. Holistically, they presaged significant transformations in how the British 
conducted counter-insurgency, largely via the political primacy achieved in regard to 
183 
 
strategic imperatives, and reveal a military persistently on the back foot, grappling with 
strategic coherence. 
 
The Political Response 
 
The most influential British political actors in the early years of the campaign coalesced 
into the so-called „Aden Group‟ of hawkish ministers in the Conservative governments 
of Harold Macmillan and then Alec Douglas-Home. The cabal were, in Clive Jones‟ 
words, „the direct descendants of the Suez Group‟ who had pushed so determinedly for 
action against Nasser in the previous decade.
10
 The Aden Group managed to shut the 
Foreign Office out of the policy-making process over Yemen and dictate an aggressive 
anti-Nasser, pro-royalist agenda.
11
 The key figures in the group were Julian Amery, 
Minister for Aviation; Duncan Sandys, the Colonial Secretary; Peter Thorneycroft, the 
Defence Secretary; and Neil „Billy‟ McClean MP, the self-styled Yemen emissary. The 
group saw the protection of British political, military and economic interests in South 
Arabia as a critical means of stemming the influence of Nasser-inspired Arab 
nationalism in the region. For the Aden Group, the humiliation of Suez still smarted.  
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The group tried to push Prime Minister Harold Macmillan into granting the royalists 
greater British support in order to defeat the republicans, encouraged by the dispatches 
of Neil McClean from Yemen and by their Jordanian and Saudi allies in the region.
12
 A 
more sceptical Foreign Secretary, Alec Douglas-Home, still maintained that the royalist 
cause was already lost and that overt British involvement would needlessly aggravate 
Egypt. On 7 January 1963 the Cabinet‟s Overseas and Defence Committee, dominated 
by the Aden Group and heavily influenced by McClean‟s report of the situation on the 
ground in Yemen, decided to recommend to full Cabinet that the British government not 
formally recognise the establishment of the YAR and to secretly supply the royalists 
with arms and supplies. Macmillan, whose instinctive suspicion of Nasser helped attain 
full Cabinet approval of the recommendation, would only later acknowledge in his 
memoirs that by early 1963 he had: „agreed to prepare defensive measures in case Aden 
or the Protectorates were openly attacked and meanwhile to take such other action as 
might seem justifiable.‟13 These „such other actions‟ that Macmillan approved included 
the deployment of mercenary special forces units inside the YAR despite an official 
policy of non-intervention. Yet Macmillan also wanted an insurance policy should the 
lid be blown on the covert mission. By early October 1962 he requested of Defence 
Minister Peter Thorneycroft that he „arrange for the Chiefs of Staff to consider our 
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military resources should we be driven to adopt an overt policy.‟14 Despite keeping an 
option open on a fully-fledged military deployment, the Colonial Office under Sandys 
turned a blind eye to the covert operations, whilst the Foreign Office became 
increasingly isolated in its attempts to rein in unlicensed action.
15
 This became a 
significantly more difficult task after 23 February 1963 when British positions within the 
FSA were attacked for the first time by Yemeni tribesmen, coinciding with a sizeable 
offensive by the Egyptians against royalist positions. This prompted the Aden Group to 
push for an outright counter-insurgency offensive.  
 
The one moment that cast aside any political misgivings about stemming the republican 
tide came with the attempted assassination of the British High Commissioner to the 
FSA, Sir Kennedy Trevaskis, in a grenade attack at Khormaksar airport on 10 December 
1963. The attack, carried out by one insurgent but orchestrated by the nascent NLF, 
convinced a previously sceptical Alec Douglas-Home, now the Prime Minister, of the 
need to tackle republican aggression both within and outside the borders of the FSA. A 
state of emergency was declared within the Federation after the failed assassination 
effort, and Trevaskis stepped up efforts in Aden to pressure London into firmly 
committing sizeable amounts of military supplies above and beyond the existing covert 
programme of arming friendly tribal groups.
16
 On 23 April 1964 the Cabinet‟s Defence 
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and Overseas Policy Committee again took a hawkish stance and endorsed many 
proposes enshrined in a document produced by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, entitled 
„Yemen: Range of Possible Courses of Action Open to Us.‟ Recommendations approved 
by the committee included mine-laying in Aden harbour (Operation Eggshell), 
distributing an increased amount of arms to tribal allies (Operation Stirrup), and 
authorising the mercenary squads to engage in acts of sabotage (Operation Bangle). The 
assassination of key insurgent leaders and Egyptian intelligence officers advising the 
military hierarchy of the YAR was, however, ruled out, against the wishes of the Chiefs 
of Staff.
17
 This course of action makes Douglas-Home‟s explicit confirmation to the 
House of Commons on 14 May 1964 that „our policy towards the Yemen is one of non-
intervention‟ even more discreditable.18  
 
The political emphasis on covert operations was heightened in March 1964 when the 
RAF‟s bombing of the republican fort at Harib resulted in civilian deaths. This offensive 
use of air power was met with international opprobrium and served as a warning to the 
British of the political dangers posed by the utilisation of overt levels of force in 
Yemen‟s civil conflict. Even the use of overt force during the campaign in Aden itself 
was blunted by a difficult urban operational environment and the constant stream of 
Egyptian supplies to the insurgents. With their hands tied in one conflict, and a 
worsening situation in the other, it is little surprise that Whitehall sought a political 
escape from the impasse. Payments from the British government to the FSA rose year-
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on-year, as Whitehall attempted to shift the burden of defeating the insurgent and 
military enemies of the FSA to the federal leaders themselves – a precedent perhaps for 
a future process of „Ulsterisation‟ in Northern Ireland. Payments increased from 
£4million in 1962, to £10million in 1963, to £14million in 1964, peaking at £18million 
in 1965 and 1966, a significant proportion of which was ring-fenced for training the 
South Arabian Army (SAA).
19
As the British required the SAA to step-up their security 
responsibilities, Whitehall was preparing to step-down from its political commitment to 
the FSA. A conference held in London in June 1964 brought together the Douglas-Home 
government and tribal representatives of the Federation. It settled on an agreement that 
full independence would be granted to the FSA no later than 1968.
20
 Three months after 
this accord had been attained the Tories left office, narrowly beaten by Harold Wilson‟s 
Labour Party in the general election. The accession of the Wilson government 
encouraged, in Fred Halliday‟s words, „illusions of radical reform‟ in relation to colonial 
dependencies, especially in Aden. However, the only difference between the 
Conservative and Labour government‟s approach to the conflict in Yemen, as Halliday 
goes on to argue, was that the Wilson administration was „more aware of objective 
difficulties and more able to put on a conciliatory face.‟21 Wilson maintained the Tories‟ 
line of none recognition for the YAR, and shared their predilection for sanctioning 
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covert operations when required.
22
 Labour offered no radical alternative to Yemeni 
policies that the Conservatives had, but this is not surprising given Douglas-Home‟s 
existing political concession that withdrawal from South Arabia was necessary and a 
timetable put in place. Initial Labour intentions to maintain a military base in Aden even 
after a large-scale withdrawal were abruptly halted with the sudden announcement in a 
February 1966 Defence White Paper that the Aden base would be abandoned, as would 
all British military commitments east of Suez. The plan to withdraw from Aden was 
brought forward a year to late 1967, marking a political acceptance of the now absent 
imperative to maintain a large military base in a country in the midst of both a civil war 
and an insurgency at a time when decolonisation had rendered the need for a major 
forward operating post in the Middle East anachronistic.
23
 However, the abandonment of 
the Aden base by the Wilson government is not as strategically short-sighted as it may 
appear when seen in the context of the newly obtained base of Diego Garcia. The 
acquisition of the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT) in November 1965 had been 
transformed into a military base of key Cold War strategic value as it was capable of 
launching British (and later American) aircraft within flying range of the Middle and Far 
East. This dual function of Diego Garcia must understandably have alleviated fears in 
the Ministry of Defence of losing strategic reach should Aden be abandoned. Indeed, 
Defence Secretary Denis Healey would later admit that the maintenance of the military 
base in Aden was „out of all proportion to the gain‟, and defended the political decision 
to withdraw without defeating the insurgency by stating that „all alternatives would have 
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been worse‟ given the inability to find a constitutional compromise between the 
seemingly irreconcilable tribes of the Federation.
24
 
 
Many fingers have been pointed at the Wilson government for its seemingly alacritous 
abandonment of Aden. David Ledger accuses Labour of taking „the road to ruin… with 
scarcely a backward glance.‟25 In a similar vein, Thomas Mockaitis, forgetting the 
previous Conservative promise to leave Aden, quite wrongly asserts that: „in no previous 
internal conflict had a change of government led to a reversal of policy in the middle of 
a campaign…‟26 Yet such criticisms miss several crucial political points. Firstly, they 
overlook the omnipresence of the sterling crisis of the late 1960s and how its financial 
implications permeated all aspects of not only domestic spending but defence spending 
too, rendering expensive overseas military campaigns unviable - the British military 
presence and operations east of Suez, including Aden, were costing £35million per year 
by 1966.
27
 As Philip Darby points out, „viewed sympathetically the 1966 White Paper 
may be regarded as a reasonable compromise between political exigency and economic 
necessity.‟28 Secondly, when viewed in the lineage of political management of counter-
insurgency campaigns, Wilson‟s execution of the withdrawal from Aden mirrors 
previous examples, as witnessed in Malaya and Kenya, of the British withdrawing all 
troops before formally handing over the reins of political power. However, where 
                                                          
24
 Denis Healey, The Time of My Life (London: Penguin, 1990), p.284. 
25
 David Ledger, Shifting Sands: The British in South Arabia (London: Peninsular Publishing, 1983), p.61. 
26
 Mockaitis, British Counter-Insurgency, p.66. 
27
 Hugh Hanning, „Britain East of Suez: Facts and Figures‟, International Affairs, Vol.42 No.2 (April 
1966), p.253. 
28
 Philip Darby, British Defence Policy East of Suez, 1947-68 (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), 
p.304. 
190 
 
Wilson is extremely culpable is his decision to retreat from South Arabia in 1966 bucked 
the equally important linear trend witnessed in British counter-insurgency, namely that 
troops are only withdrawn once a politically acceptable post-colonial authority is in 
place (admittedly a negligible possibility given the uncomfortable political amalgam that 
was the FSA) and only when the military situation is significantly under control with the 
insurgent threat perceivably neutered and indigenous forces able to contain any remnants 
of the threat (a more probable possibility, but one requiring solid political and economic 
backing in order to undertake effective host nation security force training). 
Consequentially, this process of decision-making politicised the exit strategy from a 
counter-insurgency campaign on a scale not seen before. Domestic considerations, 
combined with a politically expedient desire to relieve Britain of expensive and 
seemingly prolonged duties in one of the last troublesome colonial campaigns, witnessed 
the political trump the military for the first time in post-war British counter-insurgency. 
All counter-insurgency is political, yet previous political means had been to meet 
military ends. Not in Yemen. Seemingly abandoned by their political masters, the 
military were forced into a humiliating retreat, but not before their operational 
performance had set counter-insurgency precedents of their own. 
 
 
The Military Response 
The two distinct elements to the military campaign in South Arabia, the public and the 
private wars, made for two distinct strategies and ultimately two distinct outcomes. The 
191 
 
covert operations undertaken by the British Mercenary Organisation (BMO) successfully 
aided the royalist forces in taking back significant portions of territory lost to the 
republicans. With a restricted purview the BMO can perceivably be held to have met its 
goal of helping stem the military tide of the Egyptian-backed army of the YAR in the 
South Arabian hinterland. Their regular army comrades fighting the „conventional‟ 
counter-insurgency campaign in Aden and the troublesome tribal regions of the FSA can 
point to particular successes and to a tactically flexible performance required of large-
scale parallel urban and rural counter-insurgency campaigns, however the undiminished 
insurgent strength, fed by the public and protracted timetable for British departure, 
ensured that the military strategy never attained a level of cogent application. 
 
Political pressure from the Aden Group fomented the emergence of a covert military unit 
that was hoped could balance the political desire to retard Nasserism in South Arabia 
whilst shrouding notions of direct British involvement in the civil war, circumventing 
the constraints on overt force imposed by the legacy of Suez. A meeting in April 1963 at 
White‟s Club in London sealed the clandestine deployment of special forces to Yemen. 
Present at this meeting was Julian Amery, leading member of the Aden Group; Colonel 
David Stirling, founder of the SAS; Colonel Brian Franks, Commandant of 22 SAS; and 
crucially, Alec Douglas-Home, the Foreign Secretary, whose very presence at the 
meeting again undermines his later denials of any covert British involvement in 
Yemen.
29
 Soon after the meeting secretly sanctioned deliveries of several million pounds 
worth of light weapons were made to royalist forces, later followed by the secret 
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deployment of the BMO itself, partially pay-rolled by the Saudi royal family and in 1964 
headed by Colonel David Smiley. Smiley himself noted that „at the height of the 
mercenary effort, when I was commanding them, they [the BMO] never numbered more 
than 48, of whom 30 were French or Belgian and 18 British.‟30 The involvement of 
French mercenaries stems from their experience in Algeria and de Gaulle‟s desire to 
help undermine Nasser‟s influence in the Arab world as revenge for Egypt‟s support for 
the Algerian FLN insurgent group.
31
 Yet it is significant, as Smiley pointed out, that the 
BMO were there purely to „advise the commanders (of the royalist forces), train their 
troops and provide communication and medical services… It is important to realise that 
none of the mercenaries actually fought in the war…‟32 This advice and training under 
Smiley‟s leadership appeared to pay off. By 1964 the royalists had recaptured large 
swathes of territory lost in the previous year. However, despite undertaking Smiley‟s 
imperative of severing or disrupting the Egyptian supply lines to their republican allies, 
Nasser‟s significant escalation of Egyptian involvement in 1964 nullified the tactical 
intuition of several dozen British mercenaries. This most intriguing of British counter-
insurgency missions - covert and non-combative – was exposed and ostensibly finished 
by its exposure in an Egyptian newspaper, and subsequently the Sunday Times, which 
reproduced five letters written by members of the BMO operating in Yemen and 
acknowledging its covert mission.
33
 Yet one of the most significant ramifications that 
the politically-motivated covert operation created was a critical rupture between the civil 
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and military hierarchy in Whitehall. Declassified documents reveal that the most senior 
military commander, the Chief of the Defence Staff, Earl Mountbatten, did not 
recommend the adoption of a mercenary strategy, arguing to the Prime Minister that he 
saw „no prospect of any politically acceptable intervention that would have the 
significant effect other than to make the regime (in the YAR) more popular,‟ adding that 
he doubted „whether any undercover action… could have anything other than nuisance 
value.‟34 Even the Chief of the Air Staff, Air Chief Marshall Sir Thomas Pike, felt 
obliged to rubbish Neil McClean‟s telegrams from inside Yemen to Defence Minister 
Peter Thorneycroft, arguing that they „gave a different impression from what is being 
reported in Taiz,‟ and that he found it rather strange that „the only eye witness 
information available to us… should come from a back-bench Member of Parliament.‟35 
Despite these critical divisions, the covert mission went ahead, against the advice of 
senior military personnel. Yet the military hierarchy did have a greater input into the 
planning and execution of the overt campaign in the FSA. 
 
The first demonstration of overt force by the regular British army came with Operation 
Nutcracker in January 1964 as they launched an offensive against dissident tribal groups 
in the Radfan mountain range. The Federal government appealed to the British for a 
sizeable military presence to be sent to the region, epicentre of rural revolt towards the 
Federation. The army created the so-called „Radforce‟, a sizeable yet eclectic mix of 
troops from the 16/5
th
 Queen‟s Royal Lancers, the Royal Engineers, the Royal Horse 
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Artillery, the Royal Marines, the Parachute Regiment and the SAS.
36
 Small scale special 
forces operations were conducted alongside larger regular army operations during the 
five week operation that was painstakingly conducted, taking a single mountain at a 
time, pushing the rebels out of the area and subduing a nascent rural insurgency. 
Operation Nutcracker was the first major counter-insurgency operation that had received 
intense media coverage. Several camera crews and up to seventy newspaper 
correspondents travelled to the Radfan to cover the unfolding military campaign in rural 
South Arabia – a campaign whose emphasis lay almost exclusively on the kinetic 
elements of engaging the tribal rebels and remained disengaged from the notion of 
„hearts and minds‟.37 This resulted in a disaffected local populace in the Radfan, and 
when combined with the few resources that were being diverted to the area despite the 
military success of Nutcracker, made for a continuously problematic hotspot. The lack 
of Federal control over Radfan resulted in another major rural offensive being 
undertaken in spring 1964. Operation Cap Badge was the second demonstration of the 
British willingness to utilise its full military potential to shore up the FSA, yet it 
revealed how even this strategically important region, close to the YAR border and 
location of the Dhala Road, the only major route from the hinterland into Aden, was 
persistently vulnerable to lawlessness, ambush and supply route disruption. However, 
the Radfan dissidents proved illusive in the inhospitable mountainous terrain, and were 
able to maintain cross-border safe havens in the YAR from which to retreat and plan 
attacks on the British and FSA forces. Despite superior numbers and firepower, the 
Radforce proved less mobile, too dependent on limited air power capacities and 
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ultimately unable to stem the Egyptian supplies to the tribes. Despite some individual 
successes, the rural counter-insurgency campaign remained unable to suppress dissident 
rebellion in the face of a porous border, difficult operational conditions – 
meteorologically and logistically – and an insurgent enemy keen to avoid outright 
confrontation and test the longevity of British resistance.
38
 A different set of 
circumstances faced the military fighting the urban campaign, but they too had to accept 
a similar outcome. 
 
With its maze of crowded back streets, and its array of bazaars, mosques and cafes, 
Aden did not suit itself to the conduct of urban counter-insurgency. It offered an 
assortment of hiding places and concealments for an insurgent group with a preference 
for ambush and assassination. Once the NLF began its concerted campaign of urban 
insurgency inside Aden in 1964, the British were on the backfoot and were forced to 
launch a defensive urban counter-insurgency campaign (unlike Operation Hammer in 
Nairobi during the suppression of Mau Mau, which was pre-emptive and offensive). The 
dense population clusters, combined with the NLF‟s proclivity to attack British troops in 
public places so as to blend back into a crowd, ensured that urban patrolling was fraught 
with dangers for British service personnel. Stop-and-search checkpoints in known areas 
of insurgent support lacked both nuance and efficiency.
39
 The stream of smuggled 
weapons to the NLF in the city emboldened the group into making more brazen and 
public attacks. Rules of Engagement (RoE) in Aden were formalised on the so-called 
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„Blue Card‟ distributed to all soldiers, enshrining the procedure of issuing a verbal 
warning (in English and Arabic) before resorting to gunfire. These procedures, 
embodying in theory the notions of minimum force, were difficult to transpose into 
practice in the confusing, crowded surroundings of Aden. 
 
One of the more innovative counter-measures the British took to urban insurgency was a 
perverted form of the pseudo-gang technique. Instead of „turning‟ captured insurgents 
into reformed units of counter-insurgents, the SAS pioneered so-called „keeni meeni‟ 
operations (from the Swahili phrase to describe a snakes‟ slither through the grass). 
Based at Ballycastle House on the base at RAF Khormaksar, SAS operatives trained in 
close quarter combat would don Arab dress with concealed weapons. Deploying to the 
areas of Aden synonymous with insurgent support, the keeni meeni operatives would be 
dispatched to blend in with the populace and then kill, snatch or interrogate suspected 
insurgents. As Anthony Kemp puts it, „essentially the purpose was to meet terrorism 
with terrorism.‟40 Despite the unique approach, the keeni meeni operations produced few 
discernable results in Aden, were plagued by „friendly fire‟ incidents as regular army 
troops would occasionally mistake the operatives for insurgents, and were, in Jonathan 
Walker‟s opinion, „compromised by their wide territorial scope and the fact that they 
rarely dovetailed with the special operations of the regular army units.‟41 
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Military command of operations in Aden lay with a Security Commander. This post, 
initially filled by the Commander of the Aden Brigade from 1963, was subsumed under 
the command of the General Officer Commanding (GOC) Middle East Land Forces 
(MELF) in 1965, two years after major counter-insurgency operations began.
42
 The 
Security Commander, as the most senior military figure in the campaign had no political 
powers commensurate with a Templer-esque Director of Operations given the FSA‟s 
quasi autonomous position as a British Protectorate and not a colony. It was also not 
until 1965 that an effective civil-military structure was established – another 
demonstration of belated institutional adaptation in an insurgency environment. A 
Security Policy Committee was chaired by the High Commissioner and attended by the 
Federal Minister for Internal Security, the Commander-in-Chief Middle East, and the 
Security Commander, in an attempt to orchestrate the campaign. Under this committee 
sat the Security Committee, constitutive of the Deputy High Commissioner, Deputy 
GOC MELF, and crucially the Chiefs of Police, Intelligence, and the Aden and Federal 
Governments. This committee was able to deal with operational concerns and issues, as 
opposed to the strategic remit of the Security Policy Committee.
43
 
 
However, one of the main issues that beset the Security Policy Committee was the 
nature of the relationship between the British army and the South Arabian army – an 
amalgamation of the Federal Regular Army and the Federal National Guard in 1967. 
Although responsible for their training and much of their funding, the British army never 
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fully trusted the SAA, harbouring suspicions of its professionalism and loyalty. 
Intelligence channels between the two armies were thus sparse as the NLF was known to 
have infiltrated the ranks of the SAA.
44
 Unlike in Malaya and Kenya where indigenous 
troops proved crucial to the wider counter-insurgency campaign, the role of the army in 
South Arabia frustrated the British. Caught in a paradox between the internal ineptitude 
of reliance on the SAA and the international condemnation that a heavy British 
deployment in the Middle East would create, the British never found a truly coherent 
balance, resulting in a stymied military campaign. The mutiny of the South Arabian and 
Aden Armed Police, provoking the siege of the Crater district of Aden and its 
subsequent retaking by the 1
st
 Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders commanded by the 
infamous Lt-Colonel Colin „Mad Mitch‟ Mitchell in June-July 1967, crystallised fears 
over indigenous armed force reliability.  
 
By June 1967 the British army had already passed security responsibility for the FSA 
interior to the SAA in accordance with the imminent politically-dictated withdrawal 
timetable. The British retreated to form a defensive perimeter around Aden as troops 
became sitting targets for reprisal attacks by insurgents with near impunity such was the 
environment of lawlessness inspired by the schedule of British military departure. Such 
a scenario would find echoes in Basra forty years later. Fears over the dependability of 
the post-transition SAA were realised on the eve of British withdrawal when the SAA 
declared allegiance to the NLF. The ignominy of the retreat of the British forces – 
conducted by the largest naval task force assembled by the British since the Suez 
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invasion, totalling twenty-four ships
45
 - was compounded by the knowledge that the 
fundamental strategic goal of the Aden military mission, to secure the Protectorate for 
the FSA, was not achieved. The indigenous army it had trained to aid it in this mission 
had mutinied, and left the city in the hands of the insurgents it had spent the last four 
years battling against. Prime Minister Harold Wilson failed to see the strategic 
implication of the withdrawal when all he recalled of the retreat from Aden in his 
memoirs was that is was „successfully accomplished… in good order with no loss of 
life.‟46 The swift collapse of the FSA soon after the British departure sealed the 
ostensible failure of the British military mission – the first post-war counter-insurgency 
„defeat‟ since Palestine. Subjugated to political demands, and facing a well-supplied 
insurgent enemy, the British military were unable to fulfil the grand strategic mission set 
them. This failure was caused to a significant extent by the absence of an effective 
intelligence-gathering and dissemination network.  
 
 
Intelligence in South Arabia and Aden 
Before the coup in 1962 and the establishment of the YAR, British intelligence in 
Yemen had been the responsibility of MI5 and the Aden Intelligence Centre who were 
fed information by the local Special Branch. Despite this, developments in the north 
came as a surprise, with little foresight into the Yemeni army‟s revolutionary intentions. 
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This was in part exacerbated in the immediate post-revolution period by the Joint 
Intelligence Committee‟s refusal to sanction reconnaissance flights over Yemen to 
monitor the Egyptian build-up, consequently establishing intelligence-gathering 
parameters that deemed there was „no justification‟ for activity outside the borders of the 
Protectorates.
47
  The seeming vacuum of British intelligence in the wake of the 
revolution generated particular worry at the CIA‟s estimation that within a week of the 
coup Abdullah al-Sallal‟s new regime would be receiving support from up to twelve 
thousand Egyptian troops in the spirit of pan-Arab nationalist solidarity.
48
 However, CIA 
reports were distrusted as overly stating the strength of the Egyptian influence as a 
means of discouraging British involvement in the civil war.
49
 Significantly, at the time 
of the revolution in September 1962, there was just one MI6 officer stationed in Aden.
50
 
This paucity of trained intelligence operatives ensured that Britain‟s covert involvement 
in the civil war had to be undertaken by remnants of the SAS and not SIS given the 
timescale that would have been required to gather the requisite officers and resources in 
the country. The Director of MI6, Sir Dick White, was personally sceptical of the Aden 
Group‟s interventionist approach to Yemen and fended off attempts to engage MI6 in 
the campaign, arguing that the organisation should „just stick to the job of intelligence 
gathering.‟51 However, this did not stop Prime Minister Harold Macmillan from forming 
an unofficial Yemen intelligence taskforce, containing several retired senior MI6 
officers with significant regional experience, to advise him on the clandestine aspects of 
the campaign. It is difficult to assess whether it was despite or due to MI6s backseat role 
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in the covert campaign in Yemen that the clandestine efforts in support of the royalists 
against the republican forces were hampered by a lack of effective and accurate 
intelligence. For example, air strikes against arms caravans crossing into the FSA could 
not be sanctioned as operatives on the ground could not distinguish between them and 
ordinary caravans of legitimate goods. Consequentially, the BMOs capacity to stem the 
flow of arms to aid the nascent insurgency in the Radfan and Aden was severely 
restricted.
52
 What intelligence that was gathered by the SAS in known insurgent 
strongholds was often bought off locals in return for „thirty-thirty-thirty‟ – thirty 
thousand ryals, thirty rifles and thirty boxes of ammunition.
53
 This system of paying for 
intelligence ran parallel to a process of buying the loyalty of tribal leaders in rebellious 
areas in an attempt to quell subversion. It is estimated that up to £30million was spent on 
this informal programme of securing intelligence and loyalty, although the quality of 
both these factors was questionable given that many of the weapons given by the British 
were sold on to the republicans by expedient, even entrepreneurial, tribesmen.
54
  
 
A lack of useable intelligence not only hampered the clandestine military efforts, but the 
overt military campaign too. Even the Commander in Chief of British Forces in the 
Middle East bemoaned the fact that during the Radfan operations, „one of the greatest 
difficulties in using limited force against specific military targets is the lack of timely 
intelligence.‟55 The Chief of the Defence Staff, Earl Mountbatten, felt compelled to 
express the collective concerns of the Chiefs of Staff at the shortfall of intelligence 
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officers in the FSA and Aden in a letter to Defence Secretary Denis Healey in early 
1965. He revealed that the JIC had held a special meeting solely to discuss the issue, and 
went on to argue that unless the intelligence gap was breached, „our large military and 
financial outlay for countering insurgency… is going to be prejudiced.‟56 This was 
perhaps the one factor the overt and covert campaigns had in common that most 
hampered their respective strategic goals. 
 
Further setbacks to an efficient intelligence set-up in South Arabia remained the 
obfuscation of a discernable structure and inter-agency rivalry, each earnestly protecting 
the intelligence gathered by their own fiefdoms, wary of that produced by each other. 
Despite the SAS operatives in the BMO gathering local intelligence on the front line of 
the civil war, MI6 still remained the primary intelligence gatekeeper, controlling the 
flow of intelligence between SAS patrols unable to remain in touch with each other due 
to a lack of communication equipment. In Clive Jones‟ opinion, „the reluctance to make 
better use of the reports produced by BMO operatives remains the intelligence failure of 
the British...‟57 The nexus of the intelligence network in South Arabia was the Aden 
Intelligence Centre (AIC). Containing about thirty intelligence officers, the AIC 
coalesced intelligence representatives from Special Branch (perhaps the most significant 
intelligence gatherers within Aden itself), Military Intelligence, the Information 
Research Department (responsible for propaganda), MI6, and MI5. However, the AIC 
vied for intelligence supremacy with the FSAs own Federal Intelligence Committee 
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(FIC). A working group was established back in London by the Joint Intelligence 
Committee to review the intelligence structures and capabilities in South Arabia. In May 
1964 it delivered a report recommending changes to the existing system; however the 
change of government back in Britain, combined with the incessant inter-agency rivalry 
ensured that the changes were never wholly implemented with any conviction.
58
 Indeed, 
it was not until twelve months after the declaration of the Emergency that an 
overarching Director of Intelligence was appointed,
59
 and it was not until July 1965, 
some eighteen months into the Emergency, that the authorities proscribed the NLF – an 
indication of how little intelligence the British actually had on the source or motive of 
the violence being directed against them.  
 
There were two significant features of the intelligence efforts in South Arabia. First was 
the reliance the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) had on signals intelligence (SIGINT) 
to inform the British intelligence establishment of events pertaining to the Yemen civil 
war. Given that the only tangible human intelligence (HUMINT) capability remained 
several dozen mercenary special forces operatives and that there was a political 
reluctance to physically assign MI6 officers to the conflict area, the JIC relied heavily on 
intercepts of Egyptian radio traffic by a Government Communication Headquarters 
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(GCHQ) SIGINT intercept post, as well as army SIGINT units.
60
 The sudden and 
humiliating retreat from Aden resulted in the curtailment of the GCHQ SIGINT post, 
unlike in other recently independent colonies, including Kenya, whereby defence 
agreements with politically friendly post-colonial governments legislated for the 
maintenance of SIGINT posts. To compensate for this abrupt end to SIGINT facilities in 
Aden, three GCHQ operatives were tasked prior to the withdrawal from the colony, to 
covertly place antennas disguised as flagpoles within the grounds of the British embassy 
in the city in order to intercept signals traffic even after decolonisation.
61
 
 
The second feature was the NLF‟s deliberate targeting of the British intelligence outfit 
as part of its urban strategy in Aden. In late 1964 the NLF attempted to strengthen their 
position within the city by strangulating the British ability to infiltrate or gather 
intelligence on them. By mid-1966, sixteen Special Branch officers had been 
assassinated, stultifying the intelligence side of the urban counter-insurgency campaign 
and placed an additional emphasis on routine patrolling as a means of intelligence 
gathering in the city.
62
  
 
With the absence of a cultivated network of local sources, particularly after the advance 
notice of Britain‟s intention to withdraw (after which intelligence „all but dried up‟ as 
                                                          
60
 David Easter, „GCHQ and British External Policy in the 1960s‟, Intelligence and National Security, 
Vol.23 No.5 (2008), p.683. 
61
 James Bamford, Body of Secrets: How America’s NSA and Britain’s GCHQ Eavesdrop on the World 
(London: Arrow Books, 2002), pp.161-2. 
62
 Walker, Aden Insurgency, p.141; Mockaitis, British Counter-Insurgency, p.59. 
205 
 
locals feared reprisals once the British has departed)
63
, compounded by the parlous state 
of intelligence dissemination channels, the interrogation of suspects became one of the 
only significant methods through which to garner information on the NLF. The British 
operated a separate Detention Centre (at al-Mansoura) and an Interrogation Centre (at 
Fort Morbut). Suspects could be held at Fort Morbut for interrogation for seven days 
without warrant and for a further twenty-one days under the authority of a „holding 
order‟, totalling a maximum interrogation period of twenty-eight days without charge (a 
period with haunting contemporary echoes) unless a „detention order‟ was issued and the 
suspect sent to al-Mansoura. The Interrogation Centre at Fort Morbut represented a legal 
blackhole where „in-depth interrogation‟ masked a darker form of intelligence gathering. 
Such activity was carried out under the protection of the original Emergency 
proclamation of December 1963, further enhanced by the imposition of direct rule over 
the Protectorates in September 1965. Claims of brutality and torture were denied by the 
army, yet they still refused any foreign observers to enter the Centre, including 
representatives of the International Red Cross and Amnesty International.
64
 However, 
the British government partially bowed to pressure to address the allegations of abuse 
and commissioned Roderic Bowen QC to investigate Fort Morbut. Critically, his remit 
was restricted to reviewing procedural practices only, and not the actions of individual 
intelligence officers. The centres at Fort Morbut and al-Mansoura were operating under 
military and not civilian law. Bowen recommended that this legal modus operandi be 
reversed, requiring the employment of civilian interrogators at Morbut to replace the 
interrogators from the Counter Intelligence Company of the Aden Intelligence Corps 
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who had been the focus of accusations.
65
 Bowen‟s eventual report concluded that 
although there had been „a most regrettable failure to deal expeditiously and adequately 
with the allegations of cruelty‟ at the Interrogation Centre, „there were no serious 
criticisms‟ to be made.66 The commissioning of Bowen‟s report in the first place, 
combined with his rebuke (albeit a rather weak one) of interrogation procedures, 
encapsulates the disarray that the British intelligence system was in during the Aden 
campaign. With murky lines of communication, an ever decreasing circle of informers 
and the employment of extra-legal interrogation methods that became public knowledge, 
it became inevitable that the insurgent group that British and Federal intelligence 
community knew so little about came to elude the authorities and make irreversible in-
roads in both rural and urban South Arabia in the absence of an effective counter-
insurgency strategy. 
 
 
Insurgent Organisation 
To add to the state of strategic and tactical disorder incurred by fighting concomitant 
urban and rural counter-insurgency campaigns that were simultaneously overt and 
covert, the British even faced a bifurcated „enemy‟ in the open insurgency they faced in 
Aden and the outlying Protectorate. The National Liberation Front (NLF) was a 
disparate coalition of southern Yemeni militants who had transferred to the YAR after 
the 1962 coup. The Front for the Liberation of Occupied Southern Yemen (FLOSY) was 
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a breakaway insurgent group who had its ideological roots within the Socialist Party. 
Both groups differed in terms of their organisational structure, as well as in regard to 
strategic ends and tactical means. It was, however, to prove to be the NLF with which 
the British would come to focus their counter-insurgency efforts on as the internal power 
struggles of the fractured insurgent movement shifted in their favour. 
 
On 14 October 1963 the NLF declared their official revolt against British rule in South 
Arabia. The group forged an agglomeration of ten various clandestine groups, including 
pro-YAR tribal groups within the FSA, republican FSA army officers, middle class 
intellectuals, and mercenaries.
67
 They were, however, unified in their nationalism and in 
their mutual desire to rid south Yemen of British control and influence. The NLF was 
split into three main branches. It maintained a central political body (Maktab Siyasi); a 
financial body (Jihaz Mali); and a military body (Jihaz Askari), the latter element 
responsible for funding, training and supplying the NLF Liberation Army – the actual 
insurgent fighters.
68
 These insurgents adopted a cell-based organisational system, 
autonomous but for „link men‟ who kept cells informed of each others actions and future 
plans.
69
  
 
A desire to achieve a unity of effort against the British presence culminated in January 
1965, with a merger between the NLF and a nascent breakaway group, the Organisation 
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of the Liberation of the Occupied South (OLOS), to form FLOSY. This union was short-
lived, as the NLF quickly reasserted its independence from FLOSY over divergences of 
strategic and tactical direction amongst the leading figures of the two branches.
70
 
FLOSY remained determined to augment its own strongholds and pursue a separate path 
to insurgent victory. To emerge from its political organisation during 1966 was a quasi-
autonomous armed wing, the Popular Organisation of Revolutionary Forces (PORF). 
PORF was heavily influenced by the Egyptians, who provided the bulk of the group‟s 
training. In terms of fighting strength, PORF was constitutive of between nine and 
twelve armed units, made up of between twelve and thirty men each. These units 
operated almost exclusively in Aden, whereas other armed elements of FLOSY took 
charge of insurgent operations elsewhere in the Federation.
71
 Organisationally diverse 
from each other, FLOSY and the NLF crucially deviated on strategic vision, a factor that 
could have been exploited further, had the British not been subsumed in their own 
strategic dilemma.  
 
 
Insurgent Strategy and Tactics 
The NLF, as the primary manifestation of insurgent opposition against the British, was 
not an entrenched social movement, and neither was it driven by stringent operational 
plans to drive the British out. Instead, the NLF adopted a long-term strategy of 
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harassment, assassination, sabotage and terrorism. With overt Egyptian support, the NLF 
insurgency may have been scrappy but it was certainly potent. 
 
By late 1963 arms were permeating the border from the YAR into the FSA to aid the 
NLFs initial insurgent front in the Radfan mountains. The fulcrum of the NLFs rural 
strategy was to cut the Dhala road, the main artery from Aden to the interior of the 
Federation, thereby severing British ability to deploy forces to the hinterland and 
maintain control. The NLF blockaded the road for three months before the British 
launched Operation Nutcracker to depose them. Yet the NLF acknowledged the need to 
assert a national presence if their ultimate strategic goal was to be met. Parallel to their 
rural activities, they launched an urban insurgency inside Aden, opening a new flank in 
the insurgency. The main plank to the urban platform was a targeted campaign of 
assassination against pillars of British control. The audacious assassination attempt 
against High Commissioner Kennedy Trevaskis marked the explosive beginning of the 
official Emergency in Aden and the FSA, whilst the aforementioned targeting of the 
Aden Special Branch revealed an acute acknowledgment on the NLFs part as to the 
importance of nullifying British intelligence capabilities. High profile victims of the 
NLFs campaign against British security and political figures included Sir Arthur 
Charles, the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly (shot as he left his local tennis club), 
and Harry Barrie, Deputy Head of Aden Special Branch (shot in his car as he waited at a 
set of traffic lights).
72
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In June 1965 the NLF decreed its National Charter, a self-styled manifesto and 
ideological programme, espousing the desire to turn the national revolution into a social 
one in a country rid of colonial control. By 1966 these ideals were transmuted into 
tangible policies imminently actionable as the British announced their intention to stage 
a prolonged withdrawal. From the recommendations of the 1966 White Paper stemmed, 
in the words of journalist Stephen Harper, „the decision (by the NLF) to give the British 
a send-off with bombs and bullets, and to hell with conferences and documents.‟73 At a 
stroke, London had granted the NLF carte blanche to step up their insurgent campaign 
against an army with one eye on its looming departure and against an indigenous 
intelligence network soon to be isolated from its chief guardian. As Joseph Kostiner has 
argued, the NLFs greatest achievement as an insurgent movement „seems to have been 
its utilisation of the “fluidity of force” tactics, namely the spreading of fighting in order 
to achieve a maximum number of attacks on a given area…‟74 By opening two distinct 
fronts to the insurgency the NLF was able to forge an extensive and effective strategy 
that drained British resources and struck at the heart of their counter-insurgency 
apparatus. Sustaining this insurgent strategy was its disparate and dispersed internal 
support network within Aden and the wider Federation. 
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Internal Insurgent Support 
The complex tribal system in the Yemeni hinterland ensured that there was no logical 
pattern of insurgent support, with the loyalty of tribal leaders often being bought by both 
insurgent and counter-insurgent forces. Internal support for FLOSY stemmed primarily 
from within Aden, in contrast to the NLF who controlled most western and central parts 
of the FSA interior, although pockets of FLOSY support in these regions did give it 
access to one of the main through roads to Aden, enabling them to keep their urban 
insurgency well supplied.
75
 FLOSY also had strongholds in the East Aden Protectorates 
(EAP). However, the crucial factor that affected levels of internal support for the two 
insurgent groups was the location of their respective leaders. The FLOSY hierarchy 
directed its campaign either from Egypt or over the border in the YAR in contrast to the 
NLF‟s leaders who based themselves within the FSA. This generated a general 
perspective amongst the wider population of South Arabia, particularly those 
sympathetic to the republican cause, that the NLF was an organic indigenous movement 
with a national presence, whereas FLOSY appeared as Egyptian puppets, propagating 
Nasser‟s agenda in the country.76 Paradoxically, the greatest source of external support 
that bestowed a degree of insurgent effectiveness upon FLOSY actually provoked a 
haemorrhaging of internal support for their movement – a significant hindrance once the 
NLF and FLOSY turned their guns on each other as the British withdrawal sparked a 
power grab by the insurgent victors in the subsequent power vacuum.
77
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External Insurgent Support 
More than in any other counter-insurgency campaign in post-war British history, the 
external support dynamic that played out in South Arabia was so significant as to render 
it crucial to the actual outcome of the conflict. The assistance proffered by Nasser‟s 
Egypt shaped both conflicts the British found themselves embroiled in: the covert 
involvement in the Yemen civil war and the insurgency in Aden and the FSA. In a 
reverse mirroring of the participation levels of their British adversaries, the Egyptians 
found themselves overtly involved in assisting the republican forces in the civil war, 
whilst clandestinely training and funding the anti-British insurgency inside the 
Federation. Arguably, it was their support in the latter conflict that ultimately bore the 
most fruit. Although claims that „the Yemen was Nasser‟s Vietnam‟78 are a little far-
fetched, it was clear that in their campaign in Yemen the Egyptians „appeared no closer 
to victory (in 1967)… than they had been in 1962.‟79 
 
Egypt sent their first one hundred troops to Yemen weeks after the revolution in October 
1962, causing consternation amongst the British military hierarchy.
80
 By the end of the 
year they had sent 15,000. The Egyptian strategy during their proxy intervention in the 
Yemen civil war was threefold: to prop up the new republic in the name of Arab 
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nationalism; to encourage the revolution to spread from Yemen to Saudi Arabia; and to 
drive the British out from the south.
81
 Although the first and third of these goals were 
met, it is questionable as to the extent to which it was the Egyptian presence and effort 
that guaranteed the outcome. At best, the Egyptians were conduits through which the 
Yemeni republicans, northern regulars and southern insurgents alike, could achieve their 
own goals facilitated via Egyptian arms and training. As a proxy conflict it can be seen 
as a success. As an outright military deployment it cannot. The large Egyptian forces in 
the YAR, some 50,000 by 1965, left themselves open to militia ambushes on a terrain 
they knew little about, and failed to adequately devise a strategy capable of countering 
small, speedy royalist militias whose British sponsors had trained them in the ways of 
guerrilla fighting. In short, they sent a regular army to fight an irregular war with 
conventional tactics and unwieldy operational perspectives.
82
  
 
The British government‟s 1966 Defence White Paper that heralded a withdrawal from 
South Arabia provoked Nasser into rethinking his entire Yemen strategy and ended up 
altering the external influence dimension dramatically. Secure in the knowledge of a 
protracted British pull-out, Nasser devised a so-called „Long Breath strategy‟ in the 
week after the British announcement, which constituted the redeployment of the bulk of 
the Egyptian forces in the YAR from the north closer to the southern border with the 
FSA, ready to exploit the impending military vacuum.
83
 This shift did entail a reduction 
in the number of Egyptian troops (an intention pre-dating the White Paper), however the 
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Egyptian strategic rethink provoked by the British announcement resulted in a sizeable 
offensive force being drafted onto the FSAs borders. The vultures were immediately 
circling the frail body of the FSA in anticipation of British life-support being withdrawn. 
Yet significantly, the intervention in Yemen was proving increasingly unpopular with 
the Egyptian population. It was expensive and was draining military resources. The cost 
of Egyptian involvement in Yemen came at more than just the price of domestic 
disgruntlement for Nasser. When Israel launched its offensive against Egypt, Syria and 
Jordan in June 1967 up to one third of Egypt‟s military was deployed in Yemen.84 The 
humiliation Egypt suffered during the Six Day War prompted a chastened Nasser to 
initiate a withdrawal from Yemen in October of that year – a process complete by mid-
December, and undertaken in the knowledge that the British had already left.  
 
The British departure was in large part due to the potency and longevity of the urban 
insurgency being prosecuted in Aden by the NLF and FLOSY. The latter group‟s 
particular proximity to Nasser‟s regime granted them the privileged insurgent position of 
operating under the guardianship of a proxy state benefactor. However, even before 
FLOSYs creation in 1965, the Egyptians were promulgating insurgent action inside the 
FSA by aiding the training of NLF fighters. By 1964 „intelligence reports indicated that 
about two hundred Adenis had received terrorist training from Egyptian agents in the 
Yemen.‟85 Indeed, the Egyptian intelligence officers who undertook the tuition of 
republican insurgents posed the greater threat to British troops and represented the most 
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significant aspect of the external involvement of the Egyptians, than the tens of 
thousands of regular troops stationed menacingly on the FSAs borders. Yet it was not 
just the Egyptians who staked an external claim in the insurgent cause. It was natural for 
the insurgents operating in the FSA to look to their republican brethren in the YAR for 
assistance in achieving the unity of Yemen. However, it is revealing that at first the 
YAR were unwilling to support or supply FSA-based insurgents as they held a desire to 
engender British recognition of the YAR and thus nullify any royalist opposition to the 
entrenchment of Yemeni republicanism. Explicit support for the NLF only came after 
the British began overtly supplying the royalist armed forces in the civil war in February 
1963.
86
 But it was not just to their ideological cohorts in the north to whom the NLF 
looked to garner external support. In 1965 they secured financial aid from the Arab 
League to procure arms and ammunition, whilst there were also intelligence reports the 
same year that claimed that NLF members had travelled to Cyprus to receive training in 
sabotage and guerrilla warfare from veterans of the EOKA insurgency campaign against 
the British in the mid-to-late 1950s.
87
  
 
Accumulatively, the disparate sources of external support that the anti-British insurgent 
groups attained significantly aided the NLF in particular to not only acquire intimate 
training in insurgent warfare tactics but also acquire the financial and logistical 
resources to perpetuate their conflict beyond any reasonable hope had they been forced 
to be self-sufficient, like the MRLA in Malaya or the Mau Mau in Kenya. The NLF was 
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wired into a wider regional body politic, was part of the grander design of pan-Arab 
nationalism, and thus achieved political resonance with an audience far beyond the city 
walls of Aden or the remote mountain regions of the South Arabian interior. Indeed, the 
conflict as a whole – a conflict encompassing a civil war, covert proxy involvement by 
regional and imperial powers, and a potent insurgency – would come to have a political 
resonance beyond the capitals of those countries with an immediate stake in the 
outcome. If the level of external support rendered to the NLF set a precedent in British 
counter-insurgency campaigning, then so too did the intensity of international interest 
and input throughout the course of the conflict.  
 
 
International Context 
The ramifications of civil war, insurgency and political turmoil in Yemen presented the 
British with not only a regional maelstrom but a growing international storm over its 
interference in the YAR and over its treatment of insurgents in the FSA. The interplay 
between the perceived communist manipulation of Nasser and American interpretations 
of British resurgent imperialism made for the most turbulent period of international 
diplomacy resultant from a British counter-insurgency campaign since the withdrawal 
from Palestine.  
 
217 
 
The British and American‟s hatched fears that the Egyptian involvement in Yemen was 
a plot devised with the Soviets to destabilise security in the Arabian Peninsula,
88
 
stemming from the knowledge that the Soviets had been selling arms to nationalist 
forces in Yemen since 1956.
89
 Although the Soviets had an interest in the Middle East, 
the Kremlin seemed content to support the Egyptians efforts in South Arabia and staged 
no overt interference in the civil war or the insurgency. Indeed, any interest that the 
Kremlin paid to South Arabia was „strategic more than ideological.‟90 The Soviets 
offered no alternative communist influence to the existing appeal of Nasserism, a 
decision understandable in light of Khrushchev‟s acknowledgement of Nasser‟s regional 
influence in the Middle East in the early 1960s.
91
  
 
Although erstwhile Cold War allies, the American‟s construed British meddling in the 
region to represent renewed colonial muscle-flexing. As Anthony Eden‟s Private 
Secretary, Guy Millard, pointed out, in the wake of the Suez Crisis, Britain „could never 
again resort to military action outside British territories without at least American 
acquiescence.‟92 This truism helps characterise the attempts of the Macmillan and 
Douglas-Home administrations to hide their employment of covert mercenary groups in 
Yemen whilst simultaneously pressurising the Americans to not recognise the YAR in a 
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vein attempt to bolster legitimacy for their clandestine operations. In line with their 
vision for the development of other nations in the Third World, the US hoped that 
Yemen could be nurtured into the wider body politic of independent democratic 
capitalist states. Yet this plan failed to account firstly for Britain‟s perceived 
overlordship of Middle East stability
93, and secondly for Washington‟s inability to 
reconcile the ingredients of anti-colonialism, anti-communism and long-range economic 
interest that were inevitably in the mix of a British counter-insurgency campaign.
94
 
 
On occasions, the parallel attempts to pacify the Americans and to keep the covert 
operations secret made for a strained „special relationship‟. Harold Macmillan admitted 
that he had a „prolonged argument with Washington‟ over the issue of YAR 
recognition
95
, which the Americans duly granted in December 1962.  At a meeting at the 
White House in October 1963, Douglas-Home lied to President Kennedy when pressed 
on whether the British were aiding the royalists by stating: „we were giving them 
nothing.‟96 Yet the Prime Minister had not bargained on American intelligence already 
surmising British involvement in Yemen, hence President Kennedy‟s leading question. 
Declassified documents reveal that in the weeks immediately after the revolution in 
Yemen in 1962, at the time Macmillan was sanctioning mercenary activity in the 
country, the National Security Council notified the President that Britain „seems to be 
                                                          
93
 Fain, „Unfortunate Arabia, p.130. 
94
 William Roger Louis, „American Anti-Colonialism and the Dissolution of the British Empire‟, 
International Affairs, Vol.61 No.3 (Summer 1985), p.414. 
95
 Macmillan, At the End of the Day, p.270.  
96
 TNA, PREM 11/4928, „Extract from Record of a Conversation between the President of the United 
States and Lord Home, at the White House, Washington, 4 October 1963.‟  Significantly, there is no 
reference at all in Alec Douglas-Homes‟ memoirs to Yemen. 
219 
 
covertly in the play‟ in Yemen.97 The State Department noted as early as 9 October 1962 
that the BMO „which can hardly be concealed for long, is likely to lead to a sizeable 
commitment of UAR (Egyptian) forces in Yemen and conceivably to a Yemeni-UAR 
invitation to the Soviet Union to increase its participation.‟98 The fact that the Kennedy 
administration was almost immediately aware of covert British activity in Yemen not 
only highlights Washington‟s refusal to indicate to its closest Cold War ally that its 
intelligence agencies were acutely aware of UK clandestine military deployments but 
also makes Prime Minister Douglas-Home‟s lie to President Kennedy almost a year later 
all the more incredulous.  
 
However, the assassination of Kennedy, who had taken a personal interest in the Yemen 
conflict, and the increasing American focus on south-east Asia by the mid-1960s, 
ensured that British covert operations in South Arabia became dimmer on the 
Washington radar.
99
 This engendered a policy approaching apathy in the US towards the 
British counter-insurgency campaign, coming to conceive of the British presence, in 
Karl Pieragostini‟s words, „in the context of the worldwide containment of communism 
rather than in its more regional roles as the guardian of Western oil supplies and the 
protector of emerging Commonwealth nations.‟100 Indeed, according to Foreign 
Secretary Rab Butler, who met with Lyndon Johnson in April 1964, the President 
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„seemed to be determined to get us out of our base in Aden,‟ although the British had a 
more sympathetic ally in Secretary of State Dean Rusk.
101
  
 
However, despite their previously disapproving stance on British involvement in South 
Arabia, when London announced its east of Suez withdrawal in 1966, the Americans 
„regarded it as a betrayal‟ and felt it would leave a political vacuum at the centre of a 
volatile region susceptible to the appeals of communism.
102
 The timetable for departure 
set out in the Defence White Paper did indeed spark an increase in Soviet activity in the 
Middle East, multiplying its cohort of military advisors in Egypt and Syria in 1967, 
although crucially not deploying them to Yemen itself.
103
 Indeed, the American‟s 
considered, although ultimately dismissed, the possibility of launching their own covert 
operations through Yemeni dissidents to destabilise Nasser and prevent a total Egyptian 
takeover of South Arabia.
104
 British Defence Secretary Denis Healey later revealed his 
cynicism towards American derision of the British relinquishment of the colonial reins: 
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„The United States, after trying for thirty years to get Britain out of 
Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, was now trying desperately to keep 
us in; during the Vietnam War it did not want to be the only country 
killing coloured people on their own soil. Moreover, it had at last 
come to realise that Britain had an experience and understanding in 
the Third World, which it did not possess itself.‟105 
 
Although perhaps privately perplexed at American anger at the White Paper, the British 
were keen to harness American help in making the withdrawal as smooth as possible. In 
a joint US-UK meeting in Washington to discuss the implications of the East of Suez 
timetable, the Foreign Secretary, Michael Stewart, requested that the American 
government might wish to „use its influence with Nasser to encourage him to refrain 
from making difficulties for the British in connection with their withdrawal from 
Aden.‟106 Even if the plea was made, it fell on deaf ears.  
 
One international aspect that impacted upon the ferocity of the insurgency in South 
Arabia, particularly in Aden itself, was the perceived high level of British support for 
Israel during the Six Day War. It was arguably one of the primary contributing factors to 
the uprising in the Crater district of Aden in June 1967, which lasted fifteen days and 
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cost the lives of twenty-two British servicemen in the effort to quell the disturbances.
107
 
Indeed, the vested Israeli interest in the outcome of the British counter-insurgency 
campaign in Yemen led Tel Aviv to covertly offer their assistance to the equally covert 
BMO. The Israeli Air Force conducted several air drops of supplies and weapons to 
royalist forces in a clandestine effort to bog Nasser down in a Yemeni quagmire, and 
also to ensure that a potential royalist victory in the civil war would be rewarded with 
the recognition of the Israeli state.
108
 The conflict in South Arabia not only drew in the 
regional powers, Egypt and Israel, who staked a claim in the outcome of the conflict, but 
it also caught the attention of the international diplomatic community like no other 
British counter-insurgency campaign. 
 
From the moment the British began to re-work the political structure of South Arabia 
and conduct operations, the United Nations pursued an active and interventionist role in 
seeking a cessation of British military action and political interference. The UN 
Committee of 24, the body set up to review decolonisation procedures, published a 
report in July 1963 condemning Britain‟s constitutional efforts in forging the FSA.109 In 
the wake of Britain‟s declaration of a state of emergency in South Arabia on 10 
December 1963, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 1,972 on 16 December, 
which called for the British to end their policy of deportation and imprisonment of 
suspected insurgents.
110
 Britain denounced the Resolution as one-sided, yet the support 
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with which it passed through the Assembly demonstrated the international scrutiny that 
British actions in Yemen (the overt military operations at least) would be under from the 
beginning. This scrutiny would increase after the opprobrium wrought on Britain after 
the civilian deaths at Harib after an RAF bombing raid in March 1964, and would 
arguably have served as a crucial moment in softening the British government‟s 
previously stringent line in shunning any effort by the UN to post observers or 
peacekeepers across both sides of the YAR-FSA border for fear of losing face on the 
international stage.
111
 In June 1963 the British acquiesced to the deployment of the UN 
Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM). The Mission, which cost $2million and only 
ever posted 25 observers on the ground, was wound up in September 1964 citing British 
obstinacy in aiding the task assigned them and failing to bring the warring parties 
together to broker a peace deal to end the civil war.
112
 This unforeseen level of UN 
intervention in the conduct of a British counter-insurgency campaign reflects firstly the 
complex web of conflicts unfolding in South Arabia, but secondly remains indicative of 
the international scepticism with which British military action in an ostensible corner of 
Empire by the mid-1960s was viewed. The Yemen campaign was to prove to be the 
„nadir in the popularity of the British Empire,‟113 and the international community, 
friends and foes alike, were able to perceive this wane and use it to their own advantage 
– the Egyptians got a Middle East free from British interference; a sizeable portion of 
UN member states were placated by the eventual relinquishment of British colonial 
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control; whilst the Americans were able to extend their sphere of influence and fill the 
breach left by the British as self-championed guarantor of regional security and oil 
supplies in the Middle East. We are still living with the results of this final consequence 
of British withdrawal from commitments east of Suez in 1967 – arguably the first time 
in the modern era that a counter-insurgency campaign not only triggered a massive 
overhaul of British defence policy but also engendered geo-strategic upheavals with 
lasting ramifications for world security.   
  
 
Reflections on the British Experience in South Arabia and Aden 
Sir Richard Turnbull, successor to Sir Kennedy Trevaskis as British High Commissioner 
to South Arabia, was asked by Defence Secretary Denis Healey what he thought the 
legacy would be once the sun had set on the British Empire east of Suez. „It would leave 
behind it only two monuments,‟ Turnbull quickly replied. „One was the game of 
Association Football, the other was the expression “fuck off.”‟114 By November 1967 
the British had duly adhered to the sentiment of the second of these testaments. They left 
their royalist allies and their poor military forces, to eventually succumb to the NLF. A 
republican victory led to the incarnation of the Marxist state of the Peoples Democratic 
Republic of Yemen (PDRY) in November 1970 over the corpse of the FSA.
115
 The 
PDRY became a haven for Middle East and European terrorist groups seeking a 
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sanctuary, whilst Aden became a significant port for the Soviet and Chinese fleets who 
gained a naval foothold in the Gulf region.
116
 It also became a refuge for insurgents 
prosecuting an uprising in the neighbouring region of Dhofar against the British-trained 
forces of the Sultan of Oman.
117
 In short, the vacuum left by the British in South Arabia 
was filled by the political and paramilitary forces the British had spent five years 
covertly and overtly attempting to quash. The counter-insurgency strategy had not been 
fulfilled. Whereas in Malaya and Kenya a slow burning strategy had eventually 
prevailed over poorly supplied insurgents, in South Arabia a similarly inert strategy in 
the counter-insurgency campaign in both rural and urban areas, was not afforded the 
politically-granted time to gain the upper hand.  
 
The scuttling of Aden had cemented the primacy of politics in the execution of British 
counter-insurgency strategy. Haunted by the spectre of Suez, British policy-makers had 
been willing to initiate a programme of covert operations to facilitate a proxy 
intervention that was out-weighed from the outset by the sheer quantity of Egyptian 
forces augmenting the Yemeni republicans. In the face of international pressure, and 
confusing signals from the Americans, the British government crossed the counter-
insurgency rubicon in 1966 by committing to a protracted withdrawal in lieu of a 
satisfactory stemming of insurgent violence. 
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The campaign in South Arabia proffered some significant lessons for operations in 
Northern Ireland, where troops were deployed two years after the Aden withdrawal. 
Some of these lessons were eventually noted and adhered to, with differing effect. The 
deployment of special forces, particularly in an intelligence gathering capacity, became a 
cornerstone of military effectiveness in Yemen, and would be utilised again in Ulster. 
The experience at controlling large crowds and demonstrations would be invaluable on 
the streets of Belfast and Londonderry, whilst the formalisation of a detention and 
interrogation system achieved in Aden would have detrimental consequences when 
replicated in an essentially domestic environment. Other lessons from Yemen were 
forgotten until the damage was done and the Troubles ingratiated. Foremost was the 
failure to note the importance of the increasing coverage and attention paid by the media 
to British counter-insurgency campaigns. To the background of the spiralling Vietnam 
War, British news crews and journalists filed reports from Yemen with a frequency and 
intensity not witnessed in any other irregular war involving the British army. This was to 
represent the beginning of an era in the conduct of irregular war, where the scrutiny and 
gaze of the modern media made the military answerable to another audience. This would 
prove to be one of the un-doings of the British campaign in Northern Ireland, and can 
trace its roots, like many of the tactics unleashed in Ulster, to the barren rocks of Aden.
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Chapter 6: The Failure to Domesticate: Britain, the IRA and the ‘Troubles’, 1969-
1979 
 
 
At midnight on 31 July 2007 the Union Jack was lowered from the flag pole inside 
Thiepval Barracks in Lisburn, the headquarters of the British military command. 
Without fanfare, without ceremony, this event marked the official end to „Operation 
Banner‟, the longest operation in British military history. For thirty-eight years the 
British Army had engaged in a turbulent conflict on the streets and in the countryside of 
Northern Ireland. What began as a campaign to reduce urban civil disturbance quickly 
spiralled into a vicious counter-insurgency campaign that polarised communities and 
normalised violence as the Army and a myriad of sectarian paramilitary groups sought to 
gain the strategic momentum over what came to be known, in a gross act of 
understatement, as the „Troubles‟. Slow lesson learning in the early phases of the 
conflict would have significant ramifications on the level of violence. Within the first 
decade of the Troubles some 2,000 lives had been lost
1
 – two thirds of the eventual death 
toll in a conflict to last nearly another twenty years. Belated operational potency on 
behalf of the British army, achieved in large part by effective intelligence, would keep 
the fire of this slow burning strategy going. 
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The „Troubles‟ erupted at a point when the curtain had all but fallen on the British 
Empire. The retreat east of Suez was underway as the vestiges of imperial rule gave way 
to decolonised independent states. The experiences of the British Army, intelligence and 
political communities had become conditioned to fighting insurgencies against distant 
guerrilla groups in corners of the Empire where the use of force was applied with 
efficient yet widespread vigour. By the late 1960s the British army in particular had 
developed what they perceived to be an effective counter-insurgency strategy, founded 
in Malaya, which had been transferred piecemeal to Kenya, and had been prematurely 
compromised in Yemen. However, in Northern Ireland the process of lesson transferral 
was undertaken in the absence of context. Counter-insurgency success in overseas 
imperial campaigns had ostensibly produced an impression within the British Army that 
it was an effective strategic and tactical force in irregular warfare scenarios. Yet when a 
nascent republican insurgency erupted into violence in Northern Ireland in 1969 the 
Army and their political masters reacted with the detachment and heavy-handedness of a 
reactionary colonial force, exposing fallacies as to the British army‟s status as an 
adaptive „learning institution‟ capable of effectively nullifying insurgent opponents. 
 
The British response in part lies in the political fright at the domestic nature of the 
conflict. A de facto civil war was now taking place within the United Kingdom. Political 
panic found recourse in a military solution. The army was sent in and reacted with a 
tactical repertoire and a level of force that it had come to know throughout its colonial 
experiences. In short, there was a failure to domesticate the situation. Some of the most 
extreme aspects of its previous counter-insurgency experiences were applied, in 
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particular internment without trial and curfews in communities with suspected 
sympathies. A combination of Army excessive force and eventual republican 
paramilitary competency managed to turn around a situation of the British Army being 
viewed as saviours of the Catholic community in August 1969 to being reviled as the 
agents of repression, murder and violence. „Hearts and minds‟ was absent, as a mutual 
psychology of suspicion arguably permeated relations between the British Army and the 
Catholic community. For the British Army, in the early phases of the „Troubles‟, this 
was just another colonial war, where bombings, assassinations and ambushes, as 
experienced in the Malayan jungle, the Kenyan mountains and the Yemeni bazaar, were 
met with raids, arrests, and shootings. This merely helped perpetuate the inevitable 
„action-reaction syndrome‟ that fuels insurgencies.  
 
 
Too often analysed in isolation, British actions in Northern Ireland must be interpreted 
as part of the lineage of colonial counter-insurgencies, despite the fact that the British 
had never fought an insurgency where the insurgent opponent could physically take the 
fight to the British mainland with persistence. As happened in Yemen, political priorities 
were placed above military imperatives in Northern Ireland also. This can be seen with 
the highly politicised deployment of troops, the political decision to introduce 
internment, the numerous attempts (often secret) to find a peace agreement, and the 
civil-military emphasis upon shifting the security burden to indigenous forces via 
„Ulsterisation‟. Coterminous with this remained the ultimate British attempt to transfer 
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foreign counter-insurgency tactics to an inescapably domestic conflict. The effort to seek 
and maintain an „acceptable level of violence‟ by the mid-1970s was indicative of how 
the security situation was not under British control. This was one of the most regrettable 
elements to the sorry story of the Ulster „Troubles‟, that an effective „lesson learning‟ 
process, building from experience in previous campaigns, was implemented by the 
British Army without any contextualisation as to the domestic nature of the conflict as to 
actually prove to be a catalyst and not a retardant of violence.  
 
This chapter will, however, restrict itself to an analysis of the first decade of the 
Troubles, from the eruption of violence on the streets of Belfast in 1969 up until the 
watershed 1979 Warrenpoint and Mountbatten attacks. This period represents the zenith 
of Britain‟s application of an outright civil-military counter-insurgency strategy in the 
province, providing distinct temporal and analytical bookends. The chapter will also 
focus almost exclusively upon the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) as the 
prime instigators of insurgent violence in Northern Ireland given firstly their 
organisational supremacy over rival republican factions and secondly their focus as the 
primary target of British Army and security force operations during this period. 
Although loyalist groups shoulder a distinct portion of responsibility for fuelling 
violence in Ulster during this period, they played no central part in the British counter-
insurgency strategy, and as such do not come under analysis here. 
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Indeed, the PIRA has also secured a primacy within the existing „Troubles‟ literature. 
This fits in to a wider trend that focuses upon the insurgent groups in Northern Ireland 
and not necessarily upon the insurgent phenomena itself. This plethora of books, 
however, is distinguished not primarily by their contents but by their authorship. A 
significant bulk of literature on the PIRA and the wider Troubles has been penned not by 
academics but by journalists. Not only is this symptomatic of the essentially domestic 
nature of the conflict coinciding with the dawn of the media age, but also of what 
M.L.R. Smith has described as the „intellectually interned‟ nature of the conflict within 
academic strategic studies circles.
2
 Yet the journalistic influence over the literature has 
produced some intuitive and indispensable insights into the IRA
3
, as well as the British 
military response
4
, and wider socio-political narratives of the Troubles.
5
 Recent 
academic literature on Northern Ireland has hinged upon the political means by which 
the Good Friday Agreement represents the teleological culmination of the Troubles.
6
 Yet 
the band of scholars who have offered a consistent strategic and tactical analysis of the 
military conduct of Operation Banner and the paramilitary conduct of the IRA has been 
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smaller but by no means less influential on our understanding of the dynamics of the 
Northern Ireland conflict.
7
 This chapter hopes to go some way towards offering a 
synthesis of this admittedly diminutive segment of Troubles‟ scholarship and forwarding 
a framework, via the Tri-Partite model, to help mould an understanding of the way in 
which the Troubles was conducted in the crucial first ten years, revealing an institutional 
blindness to the deficiencies and consequences of adopted military practice and the 
lessons emanating from them, within the context of a consistently malleable strategic 
endgame.  
 
 
 
Background and Origins of the ‘Troubles’ 
Northern Ireland has a turbulent and bloody past. To trace the historical antecedents of 
the Troubles that flared in 1969 would mire the reader in centuries of conflict, repression 
and reprisal. The politico-religious catalyst for violence in the province, tracing back to 
the occupation of Cromwell‟s army in the seventeenth century, steered a path for Ireland 
through to the twentieth century as union with Britain gave way to Home Rule, civil war 
and eventual independence for the 26 southern counties of the Irish Free State in 1921. 
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Under the 1920 Government of Northern Ireland Act six counties in the north were 
retained as part of the United Kingdom and its own governmental structures, centred on 
Stormont, were created. This catalogue of events in Ulster had been violently fought by 
the province‟s citizens politically inclined towards a united Ireland, with a small number 
finding recourse to violent opposition, from Wolfe Tone‟s United Irishmen of the 
eighteenth century, through the Fenians of the nineteenth century, to the Irish 
Republican Army of the twentieth century. Yet it was the actions of the IRA, their early 
members blooded in the 1916 Easter Rising, which would come to set a precedent for 
insurgent opposition against unionist rule in Northern Ireland. Their campaign in the 
province, and against the British mainland, in the 1930s and 1940s, marked a significant 
increase in the insurgent nature of the conflict. A „border campaign‟ was conducted 
between 1956 and 1961 as IRA members attacked targets in Ulster before fleeing for 
refuge in Eire.  
 
The emerging political discourse of civil rights in the 1960s injected a new dimension to 
the tensions in the Northern Ireland. The civil rights agenda had profoundly altered race 
relations in the United States and was manifesting itself in Ulster by offering the 
minority Catholic population a means to express its perceptions of institutionalised 
prejudice and discrimination in Ulster‟s predominantly Protestant workforce and their 
near monopoly over social housing allocations. The left-leaning appeal of the civil rights 
movement inclined itself towards elements of the republican faction who harnessed the 
civil rights discourse to reinforce their own proclamations of inherent political injustice 
in the Northern Irish political structure.  As a consequence, the civil rights agenda inter-
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twined a wider social movement for change with a justificatory vehicle for renewed IRA 
violence. Therefore, as Richard English rightly points out, there was not one definable 
catalyst to propel the rise of the IRA or a single spark to ignite the Troubles. Instead, in 
the late 1960s there unfolded „an interwoven, complex sequence of events, none of 
which is singly responsible for what followed… (M)ulticausality is more striking than 
monocausality in these years.‟8 The civil rights agenda, the social status of Catholics, the 
built-in unionist control of Ulster‟s political institutions, the inflammatory rhetoric of 
republican and unionist zealots, and the ubiquity of violence in republican history were 
all ingredients thrown in to the Ulster cauldron that boiled over in August 1969. 
 
 
‘What a Bloody Awful Country’: The Political Dimension 
Home Secretary Reginald Maudling‟s apocryphal exasperation as to the state of affairs 
in Northern Ireland encapsulated the political turmoil that engulfed the province in the 
1970s and the frustrations in seeking workable solutions. The first decade of the 
Troubles was wrought with factionalism, faltered peace efforts, and institutional 
upheaval. Since the Irish political settlement of 1921 and the creation of Northern 
Ireland, the devolved government at Stormont had presided over the descent into 
sectarian conflict in 1969. Within five years, the province would have that devolution 
revoked with the imposition of Direct Rule from Westminster in March 1972; a brief 
period of a power-sharing Executive set up in the wake of the Sunningdale Agreement 
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between January and May 1974; followed by a renewed period of Direct Rule after the 
Ulster Workers‟ Council strike brought down the Executive. The contested nature of 
Northern Ireland‟s sovereignty, as demonstrated by the brevity of constitutional 
arrangements, unfolded against the backdrop of spiralling violence and aptly 
characterised the „hall of mirrors‟ that was the Northern Irish political process in the 
1970s.
9
 The political strategy for the province was therefore perpetually obfuscated, 
rendering the military strategy equally mercurial. 
 
In counter-insurgency warfare there is a tangible relationship between the effectiveness 
of the military campaign and the quality of the political direction it receives. The 
Troubles in Northern Ireland were to severely test the efficacy of this bond.
10
 Scholars of 
the conflict have been divided as to the political management of the conflict in its first 
decade under the administrations of Harold Wilson, Edward Heath and James Callaghan. 
Paul Dixon has argued that the British government‟s policy towards Northern Ireland 
since 1972 „has been characterised more by continuity and tactical adjustments than by 
discontinuity.‟11 Even Harold Wilson himself acknowledged that despite the change of 
British government in 1970 from Labour to Conservative, „the handling of the Northern 
Ireland problem was marked by a continuity of policy.‟12 In contrast to this resides the 
scholarly opinion, as enunciated amongst others by John Newsinger, that the British 
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were culpable of providing „a lack of consistent political direction,‟ resulting in a 
„contradictory‟ and „repressive‟ strategy.13 However, these opposing perspectives falsely 
dichotomise the British position. The British were indeed consistent in their 
inconsistencies. Whilst pursuing security crackdowns, successive governments sought 
ways of opening dialogue with the terrorist factions. Successive governments sought 
ways of maintaining a degree of constitutionalism between London and Belfast whilst 
dictating the province‟s agenda. Jeremy Smith‟s apt characterisation of the Heath 
government‟s approach to Northern Ireland could easily be extrapolated to encompass 
the Labour governments of Wilson and Callaghan, in as much as they exuded „a 
dialectic of coercion followed by conciliation.‟14 Even the three secretaries of state for 
Northern Ireland during this period, William Whitelaw, Merlyn Rees and Roy Mason, 
all held an over-arching strategic aim of enhancing stability in Ulster via political 
agreement despite radical deviations in perceptions of how to achieve such an aim – 
notably Mason‟s belief that Direct Rule, and not a devolved institutional arrangement, 
was the best method by which to prime the conditions for peace and an eventual British 
military withdrawal.
15
 Overall, therefore, the rhetoric was perceivably the same across 
and even between governments yet the messages were always mixed. Conservative or 
Labour, the political management of the Northern Irish Troubles in their first decade was 
decidedly contradictory and at times counter-productive. 
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The intricate and drawn-out political process in Northern Ireland between 1969 and 
1979 was one suffused with obstinacy, fervour and Machiavellian intrigue, oscillating 
between periods of devolved power and Direct Rule, as spiralling violence and socio-
religious tensions provoked the original attempt at, and subsequent failure of, power-
sharing as established in the 1974 Sunningdale Agreement. The political efforts to 
reduce violence and stabilise the security situation during the 1970s were characterised 
by two primary initiatives. The first was the introduction of internment in 1971, and 
second was the sporadic engagement in secret negotiations with the IRA from 1972. 
These two often under-explored elements to the political management of the counter-
insurgency campaign in Ulster bring to the fore two particular trends. To begin with, 
both phenomena were forged in Britain‟s previous counter-insurgency campaigns 
abroad, and were here being introduced to a fundamentally domestic conflict. 
Furthermore, they represent the fluctuation in the British political strategy towards 
Northern Ireland between promoting hardline security measures (as denoted by 
internment) and conciliatory overtures to help ensure an end to violence (as symbolised 
by the engagement in secret talks). Combined, these two seemingly opposite yet 
concomitantly applied political methods set the tone for political progress in Northern 
Ireland as the 1970s unfolded. 
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Internment as a Political Tool 
The period of internment in Northern Ireland between 1971 and 1975 represents one of 
the most turbulent and controversial times in the provinces‟ troubled history. British 
attempts to halt spiralling IRA violence by interning suspected republican members and 
sympathisers, and the treatment they received for the purposes of intelligence-gathering 
at the hands of the security services, provoked a backlash within the Catholic 
community and intensified paramilitary and civilian unrest. The four years of internment 
in Northern Ireland serves to highlight the ill-treatment of detainees by British forces in 
its historical context, whilst also raising wider questions over the use of torture for 
interrogation purposes.  
 
The use of internment as a security measure had actually been utilised in Northern 
Ireland on three previous occasions: between 1931-34, between 1938-45 under the 
auspices of wartime security, and during the IRA‟s 1956-61 „border campaign‟.16 
Provided for under the Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act (1922), the British 
government reserved the right to intern any person suspected of endangering the peace. 
Northern Irish Prime Minister Brian Faulkner had been pressing for internment long 
before its eventual introduction, and in the face of growing IRA activity since the arrival 
of British troops, British Prime Minister Edward Heath took the proposal of internment 
to full Cabinet knowing that it contravened the European Convention on Human Rights 
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(ECHR). Heath skirted round this issue by insisting that at that moment in time Britain 
was not a fully-fledged member of the European Community and was therefore not 
duty-bound by such legislation. The situation in Northern Ireland, Heath argued, „was 
now too grave for us to be swayed by such considerations‟17 – considerations such as 
human rights, civil liberties and habeas corpus.  
 
The Cabinet Committee on Northern Ireland had already discussed the possibility of 
internment as early as March 1971, five months before its eventual introduction. Aware 
of the difficulties posed to the normal legal process by IRA intimidation of witnesses, 
the government appreciated that internment would offer, in Heath‟s words, „a chance to 
bypass the wall of silence by swooping on terrorist suspects without warning.‟18 On 3 
August 1971 the Cabinet agreed to grant the authorities in Ulster the power to take any 
action to rein in violence. The following day Heath authorised the use of internment on 
the condition that Faulkner ban parades in Northern Ireland for six months in order to 
diffuse further tensions. However, it would be wrong to interpret the introduction of 
internment as a unanimous and uncontroversial measure from a British perspective. 
Despite political acquiescence regarding its implementation there were severe doubts 
emanating from the security forces. Even the General Officer Commanding (GOC) of 
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Northern Ireland, General Sir Harry Tuzo, „did not recommend internment on military 
grounds: he considered it militarily unnecessary.‟19  
 
In the first swoop of „Operation Demetrius‟ in the early hours of 9 August, 337 men 
were taken into custody from an original Special Branch list of 464.
20
 Faulty RUC 
intelligence not only failed to distinguish between those who had been involved in 
republican political campaigns and those who were directly involved in IRA violence, 
but was also known to have wrongly targeted innocent people with the same name as 
suspected IRA members, arrested the wrong family member, and indeed arrested IRA 
veterans whose last involvement with the IRA had been over fifty years ago but whose 
names still lay on RUC files. Massive civil unrest in the Catholic community followed 
this first round of arrests. The three days following the introduction of internment 
witnessed the deaths of twenty-one people as rioting broke out on the streets of Belfast, 
Londonderry and other towns. In the House of Commons in a two day debate to discuss 
the implications of internment (which had been introduced during the parliamentary 
summer recess) Home Secretary Reginald Maudling argued that it was necessary as a 
measure to contain violence:  
 
„The object of the internment policy is to hold in safety, where they can do 
no further harm, active members of the IRA and, secondly, to obtain more 
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information about their activities, their conspiracy and their organisation, to 
help security forces in their job of protecting the public as a whole against 
their activities.‟21  
 
This dual justification of internment fails to adequately represent the situation inside the 
internment camps at Long Kesh, Magilligan, the Crumlin Road prison in Belfast and the 
temporary internment hold on-board the prison ship Maidstone, anchored in Belfast 
Lough. The internees were not held for reasons of public „safety‟ as Maudling claimed, 
given that no senior IRA members were detained and that most internees were released 
after a short time as the security forces failed to prove that they were involved in 
terrorist activity. Indeed, of the 800 internees released between 1972 and 1973, just 10 
were subsequently charged with other offences.
22
 Furthermore, arguments that 
internment was necessary to uphold public safety were misguided given the authorities‟ 
narrow consideration of the impact of internment in a military context but not in a social 
one. Internment was to prove an instrument of massive upheaval that contributed to a 
sharp rise in violence. In the eight months of 1971 before the introduction of internment 
there were 30 deaths relating to sectarian violence in Northern Ireland. In the five 
months immediately proceeding the first round of arrests 143 people were killed, 46 of 
which were members of the security forces.
23
 Much of this communal unrest was a result 
of internment‟s almost exclusive discrimination against the Catholic community. Of the 
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3,633 terrorist suspects arrested during the whole period of internment just 109 were 
Protestant Loyalists. Indeed, it took until February 1973 before the first Loyalist was 
interned, almost eighteen months after its introduction.
24
 This led to understandable 
claims that internment was a policy aimed at undermining the wider Catholic 
community and helped contribute to a hardening of republican sentiment. When pressed 
on the issue of exclusive Catholic arrest in the House of Commons, Edward Heath 
denied prejudice on religious or political grounds:  
 
„The criteria (for internment) are not concerned with whether a person is 
Catholic or Protestant. What they are concerned with is whether he is a 
member of an organisation openly engaging in a campaign of violence, and 
which have openly claimed responsibility for the acts of terrorism which 
have cost the lives not only of soldiers and policemen, but also of civilians.‟25  
 
Yet Heath ignores the detrimental domestic implications of internment and the way in 
which it unified the minority community around a common repugnance at the policy and 
the stories of brutality emerging from the released internees provided ample propaganda 
for the republican cause and hardened anti-British sentiment.
26
 As Rod Thornton has 
rightly argued, internment represented a hurried political solution to a conflict that had 
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gotten out of hand, and characterised an attempt by the political community in London 
to reassert its influence over the direction of events.
27
 The obvious deficiencies of 
internment soon led Whitehall to seek alternative means by which to diminish violence 
in Ulster. One element to this altered political approach involved the initiation of secret 
talks with the IRA itself. 
 
 
Forging a Secret Peace: Political Negotiations with the IRA 
By 1972 negligible headway had been made by the security services in reducing IRA 
violence. Furthermore, the failure of the mainstream political parties in Northern Ireland 
to reach an amicable political settlement in the face of the imposition of Direct Rule in 
March 1972 opened up the option of political dialogue outside the conventional 
channels. Increasing calls, therefore, for the British to enter into negotiations with the 
IRA over a ceasefire, became ever more pragmatic and appealing to the British 
government.
28
 Secret negotiations, it must be remembered, are a constant trend 
throughout British counter-insurgency campaigns and had been instigated in previous 
conflicts in Malaya and Kenya in particular. Northern Ireland was to be no exception.  
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The first secret talks with the IRA came when opposition leader Harold Wilson, with the 
permission of Prime Minister Edward Heath, took a meeting with the leadership of the 
Provisional IRA whilst on a visit to Dublin in March 1972.
29
 Although nothing came of 
these talks it marks the establishment of cross-party consensus as to the need to engage 
in dialogue with the IRA if the peace process was to be moved on politically. Yet 
perhaps the most meaningful secret contact came with the extraordinary meeting 
between six PIRA leaders, who were helicoptered in by the RAF, and the Home 
Secretary William Whitelaw at the Chelsea home of junior minister Paul Channon on 7 
July 1972. Although there were many disagreements during this meeting, particularly 
over the issue of self-determination and the withdrawal of British troops, the two sides 
did settle on a four point plan that included the mutual suspension of offensive activities 
for one week, with immediate effect. This bilateral ceasefire, resultant of this significant 
secret meeting between a senior cabinet minister and the PIRA leadership, eventually 
lasted just two days as violence flared on the Lenadoon housing estate in Belfast over 
the rehousing of Catholic families. The perceived heavy-handedness of the British Army 
in quelling this unrest was taken as an indicator by the IRA that the ceasefire was over.
30
 
Despite the failure to secure a lasting ceasefire from this round of high-level talks, 
Edward Heath quite astutely defended the decision to engage in talks with the IRA by 
rightly observing that „British government representatives have been meeting terrorists 
                                                          
29
 Heath had just months earlier privately described the notion of talking to the IRA as „depressing.‟ This 
may in part suggest why he allowed the leader of the opposition, and not a member of the government, to 
make the first overtures. See TNA, PREM 15/1023, „From Peter Gregson to S.W Boys-Smith‟, 5 January 
1972. 
30
 For the British government‟s account of events leading up to the secret talks, a brief description of the 
conversations between Whitelaw and the IRA leadership, and an evaluation of the events at Lenadoon, see 
TNA, CJ 4/1456, „Top Secret: The IRA Truce, 26 June-10 July 1972‟. 
245 
 
for years, endeavouring to put an end to terrorism and establish a peaceful regime.‟31 
Whitelaw, although initially opposed to talking to the IRA, became „persuaded that a 
refusal to talk would leave the political initiative in the hands of the IRA.‟32 In response 
to IRA finger-pointing at British military aggression in Lenadoon as justification for 
breaking the ceasefire, Whitelaw described the secret talks of July 1972 as a „non-event‟ 
given the „impossible demands‟ and „absurd ultimatums‟ the IRA leaders insisted upon 
securing. Yet the Home Secretary claimed that by resuming their campaign of violence 
and by making public their meetings with Whitelaw, the IRA „proved they were 
intransigent and that it was the British Government who really wanted an end to 
violence.‟33 M.L.R. Smith has attributed this breakdown in peace talks after the secret 
Whitelaw meeting to „customary republican zero-sum thinking, which precluded the 
possibility of a settlement based on mutual compromise and blinded the movement to 
the realities of the political and military circumstances.‟34 However, blame must also be 
apportioned to the British government for oscillating between indifference and 
enthusiasm for secret talks. No coherent pathways out of violence were seriously 
offered. As such, the Troubles maintained its violent course in the face of such strategic 
confusion. 
 
Aside from engaging in high-level political talks with the IRA, the British government 
gave its blessing to the instigation of further talks via backchannel intermediaries. A set 
of secret talks was initiated by a group of Protestant clergymen in the County Clare town 
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of Feakle in December 1974, attended by senior IRA leadership and British civil servant 
Sir Frank Cooper, the Permanent Secretary to the Northern Ireland Office in Stormont. 
Resultant from this first round of talks was an IRA ceasefire, declared from 22 
December 1974 through until 16 January 1975.
35
 A new set of discussions was initiated 
after the breaking of the ceasefire, this time involving two Foreign Office officials, 
James Allan and Michael Oatley (who was in fact MI6‟s main intelligence officer in 
Ulster who fulfilled a quasi-diplomatic function to disguise his intelligence role). This 
new initiative brought about some tangible outcomes, including another IRA ceasefire in 
February and the establishment of local Incident Centres that would act as monitors of 
future ceasefires and encourage cross-community involvement. The ceasefire and the 
Incident Centres lasted until October 1975 when internal feuding within the IRA led to a 
resumption of violence.
36
  
 
Michael Oatley himself had received tacit Whitehall support to open up further dialogue 
with the IRA after the exposure of the Whitelaw talks aroused a public backlash. By 
1974 Oatley had developed three secret backchannels to the IRA leadership: one through 
an English businessman with links to the IRA Army Council member David O‟Connell; 
a second via the former commander of the PIRA‟s Belfast Brigade; and a third, and most 
crucial link, through a Londonderry contact with direct access to Sinn Fein President 
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Ruairi O‟Bradaigh. The collapse of the political arrangements established under 
Sunningdale had engendered within the „dovish‟ element of IRA/Sinn Fein a willingness 
to at least listen to what the British had to say, believing that, in O‟Bradaigh‟s words, 
„every solution was (now) up for consideration.‟37  
 
Ultimately, secret dialogue with the IRA/Sinn Fein leadership would eventually 
establish itself as a hallmark of British political management of the Troubles and 
arguably paved the way for the Good Friday Agreement to secure its terms and 
conditions on terrorist violence. Yet what hindered this dialogue in the 1970s was the 
failure of consecutive governments to fully commit to negotiations. Talking was often a 
reluctant process for the British political community to engage in and this sent 
incoherent messages to the insurgent opponent. The sporadic nature of the talks failed to 
depict a genuine British commitment to finding a non-military solution to the Troubles 
and also missed the opportunity to therefore further de-legitimise any elongation of the 
IRA‟s commitment to violence by forcing them on a path towards constitutional and 
peaceful political dialogue.
38
 When combined with the stick of internment, the potential 
carrot of negotiations was hesitantly and half-heartedly dangled before the IRA. The 
complex coexistence of these opposing policies failed to significantly quell the disquiet 
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on the streets of Ulster. With the political management of the conflict failing to bring 
about lasting change, the nature of the military response would therefore be under 
additional pressure to suppress violence and restore order. In large part it would fail to 
meet this challenge during the 1970s. 
 
 
The Military Dimension 
In the Chief of General Staff‟s (CGS) official review of Operation Banner in July 2006, 
the then CGS, General Sir Mike Jackson, boldly declared that the campaign was „one of 
the very few ever brought to a successful conclusion by the armed forces of a developed 
nation against an irregular force.‟39 This audacious assessment implied that the Good 
Friday Agreement was possible not because of the cross-community desire for a 
diplomatic solution and an exhausted resentment towards the prolonged violence, but 
because the British Army had actually defeated the IRA in conventional military terms. 
However, this assessment belies the significant strategic readjustments the British Army 
had to undergo during the Troubles and fails to account for the war of attrition the 
military engaged the IRA in after initial hopes of quickly stamping out the insurgent 
threat diminished as an „acceptable level of violence‟ became the strategic norm. 
Furthermore, Jackson fails to acknowledge the exceedingly detrimental effects certain 
military operations and tactics had upon the level of violence in Northern Ireland as 
perceived heavy-handedness fanned the flames of wider social conflict, especially in the 
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early 1970s. With entire neighbourhoods existing under the wary eye of a watchtower or 
armoured vehicle, the Army‟s routine patrol and monitoring tasks were frequently 
overtaken by riot control and incursion operations into republican strongholds. As 
Bloody Sunday and Operation Motorman demonstrated, the Army‟s conduct during riots 
and incursions had considerable and often opposing repercussions for the broader British 
strategy. 
 
Anti-IRA Operations and Riot Control in the early Troubles 
The early years of the Troubles posed some distinct difficulties that impinged upon the 
British Army‟s actions. The Army was deployed in 1969 against a backdrop of civil 
unrest before a significant insurgent threat had emerged, therefore requiring the military 
to fulfil a fundamental policing function – a task that although not wholly contradictory 
to their training, ran against the grain in relation to issues such as use of force. Further to 
this, as mentioned above, the Army was hamstrung by a dispersion of political 
authorities in Belfast and London and faced inconsistent political management, thus 
preventing the cementing of a cogent military strategy. Indeed, this strategy was further 
confused by a shift in modus operandi from policing to counter-insurgency as the IRA 
emerged as a potent security threat in the early 1970s. The problems adapting to all these 
changes posed distinct difficulties for the British Army and led the military to make 
some gratuitous errors in their efforts to quell social unrest and quash the insurgent 
threat posed by the IRA.
40
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The critical mistake made by the British Army and the RUC in early riot control 
scenarios is that it allowed itself to be provoked into over-reaction by the goading 
provocations of a violent fringe movement. Heavy-handed riot control techniques 
utilised by the RUC at the start of the Troubles stood in contrast to the default tactics 
employed by the Metropolitan Police and other mainland UK constabularies at the time, 
who would use „cordons and wedges in close physical contact with demonstrators to 
prevent disorder. There would be no batons or gas.‟41 The broader unrest within the 
wider Catholic community was heightened by the swift degeneration of relations with 
the British Army as the military mishandled crowd control during the first marching 
season of 1970 by using CS gas in the Catholic areas of the Ballymurphy estate in 
Belfast during disturbances.
42
 The civil-military response to increasing public unrest in 
1970 compounded the incendiary situation. The Heath government decided to devolve 
security decision-making powers to the Army, granting commanders on the ground a 
freer hand in responding to events in a manner they saw fit. This enabled the then 
General Officer Commanding (GOC) of Northern Ireland, General Ian Freeland, to 
manifest his personal hardline style of counter-insurgency on the streets of Ulster, 
unshackled from previous political restraints. Freeland imposed a curfew in response to 
rioting in the Lower Falls area of west Belfast on 3 July 1970 without political 
permission – an unprecedented move considering it was applied on British soil, 
tantamount to martial law. Freeland‟s predilection for cordon-and-search operations was 
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rolled out across the entire estate in a domineering act of indiscriminate crowd control. 
The curfew prompted a severe breakdown in trust between the Army and the Catholic 
community in the Lower Falls and beyond as reaction to the move prompted a severe 
backlash.
43
 Freeland‟s implementation of collective punishment upon the Lower Falls 
community is demonstrable of an out-of-touch quasi-colonial approach that was 
inappropriately transferred into a domestic conflict. This rudimentary and insensitive 
lesson transferral in large part explains the severe deterioration of the security situation 
and the deep-seated resentment that resided within the Catholic community towards the 
British Army. 
 
However, the tragic apogee of heavy-handed British Army crowd control came in 
Londonderry on Sunday 13 January 1972. A civil rights demonstration had been 
proscribed by the authorities yet took place regardless against a backdrop of increasing 
Catholic unrest at social conditions and anger at the British Army‟s seeming inability to 
distinguish IRA members from the wider community from which they were drawn. The 
chronology of events that unfolded on that Sunday afternoon are highly contested and 
have been the subject of two judicial reviews, one of which is still on-going.
44
 
Regardless of whether IRA snipers fired the first bullet or not, the resulting assault by 
British troops upon the assembled crowd left thirteen unarmed demonstrators dead. 
Bloody Sunday was to mark the dark nadir of British conduct in the Troubles and 
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catastrophically showcased the British Army‟s recourse to firepower in crowd control 
scenarios in the context of an already confusing urban terrain. It marked a seemingly 
unredeemable breakdown in trust between the people and the Army, therefore breaching 
an essential tenet of counter-insurgency warfare regarding the fundamental requirement 
of building good relations with domestic populations and positing the military as the 
indispensable guardian of public security in the face of an insurgent threat. The security 
situation in Northern Ireland would drastically degenerate in the wake of Bloody Sunday 
and would inordinately complicate the military‟s task of fulfilling the strategic aim of 
restoring order to Ulster and eliminating the insurgent threat that thrived on such 
disorder. 
 
The biggest test of British Army determination and capability in the immediate 
aftermath of Bloody Sunday came in the summer of 1972 as barricades were erected 
demarcating IRA-controlled zones in Londonderry and Belfast – self-styled „no go‟ 
areas for the security forces. This bold show of force by the IRA severely challenged 
British Army resolve to tackle insurgent tenacity in the face of simmering social tension 
and spiralling violence. On 21 July 1972 the IRA had ended its ceasefire by unleashing a 
wave of twenty-one bomb attacks across Belfast, killing nine people, in what came to be 
known as Bloody Friday. It became a high strategic priority to end these „no go‟ areas 
and send a statement to the IRA that the British still maintained the strategic upper-hand 
in the conflict, especially since the imposition of Direct Rule in March 1972. Operation 
Motorman was to be the conduit through which the British would send that message. 
Launched on 31 July 1972, Operation Motorman was undertaken by thirty-eight Army 
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battalions, totally 22,000 troops, and a further 5,300 Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR) 
soldiers – the largest deployment of British troops in the province in all of its twentieth 
century turbulence.
45
 In the end, the IRA‟s organisational capabilities and manpower 
levels were utterly insufficient to repel the overwhelming display of force shown by the 
British Army. As one soldier deployed to Londonderry for Motorman, Lt-Colonel R.P. 
Mason of the Royal Scots, put it: „After all the hype and the prep and the nerves, the 
whole thing was much of a non-event; the day went quieter than expected and though 
the mobs were out in force with bricks and bottles... we had no serious casualties.‟46 The 
swift eradication of the „no-go‟ areas without overt violent opposition, in M.L.R. Smith 
and Peter Neumann‟s words, „permanently altered the strategic setting in Northern 
Ireland.‟47 Such an interpretation rightly places the operation at the apex of a distinct 
downturn in the level of violence in the province – July 1972 marked a bloody high 
point in violence with ninety-five deaths in that month alone. After Motorman the 
number of fatalities related to the Troubles declined and never again reached the heights 
of 1972. Motorman had removed the IRA‟s strongholds and significantly undermined 
the group‟s bargaining capacity, retarded their operational capabilities, and diminished 
the psychological edge they arguably felt they had over the security forces. With 
Operation Motorman, therefore, what is presented is the first real British Army operation 
executed with overwhelming yet reasonable force, and the results were tangible. 
Although turning a corner in the conflict there still remained a persistent underlying 
resentment towards the British Army within the wider community, and it certainly did 
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not halt IRA activities. The introduction of the SAS into Northern Ireland was designed 
to help achieve those wider strategic aims. In fact, it had the opposite effect. 
 
Daring to Win: The SAS and ‘Shoot to Kill’ 
The SAS has shouldered much of the blame for many murders, kidnappings and 
beatings in Northern Ireland during the Troubles. The regiment has been a lightning rod 
for criticism and condemnation from the republican and wider Catholic community. 
SAS squadrons had been active in Ulster in 1969 and in 1974, but this was done secretly 
and on a temporary basis, driven by operational and not strategic needs.
48
 Yet by early 
1976 Prime Minister Harold Wilson felt compelled to take action to halt the proliferation 
of rural violence in South Armagh, so-called „Bandit Country‟. On 7 January, Wilson 
publicly announced the deployment of the SAS to South Armagh for patrolling and 
surveillance tasks in an ostentatious political move designed as much to strike fear into 
the IRA as to shore-up the impression of Wilson‟s grip on the conflict. The heralded 
introduction of the SAS has been widely criticised by scholars and practitioners alike. In 
his memoirs, General Sir Peter de la Billiere, Director of the SAS from 1978 to 1982, 
accused Wilson of deploying the regiment in a „deliberate blaze of publicity‟ that made 
it more vulnerable to IRA „black propaganda‟ surrounding its activities, thus 
undermining its entire counter-insurgency effort.
49
 Tony Geraghty has argued that „if 
Wilson‟s response in 1969 was under-played, this looked like a serious over-reaction.‟50 
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Despite the controversy, just eleven SAS members were deployed in January 1976, 
rising to a full squadron of sixty by April.
51
  
 
Surrounded by myth, and hampered by a blurred chain of command between local, 
divisional and national commanding officers, the value of the SAS to the British military 
strategy lay in prosecuting a covert war against the IRA. However, the regiment was 
stalked by controversy. One source of contention surrounded the SAS‟s alleged cross-
border activities in the Republic of Ireland. Claims that several IRA subjects were 
„lifted‟ from their homes just inside Ireland and then arrested once brought back into 
Northern Ireland raised questions as to the legal (not to mention political) ramifications 
of the regiment‟s operational remit.52 Yet the most significant controversy surrounds 
claims of the adoption of a deliberate „shoot to kill‟ policy by the SAS. By the end of 
1978, after a full three years of deployment, the SAS was responsible for the deaths of 
ten people, three of whom were innocent members of the public mistaken for IRA 
members.
53
 These tragedies were a public relations disaster for the British Army, 
jeopardising not only community relations but undermining the future of covert 
operations by elements of the security forces and intelligence agencies. A Sunday Times 
investigation into the „shoot to kill‟ policy concluded that „there is no doubt that when 
the SAS or the security forces catch IRA men in the act and open fire, they shoot to kill,‟ 
however this argument only applied to IRA members „caught in the act of planting a 
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bomb, or aiming a weapon,‟ and was not a blanket policy.54 Deploying the elite regiment 
of the British Army had become a sharp double-edged sword for the government. The 
attention and criticism the SAS encountered as a result of its high profile mistakes and 
myth-making aura provoked the Callaghan government to shift the SAS‟s efforts away 
from offensive ambush towards observation and intelligence-gathering in 1978. This of 
course did not mark an end to the controversial deployment of the SAS in the Troubles, 
yet it marked a watershed in the British military attempt to wrestle the strategic initiative 
from the IRA by instigating a covert war. It did, however, raise further questions about 
the use of force by the British Army as a whole during the early phases of the Troubles. 
 
The Use of Force 
The use of force in Northern Ireland by British troops was codified on a „Yellow Card‟ 
issued to each soldier. The card listed the rules of engagement (RoE) with suspected 
IRA members and enshrined the notion that opening fire was a last resort. Yet incidents 
involving the accidental shooting of unarmed civilians (as brutally witnessed on Bloody 
Sunday) and especially the high profile mistakes made by the SAS, severely undermined 
the belief that the British Army was adhering to its own Yellow Card principles. 
Nevertheless, the Army was anxious to absolve itself of culpability by pointing out the 
high pressure, split second decision-making that its soldiers were required to make in 
kinetic engagements with insurgents and wrapped itself in the centuries-old moral risk of 
warfare – either kill or be killed. But in retrospect, the Army was willing to concede, as 
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the Chief of General Staff‟s end of Operation Banner report states, that on occasion the 
Army failed to „discriminate between those perpetrating the violence and the remainder 
of the community.‟55 
 
The Army did, however, make moves to try and prepare soldiers as best as they could 
for the particular combat environment awaiting them upon deployment to Northern 
Ireland. The particular exigencies of urban counter-insurgency had been a residual 
element of the British irregular warfare experience (especially the recent debacle in 
Aden), yet it was not until the mid-1970s that there came a belated acknowledgement 
that the Army needed specific training to adapt it to the essentially domestic nature of 
the campaign. The Army thus established Northern Ireland Training Advisory Teams 
(NITAT) in bases on the UK mainland as well as in Germany to verse soldiers on the 
verge of deployment to Ulster in counter-insurgency principles, urban infantry skills, riot 
control methods, and instruction as to the RoE laid out on the Yellow Card.
56
 Such 
training can be perceived as vital given that by 1977 the British Army had fourteen 
battalions in Ulster, each with their own Tactical Areas of Responsibility (TAORs). In 
the same year, these battalions were digesting the publication of the new Army manual 
„Land Operations Volume III: Counter Revolutionary Operations‟, which became, in 
Mark Urban‟s words, „the bible for Army operations in Ulster‟ after its release.57 The 
manual represented an effort to bring together the Army‟s collective counter-insurgency 
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thinking and bring a practical amount of doctrine to proceedings in the province. Yet 
even the introduction of doctrine extolling the virtue of minimum force in Northern 
Ireland could not prevent occasional incidents and controversies from causing social 
ructions within Ulster as claims of a deliberate „shoot to kill‟ policy became so rife as to 
blur the line between propaganda and reality and undermined any moral exclusivity the 
British sought to hold over the conflict. Indeed, in 1970/71, the GOC General Sir Ian 
Freeland issued orders permitting the targeting and shooting of petrol bombers in riot 
situations.
58
 As one Rifleman with the Royal Green Jackets attested: „Of course we shot 
to kill; we aimed at the biggest target, the geezer‟s chest just as we had been trained to 
do... (T)his ain‟t Hollywood, it‟s not a film, and it‟s us or them.‟59 Such debates 
surrounding the use of force altered with the wider shift in the military sands as a 
process towards „Ulsterisation‟ began to occur in the late 1970s. 
 
Ulsterisation 
One of the most successful strands of previous British counter-insurgency strategy was 
the utilisation of domestic security forces. An integral element of an eventual exit 
strategy was to sufficiently train indigenous police and military who would step up their 
patrolling and operational commitments as the British stepped down. Such initiatives 
were implemented in Malaya, Kenya and South Arabia. Furthermore, domesticating the 
responsibility for community security in such a way helped „normalise‟ societies 
vulnerable to insurgent attack. The belated realisation of the need to domesticate the 
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conflict in Northern Ireland did not come until the 1976 process of „Ulsterisation‟ when 
the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) and Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR) were 
granted a much bigger role in policing and security operations.  
 
In 1975 the Wilson government sought ways to scale down the security commitment to 
Ulster as the financial cost of Operation Banner was set against an increased resentment 
at the continuing presence of British Army patrols. It published a policy document 
entitled „The Way Ahead‟ in which the security set up in Northern Ireland was to be re-
worked in order to ascertain „police primacy‟. Throughout 1976 operational control 
flowed from the Army to the RUC, intending to send a powerful message to the Catholic 
population in particular that their security was not provided by an army of occupation 
but by their fellow Ulstermen. RUC Chief Constable Kenneth Newman saw 
Ulsterisation as an opportunity to rejuvenate his force and rein in the security situation: 
„The RUC would be hard but sensitive... Maintaining law and order simply means 
giving people the freedom to conduct their own lives.‟60 Yet this was undermined by two 
major factors. Firstly, the RUC had an almost exclusive Protestant make up, giving the 
impression to the Catholic community that they were loyalist paramilitaries in uniform. 
Secondly, any advantage that Ulsterisation could have reaped in terms of placating the 
non-unionist population was diminished by allegations of a „shoot-to-kill‟ policy 
amongst the residual elements of the British Army. Peter Neumann has pointed to what 
he perceives to be the „myth‟ of Ulsterisation, arguing that numbers of Ulster security 
force members peaked before not after 1976, and that a more adequate description of the 
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process would be „professionalisation‟ given the shift towards indigenous policing as 
opposed to external military control.
61
 Neumann‟s analysis helpfully delineates the 
quantitative and qualitative elements of Ulsterisation, yet it is evident that Ulsterisation‟s 
most potent effect was as a symbol of reduced British Army control over security in 
Northern Ireland and not as a numerical exercise in rotating military for police.  
 
The Army may, after 1976, have resorted to acting in a support role in light of newly 
established RUC operational command, yet the two organisations had a poorly defined 
working relationship. Command and control (C2) structures were often obfuscated, 
whilst intelligence-sharing became a reluctantly rare occurrence.
62
 This was despite the 
creation of a devolved organisational structure aimed at co-ordinating the military-
security effort. At the top of this system was the Province Executive Committee (PEC), 
which moulded the strategic and operational direction of Operation Banner on an ad hoc 
basis (a task of heightened importance given Northern Ireland‟s unique position in the 
history of modern British counter-insurgency as being the only campaign conducted 
without the creation or implementation of a comprehensive campaign plan
63
). The PEC 
was chaired by the Deputy Chief Constable of the RUC as a demonstration of police 
primacy, and was attended by the Commander of Land Forces. Devolution of such 
decision-making occurred through the establishment of local Division Action 
Committees (DACs) who pre-empted and reacted to events within their TAOR based on 
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intelligence leads.
64
 Indeed, it would be such intelligence leads that would provide the 
most powerful weapon for the security forces in the secret war against the IRA and 
eventually add an element of targeted purpose to the British strategy. 
 
 
‘Big Boys’ Rules’: The Intelligence Dimension 
Northern Ireland was an intelligence war. For the British military and intelligence 
agencies, the collection, dissemination and use of intelligence material became 
ubiquitous in operational terms during the 1970s. By the end of the decade one regular 
soldier in every eight was directly involved in intelligence work in Ulster.
65
 A myriad of 
security branches were involved in intelligence gathering, often leading to confused 
structures and conflicting agencies. The Army, the RUC, MI5 and MI6 all vied for 
intelligence supremacy leading to the establishment of various intelligence operations 
and units that contributed highly valuable sub-parts to an admittedly uncoordinated 
whole. As a consequence, the intelligence war in Northern Ireland was essentially 
effective but controversial and mismanaged. By the end of the first decade of the 
Troubles, British intelligence had identified the IRA leadership, penetrated its ranks and 
to a large extent help retard IRA violence. Yet this was undermined in the early phases 
of the campaign by a lack of operational intelligence on the IRA and the absence of a 
centralised structure to manage intelligence gathering – arguably a perennial pattern in 
the early phases of previous British counter-insurgency campaigns. As a result of this 
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intelligence malaise, each separate intelligence unit set about collecting their own 
information without pooling it. In the early 1970s it was the UK intelligence agencies 
that had pre-eminence over their military and police colleagues. 
 
Despite a residual MI5 presence in Northern Ireland in the early Troubles, in 1971 Prime 
Minister Edward Heath authorised MI6 operations in Northern Ireland, placing reliance 
upon perceived SIS efficiency at running agent and informer networks, despite MI6s 
initial concerns that in an essentially domestic setting Ulster was the preserve of MI5.
66
 
MI6 primacy lasted just two years when MI5 was charged with taking the intelligence 
lead in an atmosphere of distrust between the two agencies. By the end of the 1970s MI6 
retained a token presence in Belfast, as MI5 took over the running of MI6s informers. 
Once they gained intelligence primacy, MI5 concentrated almost exclusively on strategic 
intelligence, directing its efforts towards undermining the IRAs long term plans.
67
 
Tactical and operational intelligence was largely the preserve of the Army and the RUC. 
 
The RUCs intelligence capabilities stemmed from two main branches. C Department 
housed the Criminal Investigations Department (CID), responsible for investigation of 
terrorist incidents and interrogating suspects. E Department was the Special Branch, who 
ran their own network of IRA informers.
68
 In 1976 the RUC created three Regional 
Crime and Intelligence Units to unite the efforts of CID and Special Branch and improve 
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co-ordination.
69
 The Army ran parallel informer networks, exacerbating the myriad 
intelligence avenues and competition that already existed within the RUC and the 
intelligence services. Special Military Intelligence Unit (Northern Ireland) – SMIU NI – 
was established by the Army in 1972 to act as a bridge between the Army and RUC 
Special Branch to aid intelligence sharing, which to a limited degree it achieved.
70
 
Further efforts at closer Army-RUC intelligence co-operation were augmented in 1978 
by the creation of integrated intelligence centres known as the Tasking and Co-
ordination group (TCG). Comprised of CID, Special Branch and Army officers, the two 
TCGs (one in the north and one in the south of Ulster) aimed at pooling intelligence 
material and making operational use out of it, therefore reducing intelligence confusion, 
duplication or contradiction. Mark Urban has described the establishment of the TCGs 
as „probably the most important of all steps taken during the late 1970s towards 
enhancing intelligence gathering.‟71  
 
By 1975 the Army had at its disposal around 100 soldiers dedicated solely to covert 
intelligence gathering. By the end of the decade this number was up to 300.
72
 This 
reflected a conscious shift in the Army‟s intelligence focus in the late 1970s, away from 
regular „Green Army‟ sources, to covert small specialist intelligence units, especially the 
SAS, who by this point had honed its own surveillance capabilities and become an 
efficient intelligence gathering unit in its own right. Yet perhaps the most innovative, 
although concertedly controversial, plank of the British intelligence war in Northern 
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Ireland stemmed from the creation in 1970 of the covert Mobile Reconnaissance Force 
(MRF) by Brigadier (later General Sir) Frank Kitson, commander of the 39 Brigade in 
Belfast. The MRF was designed to enhance the Army‟s early intelligence capabilities at 
the dawn of the Troubles, independent from the RUC and MI5. The MRF mounted 
plain-clothes covert surveillance operations predominantly in Catholic areas, often in 
conjunction with IRA members turned informers (colloquially known as the „Freds‟). 
One of its most notorious operations was the 1972 „Four Square Laundry‟ sting in which 
locally recruited MRF members established a door-to-door laundry business in the 
estates home to suspected IRA members. Clothes unwittingly handed over to the laundry 
van were then driven away for forensic analysis in search of tell-tale gun-shot residue or 
traces of explosive materials. This operation was exposed, however, when an MRF 
officer revealed the nature of the forces‟ operations when charged in court with 
attempted murder. The MRF was subsequently wound up in 1973 but was succeeded by 
a more sophisticated surveillance unit, 14 Intelligence Company. Split into three 
Detachments (Dets) covering the areas of Belfast (East Det), Armagh (South Det) and 
Londonderry (North Det)
73
, 14 Intelligence Company mounted surveillance operations 
primarily from static observation posts (OPs) or from unmarked cars (so-called „Q cars‟) 
fitted with radio equipment. 14 Intelligence Company proved less controversial than its 
predecessor, largely due to its down-played emphasis on invasive sting operations that 
utilised turned insurgents. Mark Urban has argued that the use of „Freds‟ (or „Belfast 
counter-gangs‟ as he labels them) was „foolish‟ given the republican community‟s 
„ability to win back the loyalty of IRA men who had changed sides.‟74 Urban, however, 
                                                          
73
 Taylor, Brits, p.3. 
74
 Urban, Big Boys’ Rules, p.37. 
265 
 
underplays three significant factors. Firstly, the punishment for „touts‟ or informers 
within republican circles was brutal, and often fatal. Known informers were rarely given 
a second chance. Secondly, as Kevin Toolis has pointed out, the republican community 
was extraordinarily tight-knit, to such an extent that: „There is no place for outsiders (i.e. 
MI5 or Special Branch spies) to be slotted into this complex web of social and extended 
family relationships. Informers must come from within; they must be turned.‟75 Finally, 
Urban fails to place the utility of indigenous covert units in its historical lineage of 
recent British counter-insurgency campaigns. Formed in both Malaya and Kenya 
beforehand, the use of captured or „turned‟ units of insurgents played a significant role 
in the intelligence wars to undermine the insurgent opposition. Indeed, Frank Kitson‟s 
replication of his „pseudo-gang‟ methods from its pioneering crucible of Kenya to the 
streets of Northern Ireland, emphasises modes of lesson-learning and transferral in a 
counter-insurgency context. Lesson-learning in this respect rested upon the transfer of 
personnel between campaigns (a crucial point especially given the way in which Kitson 
himself was personally vilified by the republican community for his influence on British 
tactics) and on harnessing the (misguided) belief that a successful tactic in one campaign 
is readily available for replication elsewhere, without contextualising the nature of each 
campaign.  
 
Despite the controversy surrounding the MRF, other covert surveillance units 
proliferated throughout the Army and police in the late 1970s. Aside from 14 
Intelligence Company and the SAS, the Army established Close Observation Patrols 
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(COPs), consisting of small numbers of trained soldiers who would build up an 
intelligence picture from routine patrolling. The RUC, keen to protect their intelligence 
domain, created an observation unit known as Bronze Section in 1976 as part of their 
Special Patrol Group (SPG), in order to provide undercover surveillance. This became 
overshadowed by Special Branch‟s creation of an elite observation unit, E4A, in 1977 as 
part of its Operations Division (E4), to undertake mobile and static operations. Yet 
despite such an abundance of overlapping surveillance units, there were few joint 
operations and there was little co-ordination.
76
 
 
Indeed, the co-ordination of British intelligence in Northern Ireland and assessment of 
its direction are issues that have received relatively little attention. As Eunan O‟Halpin 
has pointed out, the focus on operational intelligence has come at the price of sidelining 
the role of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC).
77
 Although primarily focussed upon 
the Cold War threat of the Soviet Union at the time the Troubles broke out, the JIC 
became „heavily involved‟ with Northern Ireland by 1970.78 Although redactions in the 
National Archives make it difficult to assess the evolution of JIC discussions on Ulster, 
the prevalence of JIC involvement in the co-ordination of the UK intelligence machine 
in Ulster paints a picture of an intelligence campaign devoid of local, tactical pre-
eminence and controlled by top-down dictation as to the focus of the intelligence 
effort.
79
 Such centralised co-ordination of intelligence efforts were intensified after the 
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same day assassination of Earl Mountbatten off the shore of Mullaghmore and the 
ambush and killing of twelve paratroopers at Warrenpoint on 27 August 1979. Maurice 
Oldfield, the former head of MI6, was appointed as the Security Co-ordinator in 
Northern Ireland to harmonise the actions of the increasingly fractious Army and RUC 
by providing a clear line of management for the entire intelligence effort. It was not 
Oldfield‟s role to conceive of or execute intelligence operations but instead to keep 
Whitehall informed as to the nature of intelligence efforts in Ulster and ensure greater 
inter-agency co-operation in the face of a seemingly resurgent IRA. Indeed, a large part 
of Oldfield‟s work was an effort to regain the intelligence initiative and reverse the level 
of IRA recruitment. 
 
Yet despite the controversial nature of the role intelligence played in the internment 
fiasco and in facilitating the use of the SAS, it remains a fair judgement, as Bradley 
Bamford has argued, that „British intelligence was ultimately very effective in the 
Northern Ireland conflict, but at the price of employing some highly dubious methods.‟80 
The contentious and ubiquitous employment of covert intelligence operations was seized 
upon by IRA propagandists and helped contribute to narratives built upon depictions of 
nefarious British duplicity. Yet such operations proved essential to producing tangible 
security results, such as the infiltration of an IRA unit, the detention of a wanted 
terrorist, or the thwarting of bomb attacks. Despite the discredited reputation of the 
Army and RUC in the eyes of the Catholic community and the subsequent hindrance this 
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created in building a reliable intelligence picture of day-to-day activity in republican 
strongholds, the „wall of silence‟ the intelligence operatives found in these communities 
was transcended by the cultivation of effective surveillance mechanisms, widespread (if 
not overtly discriminate) interrogation of suspects, and by the nurturing of a network of 
agents and informers. As the Troubles evolved, the importance of the most 
comprehensive intelligence effort in any British counter-insurgency campaign became 
integral to the overall outcome of Operation Banner. It demonstrated not only the 
importance of gathering tactical intelligence, but also highlighted the utility of 
specialised intelligence units and the necessity of parallel human and signals intelligence 
capabilities in a counter-insurgency context.
81
 Eventually, the inter-agency approach to 
waging the intelligence war on the IRA came to undermine, but not eradicate, the IRA‟s 
strategic competence and weaken its organisational functioning.  
 
 
IRA Organisation  
The IRA could only react to and not necessarily shape the events of summer 1969 given 
the ubiquitous influence of wider social upheaval. Indeed, the outbreak of the Troubles, 
far from providing a unifying moment around which the IRA could mobilise its 
organisation on a wave of popular support, actually proved to be a moment of undoing 
for the IRA. The group was unprepared for the launch of a mass campaign of violence 
against British rule in Northern Ireland. However, it soon became clear to the IRA 
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General Headquarters (GHQ) that „events had largely passed the point of no return,‟ 
specifically that „there could no longer be any hedging on the issue of abstentionism‟ 
from the political process.
82
  
 
In December 1969 the Army Convention (the highest authority within the IRA) met in 
Dublin and, with the aim of presenting a united republican front, recognised the 
governments in both the north and south of Ireland, as well as that in Westminster in an 
effort to steer the course of events in their favour from within and not outside the 
existing status quo. This proved a highly contentious move within the wider republican 
movement. Factions opposed to the abandonment of abstentionism (on the grounds that 
it would tacitly legitimate the British rule in Ulster) formed a breakaway Provisional 
Army Council which rejected overtures to opponents of a united Ireland. This faction 
soon developed its own paramilitary wing, the Provisional IRA (PIRA), which went 
about recruiting members north and south of the border who were disgruntled with the 
seeming concessions to the British. This split within the Republican movement was 
sealed in January 1970 at the Sinn Fein conference when the Provisional‟s formalised 
their secession, taking with them the more traditional, less ideological members who 
were primarily concerned with issues of nationalism than with socialism.
83
 Those 
members that remained loyal to the Marxist programme became the Official IRA 
(OIRA), yet they very much now formed a rump grouping, lacking the dynamism and 
firebrand radicalism of the PIRA membership. Cathal Goulding, the Chief of Staff of the 
                                                          
82
 J. Bowyer-Bell, The Secret Army: The IRA, 1916-1979 (Revised Edition) (Dublin: Poolbeg, 1989), 
p.366. 
83
 Ibid, pp.366-68. 
270 
 
Official‟s, declared in an interview in late 1970 that he felt there were three primary 
reasons for the split: inherent class divisions with the organisation; divisions over the 
issue of paramilitary participation; and divisions over the preparedness of the 
organisation to engage in an armed struggle.
84
 The effect of this schism was that by a 
year in to the Troubles both wings of the IRA were, as J. Bowyer-Bell concedes, „thin on 
the ground… and were quite incapable of harnessing or directing any spontaneous mass 
movement.‟85 This in large part explains the latent inability of either IRA faction to posit 
itself as the guardian of the Catholic community in the face of the civil disturbances of 
1969-70 and allow the British Army to be seen as the early protector of Catholic areas as 
unionist violence flared.  
 
Yet as the Troubles escalated and the British Army‟s actions in riot control situations 
turned Catholic feeling against the soldiers, the PIRA found itself in the ascendancy 
given its radical appeal to young republicans devoid of ideological inclinations towards 
a Marxist state but energised by violent appeals for „Brit‟s Out‟. Significantly, when the 
IRA split occurred in early 1970, nine of the eleven IRA Belfast company commanders 
pledged their allegiance to the PIRA, ensuring it received near exclusive control of the 
city.
86
 In an attempt to harness its organisational capabilities to reflect its status as the 
main republican paramilitary group, the PIRA modelled its organisational structure upon 
that of the British Army, having Brigades broken down into battalions, which 
themselves broke down into companies. The executive authority overseeing this new 
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model army was to be a seven person Army Council. However, by 1977 the PIRA 
attempted to adapt its organisational structure in the face of new strategic imperatives (as 
discussed in the next section). It shifted away from its army style division and adopted a 
new cellular structure at grassroots level with the adoption of Active Service Units as the 
atom of IRA organisation. The group also initiated changes at the top. An autonomous 
„Northern Command‟ was established in Belfast to prosecute the campaign in Northern 
Ireland independent of the GHQ in Dublin.
87
 This restructuring also included the 
establishment of an internal Security Department specifically to wheedle out British 
agents and informers within their own ranks in the wake of several high profile 
exposures of British intelligence infiltration of the group.
88
 Therefore, what emerges is a 
picture of gradual organisational evolution for the PIRA. This process was concertedly 
slower, albeit less contested within the movement, than the evolution of its strategic and 
tactical approach. 
 
IRA Strategy and Tactics 
At the first session of the new Provisional Army Council in January 1970, the PIRA‟s 
executive body enunciated a three-point strategy that would essentially remain 
unchanged for the duration of the Troubles: defend Catholic areas; to retaliate to 
perceived acts of British Army violence; and gear all operations towards the ultimate 
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goal of „Brit‟s Out.‟89 Yet the Army Council acknowledged that this strategy could not 
be fully enacted until the rank and file of the PIRA were sufficient in quality and 
quantity – a position not reached arguably until mid-1971. In the meantime, the PIRA 
undertook crude attacks on security and economic targets of importance to the British 
Army and the unionist population. Once organisational competence had been achieved 
in 1971, pre-planned acts of violence by semi-autonomous PIRA battalions were 
channelled into a more cohesive strategic effort. Indeed, it can be argued that the IRA 
was strategically consistent in the first decade of the Troubles and it was only at the 
tactical level that changes and innovations were initiated.
90
 Aside from the 1977 
adoption of the „long war‟ strategy to reflect accepted notions of the longevity of their 
struggle and the seeming immovability of the British presence in the short-to-medium 
term, the IRA stuck by the main strategic planks proposed in 1970. Yet on a tactical and 
operational level, the IRA instigated two major shifts in their approach. The first was the 
introduction of car bombings, and the second was the opening of another front in the war 
by instigating operations on the British mainland.  
 
The adoption of a bombing campaign in England was decided against by the PIRA 
leadership in 1972 – their self-proclaimed „Year of Victory‟. However, support within 
the Belfast grassroots for taking the fight to British soil overwhelmed the initial caution 
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of the Dublin-based GHQ who held reservations as to its operational viability and 
perceptions of tactical gimmickry. Indeed, such opinions would have been hardened by 
the Official IRA‟s bombing of the Parachute Regiment‟s barracks in Aldershot in 
February 1972, in retaliation for Bloody Sunday. The attack killed no soldiers but 
claimed the lives of six civilian maintenance personnel and a chaplain. The backlash at 
this blunder even within the republican community proved fatal for the OIRA, as they 
declared an indefinite ceasefire in May 1972. However, as Gary McGladdery points out, 
the PIRA‟s decision to eventually open a second front on the mainland was driven by 
two wider strategic catalysts. First was the desire to turn British public opinion away 
from maintaining troops in Northern Ireland and thus encourage Whitehall to cut and run 
from the province. Second, after internment and Operation Motorman, „the PIRA‟s 
ability to carry out operations in Northern Ireland was becoming increasingly 
constrained‟ as British intelligence improved their penetration and monitoring of the 
group.
91
 As a consequence the PIRA initiated its first attack in England by detonating 
bombs outside the Old Bailey and on Whitehall on 8 March 1972. Yet even when the 
campaign was underway the wider republican movement remained split in their attitude 
towards indiscriminate bombings of civilian targets – a schism that was intensified after 
the November 1974 Birmingham pub bombings and the subsequent anti-Irish backlash 
in Britain and the hurried passage of the Prevention of Terrorism Act through 
Parliament, which proscribed the IRA.
92
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The second major tactical shift adopted by the IRA was the introduction of car bombs as 
a means of concomitantly making Ulster seem ungovernable for Stormont and London, 
whilst also tying down and tiring out the resources and manpower of the security forces. 
Just weeks after the attacks in London, the IRA detonated its first car bomb in Belfast, 
killing six people and injuring over one hundred on 20 March 1972. This deadly new 
tactical innovation would become a staple element of the IRA‟s operational output for 
the remainder of the Troubles. The car bomb tactic was the most devastating terrorist 
method utilised by the IRA.  
 
Yet it remains significant that perhaps its most effective tactical novelty was entirely 
passive. In the autumn of 1976 a politicised campaign was instigated amongst IRA 
members incarcerated in Ulster‟s prisons in support of their re-categorisation as political 
prisoners. Three hundred IRA suspects were engaged in the so-called „blanket protest‟ 
by 1978, refusing to wear prison regulation clothing and instead wearing nothing but the 
blankets from their cells in an attempt to force the re-introduction of Special Category 
Status in prison. The protest was not successful, but significantly raised the profile of the 
IRA leadership and made for uncomfortable political pressure upon the British 
government. It also paved the way for the escalation of passive prison protests by IRA 
members with the adoption of the „dirty protest‟ in March 1978 when personal hygiene 
became a political weapon, and for the start of the hunger strikes in the 1980s. Such 
tactical initiatives, as opposed to changes in the terror campaign, were designed to 
augment the IRA‟s political message and manipulate areas of the Troubles where 
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security force or British „repression‟ or „coercion‟ could be developed into more 
effective republican narratives.  
 
In the opinion of J. Bowyer Bell, the IRA was „in tactical matter most conservative,‟ 
pointing to the near exclusive utilisation of bombings and assassinations.
93
 Bell 
highlights other tactical avenues that the IRA chose not to pursue, such as plane 
hijackings, kidnap of leading Protestant politicians, poison or gas attacks, for reasons he 
argues were down to a „lack of appropriate resources.‟94 However, Bell‟s analysis 
fundamentally misconceives the relationship that the IRAs tactics had upon its over-
arching strategy. The IRA consciously avoided the adoption of acts of catastrophic mass 
terrorism in the early Troubles not because of a resource hindrance but because of the 
inescapably domestic nature of the conflict. Political and social outrage from both sides 
of the republican-unionist divide were a natural occurrence in the aftermath of atrocities, 
as the backlash at Bloody Sunday and Bloody Friday attest. In such a domestic conflict, 
tactical exuberance detrimentally affects strategic attainment. The IRA‟s primary 
strategic goal was to force the British to withdraw from Northern Ireland. The deaths of 
large numbers of civilians, as post-1979 attacks such as the Remembrance Day attack in 
Enniskillen in 1987 or the Real IRA‟s 1998 attack in Omagh brutally demonstrated, 
have a counter-productive effect upon insurgent strategic aims as they inherently strain 
the ties of trust with the indigenous population who groups purport to protect, whilst also 
damaging their cause in the eyes of international opinion. Spectacular acts of 
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catastrophic terrorism on a consistent and mass scale were never adopted by the IRA not 
for reasons of resources but for reasons of strategic clarity. In many ways acts at the 
opposite end of the strategic scale, namely the prison protests, did more for furthering 
the republican cause than any act of catastrophic terrorism would have. Crucially, this 
was able to occur because such tactics harnessed the support of its societal support base.  
 
 
Internal Insurgent Support 
Despite the initial stigma of its actions in the Bogside riots, the IRA soon became the 
self-styled guardian of the Catholic community in Northern Ireland. The blurred 
national-religious nature of the conflict ensured that whilst only a minority of the 
republican/Catholic community volunteered for the IRA, there was undeniably more 
widespread tacit support, not necessarily for violent terrorist means, but for the 
disruption of British rule as a whole. Indeed, the heavy-handed actions of the British, in 
particular the introduction of internment and the events of Bloody Sunday, served to 
galvanise the community against the presence of troops, hence increasing the implicit 
internal support for the IRA‟s strategy, if not their tactics. As one IRA volunteer, 
Seamus Finucane, attested: „There was a sense that this was the time to change things 
and stop being pushed around, stop being downtrodden... The politics of the struggle 
ended up taking over our lives.‟95 
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When the Troubles broke out in the summer of 1969 the IRA was a husk group, with 
few funds, even fewer arms and little support outside the older generation for whom the 
Easter Rising was a direct inspiration. Yet as Richard English astutely observes, for a 
significant portion of the swell of post-1969 recruits, their dedication to armed conflict 
was not solely reliant on reaction to unfolding acts of perceived British oppression, but 
often stemmed from deeper social catalysts like „family, locality [and] tradition.‟96 Many 
leading IRA members were third generation republicans who were steeped in the history 
of the anti-British struggle. Belonging to the IRA was to be woven into the social fabric 
of the wider republican tradition, to be a part of the revered ranks of republicans that 
were celebrated from Wolfe Tone to Michael Connolly. Perhaps more than any other 
insurgent opponent that the British faced in the late twentieth century, Irish 
republicanism was rooted deep in the society from which it sprang, and was inexplicably 
inter-twined with long-standing social, religious and political grievances. To that extent, 
the IRA was able to rely in the early phases of the Troubles on an extensive support 
network within Northern Ireland‟s republican strongholds, whilst also capitalising on the 
excessive force occasionally unleashed by the British military in order to radicalise the 
angry young men of Ulster‟s Catholic housing estates as it engaged the security forces in 
a race to learn the path to tactical effectiveness. As fear of reprisals for suspected 
collusion with the security forces emanated within the wider Catholic community, it 
became clear that support for the IRA was predicated not only upon an implicit support 
for „Brit‟s Out‟ if not an explicit backing for terrorist means, but was also based as much 
on fear as it was on outright conviction. Narratives, carefully fostered by IRA 
propagandists, of minority persecution played to the republican and wider Catholic 
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perception of discrimination and subjugation. John Newsinger even goes as far as to 
suggest that: „there can be little doubt that if the Catholics had been the majority 
community, the British would have been forced to withdraw…‟97 Although counter-
factual, Newsinger‟s point raises the wider issue surrounding the integral importance of 
securing the support of „loyalist‟ indigenous elements in counter-insurgency campaigns. 
Attaining high levels of domestic loyalism within Malaya and Kenya proved crucial to 
British efforts to stem insurgent support in vulnerable rural and urban areas. Although 
„loyalism‟ carries paramilitary connotations in the Northern Irish context, in its wider 
meaning pertaining to the support granted the counter-insurgent force by sections of the 
indigenous population, the broad congruence of the British and unionist political agenda 
relating to Northern Ireland‟s continued membership of the United Kingdom again 
demonstrates the perennial importance of localised support for the counter-insurgent 
strategy. Yet despite the finite support it received within Ulster an element of IRA 
support that significantly bolstered the movement came from outside Northern Ireland‟s 
borders. 
 
 
External Insurgent Support 
Notoriously under-funded and under-armed at the outset of the new „Troubles‟, and soon 
squeezed by security force crackdowns and raids, the IRA sought supplies from a 
number of sources to replenish their arsenal and perpetuate the armed struggle. One of 
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the most prominent supply channels came from the Irish diaspora in the United States. 
Weaponry was smuggled across the Atlantic, whilst money was raised in large quantities 
to support the cause of the „old country‟. This was to prove the most crucial element to 
the external support dynamic of the first decade of the Troubles and did much to 
frustrate counter-insurgent efforts to weaken the IRA. 
 
At the outbreak of the Troubles, the United States had five times as many Irish citizens 
as Ireland itself.
98
 This sizeable kinship network provided a substantial transatlantic 
constituency favourable to the republican cause, steeped as it was in romantic visions of 
a united Ireland. Dormant American interest in Northern Ireland was sparked by the civil 
rights marches on summer 1969 and the subsequent degeneration into violence. Groups 
and associations sprang up in an effort to channel solidarity and money to Ulster, mainly 
by civil rights organisations. However, such groups were counter-balanced by the 
foundation of groups favouring a more interventionist and direct approach. Most 
significant of these was the Irish Northern Aid Committee (Noraid) that was created by 
an emigrant IRA veteran, Michael Flannery, in 1970. Noraid became a vehicle through 
which many „old warriors‟ and their families felt they could reconnect with the new 
struggle for republicanism. The group quickly organised an extensive programme of 
fundraising events across the US, from testimonial dinners to whip-rounds in Irish bars. 
This money (some $3 million in total by 1986) was channelled by Noraid back to 
Northern Ireland, purportedly to the families of republican prisoners, yet suspected by 
the British and Irish governments to have been knowingly diverted to purchase arms for 
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the PIRA.
99
 Such concerns were heightened by the sporadic presence of Joe Cahill, 
PIRA Chief of Staff, in America on false passports to undertake fundraising trips 
ostensibly for Sinn Fein. Cahill was an acknowledged go-between for Noraid and the 
PIRA, prompting transatlantic intelligence investigations into his activities.
100
  
 
Indeed, Cahill was not the only individual with IRA links to be manipulating American 
support for the armed struggle. Leading IRA figure Sean Kennan was sent to the US in 
late 1969 to cultivate an arms supply network with American suppliers. Resultant of 
Kennan‟s visit was the first American shipment of arms to the IRA, which arrived in 
Ireland from Philadelphia in August 1970. This cache of Armalites drastically 
modernised the IRA‟s aging arsenal of outdated weapons.101 This initial phase of 
American arms purchasing was undertaken on a relatively small scale in an attempt to 
detract the attention of the intelligence agencies. Preferred methods involved IRA agents 
travelling to gun fairs in the American mid-West and then transporting purchased 
weapons back to Ireland via air and sea ports on the east coast of the US with the 
assisted corroboration of pro-republican elements within the longshoreman‟s union and 
US Customs. Yet the IRA was forced to find alternative methods and routes from 
October 1971 onwards when Irish police found six unclaimed suitcases of guns and 
ammunition at terminals in Dublin.
102
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Intelligence efforts to diminish the impact that American support had upon the potency 
of the IRA were sharpened by the active involvement of the FBI in cracking down on 
American-based IRA fundraisers and arms procurers in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
Bureau agents infiltrated Noraid after intelligence revealed that two of the five 
Americans who organised the IRA‟s first gun shipment out of Philadelphia in 1970 were 
Noraid officers. FBI operations led to the arrest of one of the IRAs primary arms 
suppliers, a New York-based Corsican with mafia connections, George De Meo, in 
1980. De Meo had supplied the IRA with a shipment of M60 machine guns stolen from 
a US National Guard armoury in August 1976, and had been organising biannual arms 
consignments to Ireland since then.
103
 Further FBI infiltration operations (resultant from 
information gleaned from De Meo after his arrest in return for leniency) revealed other 
key American links to IRA weapons smuggling, including a Brooklyn security guard, 
George Harrison, who was believed to be the IRA‟s main arms supplier in the US, with 
the FBI estimating he had organised the delivery of over 2,500 weapons to the IRA.
104
 
FBI wire tap intercepts uncovered direct contact between Harrison and Noraid chief 
Michael Flannery in which Harrison was attempting to solicit $17,000 of Noraid money 
to fund a shipment of grenade launchers for the IRA. Both were arrested, although their 
subsequent trial collapsed after the jury accepted the defences‟ argument that the sting 
operation had been illegally engineered by the CIA.
105
 Such a set back frustrated the 
British. A leaked British Army intelligence report estimated that by 1979 the PIRA‟s 
known annual income stood at £950,000, of which £120,000 was known to come from 
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overseas, with half of that sum coming direct from Noraid.
106
 Such British concern over 
the American link was heightened by estimates that by 1975 up to 85% of all PIRA 
weapons were thought to have been shipped from America.
107
 In a speech to the 
Association of American Correspondents in London in December 1975 Prime Minister 
Harold Wilson took the opportunity to upbraid „the financing of IRA terror, brutality and 
murder by misguided Irish-American sympathisers‟, warning American backers that 
they were „playing the role of vicarious merchants of death.‟108 Even the Chief of Staff 
of the Official IRA, Cathal Goulding, was ready to admit before his group disbanded 
that there was a link between the perpetuation of republican violence in Northern Ireland 
and American money: „They [supporters in America] couldn‟t support us financially 
unless there was some form of revolutionary activity… [T]hey would only support those 
that were using force alone.‟109 Such an admission, together with the intelligence picture 
built up by agencies on both sides of the Atlantic, generates a depiction of American 
funding as the most influential element of the external support dynamic propagating 
republican paramilitary activities in the early phase of the Troubles. It was, however, not 
the only outside dimension to influence the IRA. 
 
Sinn Fein president Ruairi O‟Bradaigh fostered links in the early 1970s with fellow 
European nationalist groups in the Basque country, Corsica and the Breton region of 
France. In 1972 it was a meeting with Breton nationalists that led to contact, initiated by 
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the separatist Frenchmen, with the Libyan regime of Colonel Qaddafi. In August of that 
year PIRA Chief of Staff Joe Cahill and PIRA Quartermaster Denis McInerney met with 
members of the Libyan Intelligence Service (LIS) in Poland, hoping to extract supplies 
from a government who were already espousing rhetorical support for the IRA‟s cause. 
The LIS complied, and agreed to supply money and weapons, smuggled through a 
mutually agreed route. This would be managed by an IRA overseer who became 
permanently based in Tripoli, lauded with semi-ambassadorial status.
110
 However, the 
Libyan-IRA connection was exposed on 23 March 1973 when a Cypriot-registered boat, 
the „Claudia‟, was intercepted off the coast of Ireland carrying Cahill and nearly 500 
Libyan-supplied weapons.
111
 Despite this exposure, covert Libyan funding for the IRA 
still flowed. By 1975, Qaddafi‟s regime had supplied the group with $3.5million, but 
would dry up soon after as relations between Tripoli and the IRA „ambassador‟ 
deteriorated until a resurgence of funds began again in the 1980s.
112
 The Libyan, and 
especially the American, connection to the IRA armed struggle highlights the impact 
that external support can have upon the potency and longevity of an insurgency. Foreign 
money and weapons consistently replenished the IRA‟s coffers and arsenals, 
undermining domestic counter-insurgency efforts to restrict IRA supply sources and 
weaken its paramilitary capabilities. Yet adding to such politico-military efforts in the 
fight against the IRA was the intense scrutiny of the campaign by the international 
community.  
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The International Dimension 
Concomitant with the influence of American supporters upon the level of external 
support for IRA paramilitary activities was American political pressure upon the British 
government over Northern Ireland. Again, American influence was arguably the most 
prevalent element of the international dimension to the Northern Ireland conflict. 
Legislative and executive branch interest in the Troubles was spawned from effective 
pressure group lobbying. Among groups pressing for American diplomatic intervention 
in Ulster was the Irish National Caucus, created in 1974, who maintained a hardline 
stance of the issue of a united Ireland that despite being at odds with mainstream 
nationalism within Ulster still managed to exert influence over Congressional opinion. 
The Caucus successfully petitioned for the establishment of the Ad Hoc Congressional 
Committee for Irish Affairs in 1977. This committee formalised the already long-
standing involvement that a core of leading Democrats had with promoting pro-
nationalist solutions. Known as the „Four Horsemen‟, Senator Edward Kennedy, 
Speaker Tip O‟Neill, Governor Hugh Carey and Senator Patrick Moynihan, had long 
stood on a moderate nationalist platform and provided a transatlantic mouthpiece for 
criticism at perceived British heavy-handedness in Northern Ireland. Events such as the 
introduction of internment (the „nadir of British policy in Ulster,‟ according to 
Kennedy
113
) and Bloody Sunday provoked fierce condemnation as the Troubles 
transcended its essential domesticity to become an internationalised conflict via the 
spread of media coverage and especially via the intercessions of the powerful Irish-
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American lobby.
114
 The Four Horsemen brought their influence to bear during the Carter 
years, after the Nixon administration had shown little enthusiasm for interfering in what 
it deemed an essentially British matter. In 1977 the quartet persuaded Secretary of State 
Cyrus Vance to adopt the so-called „Friends of Ireland‟ agenda as administration policy. 
In August 1977 President Carter openly condemned the use of violence and reprisal by 
both sides, encouraged cross-community dialogue and promised to fund relief efforts 
once peace had been achieved. For the first time since the Troubles began, Northern 
Ireland had been explicitly identified as a legitimate plank of the American foreign 
policy agenda. British suspicions at Carter‟s intervention were crystallised in August 
1979 when the State Department suspended all American arms supplies to the RUC, in a 
move usually reserved for regimes guilty of human rights abuses and designed to 
embarrass the British into adopting a more nuanced approach to policing. Yet by the end 
of his presidency Carter had become embroiled in the Iranian hostage crisis and the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, detracting him from pressuring the British over 
Northern Ireland. Yet such distractions would also infuse an element of the Cold War 
into the long war in Ulster.  
 
The rhetoric of anti-imperialism and the dogmatic Marxism of the Official IRA in 
particular pricked Soviet interest in the Northern Ireland Troubles. The British 
government was especially concerned in the early years of the conflict as to just what 
level of participation the Soviets would seek in an attempt to exacerbate Cold War 
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enmities with Britain by interfering in Ulster. Edward Heath was worried enough to 
share intelligence material with the Irish Taoiseach Jack Lynch in March 1972 to warn 
him off establishing full diplomatic links with the USSR, writing to Dublin that: „a 
recent defector has told us that the KGB are taking a close interest in the Irish situation 
and that a KGB officer has already discussed with the Secretary of the Communist Party 
of Ireland his request for arms for the IRA.‟115 British Foreign Secretary Alec Douglas-
Home had already written to Heath expressing his concern as to the perceived „positive 
Soviet attitude to the IRA.‟116 Only minor arms shipments seem to have been made 
between the Soviets and Irish republicans, ensuring that its influence remained primarily 
„educational and propagandist.‟117  
 
Taken holistically, therefore, a picture of the Troubles emerges in a strong international 
context. Several scholars, in particular Adrian Guelke and Michael Cox, have long been 
proponents of utilising the international dimension through which to interpret the 
multiple layers of interest and influence over the course of the conflict.
118
 The assertion 
of American political leverage over the Troubles remains the single most important 
external element of the conflict, and arguably that still remains the case in post-Good 
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Friday Agreement Ulster. The lobbying power of the Irish-Americans inside and outside 
Congress, when combined with the external support directly offered to the IRA by 
American and Libyan sympathisers in particular, had a tangible impact upon the 
Troubles on both a political and paramilitary level. The official end of „Operation 
Banner‟ report by the Ministry of Defence utterly misrepresents the influence of the 
international dimension, when its states in a vein of understatement that: „The rest of the 
world was, by and large, little more than an audience to the drama in Northern 
Ireland.‟119 They were not merely the audience. They were part of the cast. 
 
 
Reflecting on the early Northern Irish Troubles 
By January 1979, nearly ten years into the Troubles in Northern Ireland, the British 
Army had 13,311 troops in the province. These numbers were augmented by 8,684 
mainly part-time members of the Ulster Defence Regiment and 6,110 RUC police 
officers.
120
 The militarisation of everyday life in Ulster was underlined not only by this 
ubiquitous security presence but by the infusion of paramilitary activity with community 
life, by the fierce inter-connectedness of national and religious identities, and by the 
seemingly incessant cycle of attack and counter-attacks that cast a cloud of violence over 
Northern Ireland.  
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The 1970s represented the bloody peak of violence in Ulster and showcased the best and 
the worst of the British Army‟s counter-insurgency approach. The short-circuiting of 
context in its lesson transferral process from previous conflicts, notably from Yemen, 
caused an un-nuanced tactical repertoire to be unleashed against republican 
paramilitaries without adequate discernment for the treatment of the wider Catholic 
community. In short, there was a failure to adapt to the domestic nature of the Troubles, 
and to therefore appreciate the difficulties of undertaking counter-insurgency operations 
in the midst of effectively a civil war. For this reason emerged some operational conduct 
that aggravated the insurgent opposition and the community from which they were 
drawn. In this vein, Robert White and Terry Falkenberg White have helpfully 
distinguished between what they characterise as „formal‟ acts of British „repression‟ (in 
this context, „suppression‟ might be a more useful term to apply), such as the state-
sanctioned implementation of internment, and „informal‟ acts, as exemplified by the 
actions of individual state agents, such as the actions of Parachute Regiment soldiers on 
Bloody Sunday.
121
  
 
These „formal‟ and „informal‟ acts of suppression were indicative of inconsistent 
political management and an over-zealous military engagement with the Troubles. Too 
often were central strands of Britain‟s civil-military counter-insurgency approach 
counter-productive, as was demonstrated with early riot control methods and the 
introduction of internment. Such heavy-handedness was replete with colonial-era 
                                                          
121
 Robert W. White and Terry Falkenberg White, „Repression and the Liberal State: The Case of Northern 
Ireland, 1969-72‟, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.39 No.2 (June 1995), p.332. 
289 
 
echoes, wholly inappropriate to the suppression of civil disturbance and domestic 
insurgency. Such a lack of sophistication, from the tactical to the strategic levels, played 
its part to imbuing the Troubles with an attritional quality that was eventually to rely on 
stalemate and cross-community clamours for peace in order to pave the way for a 
comprehensive peace settlement that emerged on Good Friday 1998. There were distinct 
elements of success in the realm of intelligence for the British that severely undermined 
IRA efficiency and effectiveness, however such successful infiltrations and cultivation 
of informers as a means of tipping the intelligence war in the British favour were too 
often undermined by the highly contentious actions of the British Army or the backlash 
at political decisions which fanned the flames of violence. Unlike in previous colonial 
conflicts, the covert war in Northern Ireland was hindered, not aided, by aggressive 
counter-insurgency campaigning by the regular Army.  
 
On 28 July 2005, just weeks after radical Islamists had brought a different kind of 
terrorism to the streets of London, the Provisional IRA issued a statement announcing an 
official end to its armed campaign.
122
 This drew to a close a chapter in the wider story of 
insurgent violence in Northern Ireland. However, it would be premature to have 
heralded the end of paramilitary activity in Ulster. The sporadic ability and willingness 
of IRA splinter groups, notably the Real and Continuity IRAs, have provided 
intermittent attempts to derail the ongoing forging of a lasting peace in Northern Ireland 
since the Good Friday Agreement. From the Omagh bombing in August 1998 (the single 
worst atrocity in the bloody history of the recent Troubles, with 29 dead), through to the 
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efforts to spark a re-ignition of widespread violence in March 2009 with the shooting of 
two soldiers and a police officer, such splinter groups represent a perilous warning as to 
the latent albeit narrow presence of dangers to peace in Northern Ireland. As political 
leaders in Belfast and London grapple with the response to splinter group violence, the 
military hierarchy would do well to be reminded of the effects of a draconian response to 
a specific threat. Furthermore, the history of the early conduct of counter-insurgency in 
Northern Ireland holds not only continuing relevance to managing contemporary 
residual threats to peace in the province, but also holds a wider significance for 
subsequent counter-insurgency operations. The post-Operation Banner Ministry of 
Defence report was right to assert that the British Army‟s experience in Northern Ireland 
was a „landmark‟, and indeed the lessons that have emanated from the conflict have 
„stood the Army in good stead in other theatres and will probably continue to do so for a 
long time.‟123 With the dangers of undertaking urban counter-insurgency in the midst of 
a de facto civil war and the degenerate effects of implementing indiscriminate security 
measures at the expense of community relations, the British experience in Northern 
Ireland was a bloody crucible in which to reappraise the national counter-insurgency 
approach. In this crucible lessons were partially and parenthetically acknowledged, 
whilst strategy for defeating paramilitary republicanism was suffused with political 
hesitation and undermined by military heavy-handedness. Indeed, the lessons of the 
original „long war‟ on terror in Northern Ireland were learned the hard way by the 
British and are of extreme importance to a later yet very different „war on terror.‟ 
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CHAPTER 7: ‘Magnanimous in Victory? British Counter-Insurgency Efforts in 
Iraq’ 
 
 
‘I went up the Tigris with one hundred Devon Territorials, young, clean 
delightful fellows… By them one saw vividly how great it was to be their 
kin, and English. And we were casting them by thousands into the fire to 
the worst of deaths, not to win the war but that the corn and rice and oil 
of Mesopotamia might be ours.’ 
T.E. Lawrence, 
‘Seven Pillars of Wisdom’1 
 
 
In one of the most renowned pre-battle speeches of the modern era, Colonel Tim Collins 
of the 1
st
 Battalion, Royal Irish Regiment urged his troops on the eve of the Iraq war: „if 
you are ferocious in battle remember to be magnanimous in victory.‟ That victory would 
take less than two months from the first „shock and awe‟ air strikes on Baghdad on 20 
March 2003 to President Bush declaring „mission accomplished‟ on 1 May. In reality, 
only a fraction of the battle had been fought. Saddam may have been toppled, but a 
Pandora‟s Box of ethnic, religious and nationalist insurgent violence was unleashed by 
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this highly controversial war. With the official withdrawal of British combat troops 
complete by May 2009, magnanimous conduct became eclipsed by poor strategic 
planning and underwhelming operational performance. If Iraq represents the culmination 
of sixty years worth of „modern‟ counter-insurgency lesson learning then the results 
have been disconcerting.  
 
The UK Armed Forces were one of twenty-seven national forces that made up the Multi-
National Force – Iraq (MNF-I). The coalition‟s military control of Iraq saw the country 
split into six main Areas of Responsibility (AORs), with the British providing the 
leadership in Multi-National Division (South East) (MND(SE)). This sector 
encompassed the four provinces of Basra, Maysan, Dhi Qar and Muthanna, where the 
vast majority of Britain‟s troops were deployed. The initial post-conflict stage was a 
relatively quite period in southern Iraq as operations focussed on securing the oil fields 
and the long stretch of border with Iran. However, pre-war expectations that post-
Saddam resistance would be low were massively misguided resulting in insufficient 
preparedness for the British, as well as the American, army. In late 2005 the security 
situation in and around Basra deteriorated significantly as a result of local competition 
amongst rival militant groups for political and economic control in the region. Attacks 
on British troops increased, as did violence between rival Shia factions. This conflict 
environment facing the British in southern Iraq was tangibly different from that facing 
the Americans in Baghdad and the infamous „Sunni Triangle‟ in central Iraq, particularly 
in relation to the quantity of foreign jihadists belonging to such groups as Al-Qaeda in 
Iraq. Sectarian violence in Basra reached a bloody crescendo in May 2006 forcing the 
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Iraqi Prime Minister, Nouri al-Maliki, to declare a month-long state of emergency, 
testing the efficacy of contemporary British counter-insurgency tactics. A controversial 
withdrawal to an „overwatch‟ role at Basra airport in September 2007 created a security 
vacuum in the city that was filled by the militias and was arguably not plugged until the 
joint Iraqi-American „Operation Charge of the Knights‟, which largely bypassed British 
involvement in 2008. Slow burning strategies that have unfolded in counter-insurgency 
campaigns previous to Iraq have relied upon harnessing eventual operational 
competence and success. This was a catalyst absent in Iraq. Even a slow burning 
strategy needs kindling and a flame. The British performance in Iraq provided neither. 
 
Strategy and tactics, both military and political, utilised in Iraq will be examined in this 
chapter in the context of experiences in the other case studies. Observations have been 
abound as to the imperative of joining-up political and military actions in the transitional 
phase of government along the lines of Templer‟s Malaya model2, as well as in regard to 
the value and ability to implement lessons from the experience in Northern Ireland.
3
 
Indeed, the majority of the burden of blame for the admittedly insufficient and under-
prepared response to post-conflict violence lies with the political community who 
initially engineered the war. Blair‟s decision to join Bush in the invasion of Iraq caused 
enormous political ructions as well as creating unprecedented scenarios for the British 
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military, of which a sizeable literature has emerged.
4
 Not only did they prepare for and 
deploy into one form of warfare (a conventional land invasion) and had to adapt to 
eventually fight a different category of warfare altogether (counter-insurgency), they 
also had to contend with junior coalition partner status in an asymmetric conflict for the 
first time.
5
 In such a politicised conflict environment, stemming from the British retreat 
from Aden and South Yemen in the late 1960s, Whitehall has retained the capacity to 
politicise the missions of the army, control the level of troop numbers and the timing of 
any future withdrawal, all within a context of tightly controlled spending for military 
operations. Over-simplified, perhaps naïve, assumptions as to the reaction of the Iraqi 
population upon the toppling of Saddam Hussein and his Ba‟athist regime belied a 
complex welter of ethnic, tribal and religious responses to the coalition control of the 
country. Talk of „liberation‟ seemed to come from the lips of occupiers. As a 
consequence, counter-insurgency in Iraq was, firstly, not expected to be the primary 
mode of warfare, and therefore secondly, had to be painfully re-learned. In short, the war 
eventually fought to secure the political imperative of engineering a democratic Iraq was 
not the war envisaged by its architects. Where did it all go wrong? 
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Prelude to Insurgency: Saddam, WMD, and ‘Shock and Awe’ 
That the Iraq war was the most controversial conflict in the modern era remains one of 
the most prevalent truisms in contemporary international relations. The Bush 
administration‟s post-9/11 conceptualisation of an „axis of evil‟ constituting rogue states 
desirous of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) paved the way for the invasion of Iraq, 
augmented by erroneous intelligence claims, neo-conservative threat perceptions, and 
Bush family „unfinished business.‟ The notion of a „pre-emptive war‟ retained an 
unprecedented position in legal, political, and ethical terms, requiring a forceful 
justification to counter-act the rejoinders of illegality, illegitimacy and immorality. 
Intelligence material claiming Saddam not only possessed WMD but could deploy them 
in forty-five minutes came to dominate the narrative that marketed the war as a just one. 
Not only did this push Anglo-American intelligence agencies from their preferred 
residence as arbiter of secrets and private councillor to governments into the political 
limelight, but it also set new benchmarks for the publication of intelligence material as a 
politicised tool to secure seemingly pre-determined aims. Behind the „slam dunk‟ of 
intelligence material, the American push for war also needed a greater veneer of political 
legitimacy by garnering international support in the form of a „coalition of the willing‟. 
A total of 27 countries provided troops for this coalition that would eventually invade 
Iraq in March 2003. Yet the distribution of the burden of removing Saddam would not 
be as even as the size of the coalition would seemingly present. The US would supply 
91% of all combat troops in the initial invasion with their initial contingent of 424,000.
6
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The second largest military grouping was the 41,000 British troops sent into battle by 
Tony Blair – one third of the non-US coalition force.7 
 
The British decision to join the American-led invasion of Iraq affected international 
depictions of Britain‟s role in the world, especially given characterisations of Blair as 
Bush‟s „poodle‟.8 It also led to a large domestic backlash towards Blair, his government 
and an increasingly unpopular war. Yet what remains significant is that the American‟s 
did not need the physical presence of British troops (or indeed any other coalition 
troops) to achieve the goal of toppling Saddam (US troops outnumbered UK troops by 
10:1), but British involvement provided political symbolism that denoted international 
consensus and moral legitimacy.
9
 In the wake of his crucial meeting with Bush at the 
president‟s Texas ranch in April 2002, Blair began asserting the threat from Saddam 
with „archbishopric certainty.‟10 Yet for a politician acutely aware of creating a legacy, 
the invasion of Iraq will quite possibly be written by the self-invoked „hand of history‟ 
as being „Tony Blair‟s Vietnam‟, predicated upon his steadfast, if not fawning, belief 
that standing „shoulder to shoulder‟ with the Americans buttressed a crucial alliance and 
strengthened the „forces for good‟ in the world.11 Blair‟s missionary zeal to tackle Iraq 
conjoined with Bush‟s Manichean conception of international relations. The invasion of 
Iraq would therefore be a heady mix of idealism, vindication and faulty intelligence.  
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Post-Invasion Politics: The Political Management of Counter-Insurgency in Iraq 
Essential to an appreciation of the political management of the British counter-
insurgency campaign is Iraq is the disaggregating of Whitehall control over the strategic 
issues, such as troop numbers, longevity of the military presence, and financial 
supervision of military operations and reconstruction efforts, and the British-mandated 
political strands of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in southern Iraq, who 
were responsible for the day-to-day running of the four southern provinces in MND(SE). 
When the hunt for WMD was exposed as a fallacy, and the tumult of religious and 
nationalist violence turned against the coalition, there was a tangible reluctance on 
behalf of the British government to engage in an outright counter-insurgency campaign. 
Not only did this erode the British military‟s morale but it also compromised on-the-
ground political efforts of British reconstruction and stabilisation teams as misguided 
pre-invasion Whitehall expectations failed to materialise.
12
 When this was combined 
with consistent government reluctance to provide sufficient financial resources for the 
provision of adequate equipment the result was strategic stagnancy from London and 
operational insufficiency in Iraq.
13
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The main coalition political presence in the British-controlled MND(SE) was the thirty-
odd civil-military staff of the Coalition Provisional Authority (South), headed by a 
regional co-ordinator. The CPA (South), in conjuction with the military command of 
MND(SE), enunciated four overarching priorities in their sector: security; reconstruction 
and economic development; democratic governance; and improving Iraqi perceptions of 
the other three goals.
14
 Sir Hilary Synnott, the British co-ordinator in the south between 
July 2003 and January 2004, has publicly deconstructed the CPA‟s political efforts to 
achieve these goals, criticising its highly centralised structure and its unashamed focus 
on Baghdad as the priority for security and reconstruction operations: „CPA 
Headquarters tended to expect the British to sort out the problem for themselves… 
[This] put the south in danger of being starved of resources…‟15 What resources that did 
eventually reach the British-administered southern provinces, from money to pay Iraqi 
civil service wages to food aid, came from the American government and not the British, 
forcing British administrators in Basra to pay police and civil servants wages with 
confiscated Ba‟thist funds to circumvent the poor flow of finances in the immediate 
post-invasion period.
16
 In Synnott‟s view, the poor political and financial co-ordination 
of the CPA was exacerbated by the short „tours of duty‟ that most CPA administrators 
served. The usual three month stints (as opposed to the average six month tours for 
military personnel) were, Synnott argues, too short to be effective, and as a consequence 
of such administrative brevity the political management of Iraq as it entered a period of 
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violent insurgent upheaval would be characterised by a „loss of momentum and of 
experience, and [led] to confusion and dismay on the part of the Iraqis…‟ 17  
 
Even those sent by Whitehall to bridge the gap between London and Baghdad 
consistently painted a bleak portrait for the political masters of the counter-insurgency 
effort. In May 2003, Tony Blair appointed John Sawyers, the British Ambassador to 
Egypt, as London‟s envoy in Baghdad. A short period into his appointment, Sawyers 
cabled to Whitehall a damning report on the nationwide civil-military counter-
insurgency effort, accusing the US military of „not providing the security framework 
needed‟, and branding the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance 
(ORHA – the short-lived predecessor of the CPA) an „unbelievable mess.‟ He pushed 
for „an operational UK presence in Baghdad‟ to help alleviate the problems but was 
over-ruled by a Whitehall wary of expanding the UK effort outside the south.
18
 Another 
memo by Sawyers back to London one month later revealed his concerns over „how thin 
is the veneer of security in many parts of Iraq‟, given the prevalence of insurgent 
violence against the Iraqi infrastructure and the increasing radicalisation of young Shias 
in the south by burgeoning extremist religious movements.
19
 The gravity of Sawyers‟ 
grim interpretation of the effectiveness of coalition political control over Iraq is 
heightened by his role as the leading British diplomat in the country at the outbreak of 
the insurgency, especially through his selection by CPA chief Paul Bremer to help 
jointly construct the membership of the Iraqi Governing Council in the summer of 
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2003.
20
 Once full diplomatic relations with Iraq had been re-established by Britain, even 
British Ambassadors to Iraq had difficulty in presenting a positive political picture. In 
his final diplomatic telegram, which was leaked to the press, William Patey offered a 
devastating assessment to the Prime Minister and UK military commanders of the Iraqi 
situation in mid-2006, three years after Sawyers‟ initial aspersions: „civil war and a de 
facto division of Iraq is probably more likely at this stage than a successful and 
substantial transition to a stable democracy.‟21 Depictions of political failure were 
ubiquitous, in terms of the provision for adequate democratic governance structures to 
be sufficiently financed and for post-Saddam security and policing to be effectively 
funded. Reconstruction efforts were to receive equally parlous political co-ordination. 
 
One of the earliest British civil-military reconstruction efforts came in the form of the 
Emergency Infrastructure Plan (EIP). Spearheaded by the Department for International 
Development (DFiD), the EIP was an integral British-led programme designed to benefit 
key services in MND(SE) in the immediate post-invasion period to the tune of 
$127million.
22
 Despite managerial problems, the EIP grew in scope and it achieved 
moderate success. It funded projects that contributed to the strategic goals of aiding 
reconstruction, such as rebuilding schools, re-equipping hospitals, and the opening of 
water purification plants, however, the distribution of this money was haphazard and 
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access to it obfuscated.
23
 Yet so poor were civil-military relations in the first few years 
after the invasion that, as former British CPA Administrator in Maysan province, Rory 
Stewart, put it: „Most of the soldiers did not even know there had once been a civilian 
presence in the province. The new British battle group claimed that almost no 
development had happened before their arrival.‟24 All EIP efforts were effectively 
curtailed by early 2004 as the security situation in and around Basra significantly 
degenerated. However, the UK government continued to pledge money for such efforts, 
but in relatively small amounts given the cost of nation-building. Between 2003 and 
2006 Whitehall earmarked £544million for post-war reconstruction in Iraq,
25
 despite the 
absence of a coherent structural programme for the delivery of reconstruction and relief 
work for much of this period. It was not until 2006, three years after the invasion of Iraq, 
that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and 
DFiD jointly established a formal agency to co-ordinate the delivery of British 
reconstruction plans, the Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU), which in December 
2007 changed its name to the Stabilisation Unit. This three year gap represented a 
crucial window of time during which the Iraqi people were most in need of coalition-
provided security, economic provision and the maintenance of national infrastructure. In 
the absence of this, support for the militias in southern Iraq multiplied. This remains one 
of the most lamentable aspects of the British failings in Iraq. Indeed, by the admission of 
the British deputy head of the ORHA, Major-General Tim Cross, the British „didn‟t have 
a coherent plan put together‟ for post-war reconstruction. He went on to argue that there 
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was a pervasive trans-Atlantic belief that Iraq could „rebuild itself‟ given its endogenous 
resources, negating the need for exogenous assistance.
26
 
 
The Stabilisation Unit was designed to help undertake and manage „capacity building 
assistance to the Iraqi Government in the South, focussing on Basra Province.‟27 With a 
budget of nearly £700million (a fraction of the finances required for an effective and 
substantial reconstruction effort in southern Iraq) there was an utter lack of civil-military 
co-operation in the reconstruction effort in MND(SE) given the absence of a coherent 
plan, and the failure to co-opt the British military into civilian reconstruction efforts, 
often resulting in parallel efforts being undertaken. Even the General Staff admitted in 
their official analysis of stability operations in Iraq that: „There was little effective 
correlation in the planning of reconstruction projects.‟28 Due to this confusion of 
responsibilities the military often had to fulfil political functions, for example some 
senior officers were posted as interim provincial governors in the absence of any action 
or input from the FCO or DFiD.
29
 Indeed, this would be symptomatic of the demands 
placed upon the British military in Iraq: they would be multivariate, often contradictory, 
pushing them to the point of overstretch. 
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Junior Partner Counter-Insurgency: The British Military in Iraq 
Since March 2003, the British Army had fought two very different conflicts. The initial 
war saw the execution of a conventional land invasion, pragmatically and successfully 
undertaken. Yet the degeneration of Iraqi society as lawlessness and insurgent violence 
proliferated required the British Army in southern Iraq to adapt to counter-insurgency 
warfighting as early indicators of Basrawi pliancy gradually gave way to anger and 
militia influence. On top of the tactical shift required between Phase III (combat) and 
Phase IV (post-combat) operations, the British military operations in Iraq also had been, 
by the British government‟s own admission, „one of the first times in recent history that 
the UK had to take on the obligations of an occupying power, and operated as a junior 
partner in a counter-insurgency.‟30 This would present a unique strategic environment 
for the British military in counter-insurgency terms. Arguably, it was the first post-
colonial counter-insurgency the British Army had faced.
31
 It was also essentially the first 
post-Maoist, indeed post-modern, insurgency the British had confronted in as much as 
the disparate groupings were not strategically cogent or territorially defined, eschewing 
traditional insurgent notions of a population-based „centre of gravity‟, in addition to 
abandoning ideological dogma in favour of a blanket rejection of Western „modernity.‟ 
Adaptability to this environment for the British Army would come at a heavy price and 
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would call into question the value of their accumulative post-World War Two counter-
insurgency learning. 
 
When troops from the British military contingent in Iraq, the 1
st
 UK Armoured Division, 
began to take Basra city in early April 2003 they found themselves, by their own 
admission, fighting a twofold war. Concomitantly they were conducting a conventional 
campaign against regular Iraqi army units to gain access to the city as well as irregular 
Fedayeen and militias, requiring the parallel implementation of counter-insurgency 
tactics.
32
 Ground combat operations by British troops had taken nearly three weeks to 
secure Basra for the coalition, a strategically important site given its status as Iraq‟s 
second city and given southern Iraq‟s plentiful oil facilities. Charged with this strategic 
objective at the outset of the invasion, the 1
st
 UK Armoured Division (an amalgam of 
armoured and mechanised brigades as well as rapid reaction forces), and its 
commanding officer, Major-General Robin Brims, believed Basra to be lightly defended 
and would therefore fall easily. The initial approach was to encircle the city and await an 
imminent dissipation of Iraqi forces as the collapse of Saddam‟s regime became 
apparent. This assumption was based in part on a reluctance to enter Basra immediately 
and thus avoid any traps that irregular troops and militias would have set, circumventing 
the possibility of an urban siege, mass civilian casualties and significant infrastructural 
damage.
33
 This approach met with some criticism, particularly from their American 
allies, which questioned its level of aggressiveness in the face of enemy opposition. 
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However, Major-General Brims defended his less belligerent securing of Basra by 
arguing that: „I exercised restraint… But it was not because I was given “limited 
freedom of action”, nor for “legal reasons”, but because that is how we wanted to fight 
the war.‟34 That would be the last time that the British got to fight the war on their own 
terms.  
 
The primacy of counter-insurgency in the British Army‟s tactical approach during and 
after the capture of Basra was complicated by the rise of multiple insurgencies, each 
with its own catalyst, methods, and endgame. The complete breakdown of the security 
situation that accompanied the British takeover of Basra created a suitable environment 
for the insurgencies to flourish. Looting, kidnapping and murder engulfed the city and 
proved beyond the capabilities of the British troops to adequately curb. Measures were 
taken by the UK military in Basra in mid-2003, including attempts to reconstitute the 
police force and repair the judicial system, however in the growing security vacuum 
Basra‟s vulnerable population felt an increasing lack of confidence in the British ability 
to protect their livelihoods and families. This allowed insurgent and militia groups to 
posit themselves as the true guarantors of security.
35
 
 
Even by August 2003, just three months after capturing Basra, the CPA chief Paul 
Bremer, was accusing the British military of going „weak in the knees‟ by showing 
reluctance to take action against the increasing influence of the radical cleric Muqtada 
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al-Sadr and his Mahdi Army militia.
36
 Bremer‟s criticisms belie wider American 
perceptions of the emergent insurgency, especially from Washington. Ali Allawi, the 
Iraqi finance minister in the Transitional National Government, credited the British for 
being first to appreciate the development of a nascent insurgency in the country, 
however „the situation had not yet deteriorated to the point there they could challenge 
the entrenched American thinking‟ that post-invasion violence was orchestrated by 
Saddam loyalists.
37
 An early signifier of the vicious pockets of resistance to the British 
presence came in June 2003 when six Royal Military Police (RMP) officers were killed 
by a mob in Majar al Kebir in Maysan province.
38
 Yet such incidents were seen as 
isolated against the backdrop of British troops patrolling Basra in their regimental berets, 
shunning helmets and sunglasses, as in-roads were made into ingratiating the military 
with the southern Iraqi people.  
 
Arguably this perception of a relatively „secure‟ south lasted up until 2005, when the 
situation „deteriorated significantly‟ due to a rise in attacks on British and Iraqi troops, 
and a rise in inter-Shia militia violence
39
 – primarily between the rival factions of 
Muqtada al-Sadr‟s Madhi Army and the Badr Organisation, the paramilitary wing of the 
Supreme Council of the Islamic Republic of Iraq (SCIRI), the largest Shia political party 
in the south. Clearly the intensity of the insurgency in and around Basra was far short of 
that in Baghdad or the „Sunni Triangle‟ in central Iraq, yet this corrosion in British 
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control of the south was exposing British troops to greater threat and danger. As 
Brigadier-General Adel Abbas, one of Iraq‟s most senior soldiers and commander of the 
1
st
 Battalion of the Iraqi Army, lamented: „In 2005 the British started to lose Basra. They 
left the mission and started to defend themselves.‟40 Insurgent control of Basra grew 
throughout 2005 and 2006 as rival factions vied for political and economic power, 
emboldened by increasing external support from Iran. One Basra resident summed up 
the „miserable situation‟ in the city in spring 2006: „Electricity is absent for most of the 
day and gasoline is very expensive. Ordinary people can never get a job at the state 
security forces because it is entirely controlled by the militias.‟41 In the face of this 
evident breakdown in the British ability to implement sustainable reconstruction and 
ensure effective security, the Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki declared a state of 
emergency in Basra in May and promised to crush the insurgents and criminal gangs 
„with an iron fist.‟42 The visible manifestation of this „iron fist‟ approach was „Operation 
Sinbad‟, launched in late September 2006, a joint British-Iraqi mission to curtail the 
power of militia „death squads‟ and shore-up the political power of Basra‟s civil leaders. 
Taking areas of the city systematically, around 1,000 British troops and 2,300 Iraqi 
soldiers cordoned-off and searched districts for militia members and provided security 
for reconstruction work to be carried out. „Operation Sinbad‟ also involved placing 
Royal Military Police „transition teams‟ with Iraq police units to build their resilience to 
insurgent infiltration. However, the military side of Sinbad, designed to last five months 
up until February 2007 „virtually came to a halt after one wave of raids‟ in the face of 
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militia opposition, ensuring that the operation was characterised as „a last attempt to be 
seen to be doing something‟ before security responsibilities were transferred to the 
Iraqis.
43
 Operation Sinbad is symptomatic of the overall British malaise in Iraq. Over-
stretched and operationally inert, the military were caught between the devil of vicious 
and multiple insurgencies and the deep blue sea of political mismanagement and 
financial constraint. The overall outcome was a strategically obfuscated military 
campaign that was to end in an indecorous withdrawal amidst the sweltering Gulf heat. 
 
By the end of 2007 the power of the militia‟s had still not diminished. Whatever peace 
there was in the city was, as the House of Commons Defence Select Committee 
concluded, „said to owe more to the dominance of militias and criminal gangs… than to 
the success of Multi-National and Iraqi Security Forces.‟44 Thomas Ricks described 
Basra in 2007 as having descended into „gangland warfare over control of oil exports 
and other sources of revenue.‟45 The permeation of government institutions in the city by 
rival extremist factions was exacerbated by politically-motivated assassinations, 
intimidation and vigilante law enforcement.
46
 In large part this had been facilitated by 
the British military withdrawal to their Contingency Operating Base (COB) at Basra 
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airport on the outskirts of the city, leaving all inner-city patrolling to their erstwhile Iraqi 
trainees, in early September.
47
  
 
The withdrawal to an „overwatch‟ position was achieved peacefully despite the 
prevalence of violence and regularity of attacks against British troops. However, it soon 
emerged that this unmolested departure was the product of British military negotiations 
with the Mahdi Army, the primary perpetrator of insurgent violence against British 
troops. A Ministry of Defence spokesperson reluctantly justified the dialogue in 
pragmatic terms but denied a negotiated settlement as a pre-cursor to withdrawal: „We 
talk to the Mahdi Army and other military groups in our area of operations as part of the 
strategy of political engagement… (A)n outright refusal to engage in dialogue with them 
would not be in Iraq‟s or Basra‟s best interests.‟48 Similar arguments had of course been 
utilised to justify talks with the IRA in previous decades. However, a Mahdi Army 
leader claimed that the British had initiated talks with the militia group as their resilience 
had been broken: „They (the British) wanted us to stop attacking their compounds and 
troops… It was obvious they had suffered enough attacks and could not deal with 
more.‟49 The Mahdi Army claimed they had agreed a deal not to harass the British 
withdrawal on two conditions: that the withdrawal take all British troops out of the city 
and that detained Mahdi army members be released. The fulfilment of both of these 
provisos has understandably led to claims that the British ceded to insurgent demands, 
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even if the result was a reduction in violence against British troops. Although the 
Americans had started to cut deals with Sunni insurgents as the „Awakening Movement‟ 
took hold in Anbar province, including cash incentives not to attack US forces, the 
consequences of the British deal with Shia militias were far greater – essentially 
surrendering control of a city to the insurgency. The Mahdi Army‟s claims were 
seemingly vindicated in 2008 when it became apparent that Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri 
al-Maliki had deliberately not included British commanders in the operational planning 
of „Operation Charge of the Knights‟ – a massive joint US-Iraqi military operation to rid 
Basra of the influence of the militias, including the Mahdi Army, in April 2008 – 
because he was reportedly furious over the deal the British had done.
50
 Iraqi government 
anger at the reluctance of the British military to arrest the power of the Mahdi Army in 
2007-08 marked a distinct low-point not only in UK-Iraqi relations, but also in terms of 
the perceived efficacy of the British military counter-insurgency effort in the country.  
 
This feeling was exacerbated by the relatively successful outcome of the US-Iraqi 
„Operation Charge of the Knights‟ in dampening the potency of the Mahdi Army in 
Basra and securing a psychological and political victory for al-Maliki. Indeed, this 
operation encapsulated the frustrations that had been increasing within the American 
military command at the performance of their British allies. In mid-2007 US General 
Jack Keane, one of the architects of President Bush‟s troop „surge‟ strategy, outspokenly 
criticised the British military performance in Basra, stating he was „frustrated‟ by the 
                                                          
50
 The Times, „Iraq snubs Britain and calls US into Basra battle‟, 10 April 2008; The Times, „Secret deal 
kept Army out of battle for Basra‟, 5 August 2008. 
311 
 
„disengagement‟ of British troops.51 When the British pulled back from Basra Palace to 
the airport in September 2007 a dejected senior US intelligence official interpreted this 
as the British being „defeated in the south.‟52 Thomas Ricks concurs, arguing that this 
represented a remarkable turnaround for the British who in the early phase of the 
insurgency „had felt rather superior to the clumsy Americans‟, but who had now „fell 
almost silent‟ since the Petraeus-implemented „surge‟ had radically reformed the 
situation in the American-occupied provinces.
53
 On this transformation of fortunes, 
Hilary Synnott, the leading British political co-ordinator in Iraq during the early phases 
of the insurgency, had warned that „extol[ing] the merits of the British approach‟ to 
countering insurgents in southern Iraq „implied that the British could manage such 
challenges better than the United States…‟ Synnott also noted that praise for the British 
counter-insurgency effort in 2003-04, clad as it was in soft hats, sans sunglasses, was an 
irritant to American military commanders, who „proved remarkably sensitive on this 
point.‟54 Residual within these debates lay the weight of the British historical 
experience. The lessons from Northern Ireland in particular were interpreted by the 
Americans and British alike as having great utility for the British military in Iraq, able as 
they were to rely upon decades of familiarity with unconventional warfighting. Benign 
constructions of a discernable „British way‟ of counter-insurgency certainly shaped 
expectations of not only what the British military would achieve in Iraq but also formed 
malignant perceptions of American military culture in the realm of asymmetric 
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warfare.
55
 Such intra-alliance division between the British and the Americans over 
counter-insurgency in Iraq arguably sourced its roots to the nature and balance of the 
coalition.
56
 Junior coalition partner status had become a strategic norm for Britain in the 
post-Cold War world, as demonstrated in the first Gulf War and again in Kosovo and 
Afghanistan. Yet as discussed earlier, Iraq presented an unprecedented strategic scenario 
for the British military in as much as it represented the first time they had to operate as a 
junior partner in a counter-insurgency coalition. This placed the British in a strategic 
straightjacket through which any discernable „British approach‟ to counter-insurgency 
was mitigated by overarching American coalition leadership. A strand of thought 
emerged within the British military that perceived significant barriers to the application 
of a distinctly „British way‟ stemming from the American suzerainty over the whole of 
Iraq, thus restricting the independent ability of the British to forge separate civil-military 
solutions in MND(SE). As a consequence of this coalition structure, „British military 
policy became confused and suffered as it sought to serve the Americans.‟57 However, 
such an interpretation overlooks the health of British counter-insurgency doctrine in the 
early-twenty-first century. Iraq represented an insurgent campaign sui generis to the 
British historical experience. The very nature of the insurgency was radically different to 
anything the British had faced before and the conflict environment, coalition 
subjugation, and political restrictions all ensured that the challenges posed by 
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contemporary insurgents (often with global links, as seen in Iraq) would gravely 
undermine the decades-old faith in British competence at counter-insurgency. 
 
Yet explanations of the seeming strategic failure of the British military in Iraq cannot 
rest solely upon interpretations of restricted operational freedom within the remit of the 
coalition‟s American-led strategic plan.58 Two primary issues should arguably be at the 
forefront of our understanding: first is the overstretch of the British military, fostered by 
a overtly hurried troop „drawdown‟, impinging upon the sustainability of the UK armed 
forces in Iraq; second, is the excessive political expectations as to what the military 
could achieve. The two factors are inexplicably linked.  
 
The British military has faced severe tests of its own sustainability in Iraq from both the 
specific operational demands of security provision and reconstruction programmes, and 
from domestic public disillusionment at this most controversial of occupations.
59
 This 
sustainability test has taken a human as well as institutional strain. In the first two and a 
half years following the invasion of Iraq, 1,333 British military personnel sought 
psychiatric treatment to help overcome the traumatic combat experiences necessitated by 
complex counter-insurgency operations.
60
 Such statistics are not only indicative of the 
particular viciousness of the Iraqi insurgency but also of the overstretch faced by the 
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armed forces engendered by a politically-motivated reduction in troop numbers. To 
undertake the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, the British deployed 41,000 troops. Just 
two months later, amid a confusing picture of lawlessness and political fluidity across 
southern Iraq, the government massively reduced UK troop numbers to 18,000. By the 
end of 2008, despite the quagmire of violence in Basra, troop numbers dropped to just 
over 4,000.
61
 Even at the peak of UK troop deployment at the point of invasion, the ratio 
of British soldiers to Basrawi civilians stood at 1:370, compared to the 1:65 troop-to-
civilian ratio seen in Belfast at the peak of the Troubles in the early 1970s.
62
 Indeed, at 
the end of 2005 there were more British troops stationed in Northern Ireland than there 
were tackling insurgent violence in Iraq (around 8,000).
63
 In the context of the American 
troop increase resultant of the 2007 „surge‟, one British defence expert labelled the 
contrasting reduction of UK troops „a calamitous misjudgement… for which the 
government – anxious to reduce domestic criticism of its involvement in Iraq – was 
largely responsible.‟64 There were simply not enough „boots on the ground‟ to achieve 
the ambitious strategic goals of ensuring security and reconstruction in the face of a 
virulent insurgency, rampant lawlessness and ill-coordinated political initiatives. Some 
observers, and indeed the then Chief of the General Staff, General Sir Richard Dannatt 
in an interview with the Daily Mail, have argued that British troops should have been 
withdrawn far earlier than mid-2009 and that their continued presence exacerbated rather 
than placated violence in southern Iraq. However, as the American „surge‟ clinically 
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demonstrated, the maintenance of a sizeable military presence in Iraq would eventually 
ameliorate insurgent violence, augment a stable security situation, and hence create the 
conditions for a speedier (and crucially more credible) withdrawal. This may have been 
politically damaging, but would almost certainly have been militarily plausible. Yet in 
reality, by the end of „Operation Telic‟ too few British troops were being asked to do too 
much, thus resulting in strategic inertia. 
 
Such political short-sightedness in the context of Iraq created what the Chief of the 
Defence Staff, Sir Jock Stirrup, labelled „false and inflated expectations‟ of what the UK 
military could achieve.
65
 The resultant lack of political post-invasion planning led to a 
strategic vacuum that left British forces, in the opinion of the House of Commons 
Defence Select Committee, „insufficiently prepared for the challenge represented by the 
insurgency.‟66 This was a situation from which the British military, with an insufficient 
number of troops and an absence of political will, could not regain the strategic 
initiative. As the British exit strategy neared completion, proponents of an optimistic 
interpretation of the British campaign in Iraq pointed to an effective transition to the 
Iraqi army, trained by 11 British Military Transition Teams (MiTTs) (although the 
training of the Iraqi Police Service by the UK Police Mission was arguably less 
successful given rife corruption and militia infiltration), and the establishment of an Iraqi 
Defence Academy and Staff College to ensure the lasting professionalisation of the Iraqi 
army. The Chief of Defence Staff dismissed „the nonsense about the British having 
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failed in Basra,‟67 whilst even the newly installed head of the US Central Command, 
General David Petraeus, felt compelled to argue that: „the significance of the United 
Kingdom‟s contribution should not be underestimated. Its military activities… have 
been instrumental in successful capacity building and the progress that we have made in 
various endeavours.‟68 However, this interpretation is perhaps overly benevolent. At best 
it can be inferred that British military achievements in Iraq did not match the 
expectations of 2003. In-roads into reducing insurgent violence in Basra came initially at 
the price of ceding control of the city to the Mahdi Army, and then were kinetically 
instigated without major British military input. It is therefore doubtful that the military 
mission in Iraq will mark a glorious first chapter in the history of British twenty-first 
century counter-insurgency campaigning. 
 
 
Intelligence in Iraq 
The bulk of literature on the role of intelligence in Iraq has naturally focussed on the 
WMD debacle and the failure of Anglo-American intelligence. Work scrutinising the 
intelligence dimension of the post-invasion counter-insurgency conflict has been 
significantly smaller.  
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Debates about British intelligence in the build-up to the Iraq War centred around three 
main issues: the deliberate publication by the Blair government of Joint Intelligence 
Committee (JIC) assessments; the pressure the government may have brought to bear on 
the JIC to reach its conclusions; and how the political pressures relating to the 
intelligence material contributed to the suicide of MoD weapons expert Dr David Kelly 
in July 2003.
69
 Even after the invasion had been undertaken, political, media and public 
attention was diverted by allegations of „dodgy‟ intelligence dossiers, with the JIC and 
MI6 thrown uncomfortably into the limelight as questions arose about the competency 
and neutrality of Britain‟s intelligence agencies. Yet as this furore unfolded, British 
intelligence agents inside Iraq focussed their efforts in the immediate post-invasion 
period on locating supposed weapons of mass destruction as well as former Ba‟athist 
leaders, especially „Chemical‟ Ali Hassan al-Majid, former head of the Iraqi intelligence 
services, who was known to be in southern Iraq at the time of the invasion. Yet such 
efforts proved diversionary from the growing threat of the nascent insurgency. Military 
intelligence would therefore be crucial to the coming campaign. 
 
Since the first Gulf War in the early 1990s, British intelligence had undertaken efforts to 
cultivate an intelligence network in Basra, given its proximity to Kuwait and traditional 
ties to Iran. As the British encircled Basra in March 2003, Special Air Service (SAS) and 
Special Boat Service (SBS) units infiltrated the city to make contact with these 
intelligence links, in order to build up a picture of Iraqi army strongholds and levels of 
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militia support.
70
 It was this military intelligence that played a large role in allowing UK 
troops to eventually take control of the city virtually unhindered as a picture of the city‟s 
defensive weak spots had already been gleaned.
71
 
 
The nerve centre of British intelligence in Iraq during Operation Telic was, however, not 
in Basra alongside the British military command, but was based in Baghdad, at Station 
House, inside the fortified „Green Zone‟. This intelligence headquarters was shared by 
MI6, SAS and Special Reconnaissance Regiment officers, and being housed under the 
same roof was certainly hoped to engender a great deal of inter-agency intelligence co-
operation.
72
 Hopes for enhanced intelligence sharing with coalition allies, namely the 
Americans, were, however, frustrated by a series of bureaucratic barriers. Anglo-
American intelligence-sharing became a critical problem at a very early stage in the 
counter-insurgency campaign. American intelligence protocol classified all intelligence 
data in Iraq as „NOFORN‟ – no foreign access. This created the situation whereby 
British intelligence in Iraq, assembled by Station House, that was passed to the central 
US intelligence fusion centre for collation into an all-source intelligence picture was 
automatically marked „NOFORN‟ barring the British from access to their own 
intelligence material. Tony Blair took this issue up directly with George W. Bush in 
2004, who signed a directive allowing British (and Australian, but no other coalition 
countries) access to intelligence material for the planning and training phases of counter-
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insurgency operations, although Pentagon foot-dragging ensured this initiative was not 
efficiently enacted.
73
 
 
Despite these intra-coalition intelligence-sharing difficulties, the British aimed to garner 
as sizeable and accurate an intelligence picture of the insurgency as they could via their 
own capabilities. Yet these were extremely deficient in Iraq. The General Staff, in their 
report on UK stability operations, marks out the state of military intelligence-gathering 
in Iraq for particular criticism, especially in relation to the paucity of cultivated human 
intelligence (HUMINT): „UK ISTAR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, 
and Reconnaissance) capability produced results often regarded as disappointing by 
battlegroups... usually related to the availability of HUMINT.‟74 Additional concerns 
were raised relating to the absence of a single intelligence database, the level of 
ingratiation with local communities who could have furnished intelligence, and the 
consistent inability of UK ISTAR systems to provide „actionable intelligence‟, meaning 
as a result that British battlegroups were „seldom able to mount operations on the basis 
on good intelligence.‟75 To compensate for such parlous ISTAR assets, the British had to 
rely on alternative channels for intelligence material, and this in large part shifted the 
emphasis onto the interrogation of detained suspected insurgents. 
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UK intelligence personnel undertook interviews with Iraqi detainees for five primary 
reasons: to gather a wider intelligence picture of Iraq; in order to glean intelligence for 
the Iraq Survey Group (ISG); to extract information for British purposes on supposed 
WMD; to interrogate those with information on Iraq military weapons systems; and to 
build up an intelligence picture of those forces resisting the coalition military presence.
76
 
As the occupation wore on and stockpiles of WMD proved illusory, it was the last of 
these intelligence objectives, ostensibly a counter-insurgency intelligence function, 
which came to dominate British intelligence capabilities. The House of Commons 
Intelligence and Security Committee revealed that between 2003 and 2005 „the SIS 
(MI6), UK Armed Forces intelligence personnel, military and civilian Defence 
Intelligence Staff (DIS) personnel and, in a handful of cases, the Security Service (MI5)‟ 
undertook interviews with detainees in Iraq.
77
 Not only does the presence of MI5 agents 
indicate an intelligence awareness of possible British links to Iraqi violence, but the 
Intelligence and Security Committee report also reveals that unlike military intelligence 
personnel, the civilian agents of MI5, MI6 and the DIS were „not provided with any 
training concerning the Geneva Conventions… conversant with the rules for handling 
prisoners of war and detainees.‟78 Yet despite this concern over civilian intelligence 
agencies, the most high profile instances of detainee abuse have emanated from the 
actions of the Army. Widely publicised incidents, such as the death in British custody of 
Basra hotel clerk Baha Mousa in 2003 and the subsequent court-martialling of the first 
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ever British soldier convicted of war crimes in relation to Mousa‟s death79, severely 
threatened British efforts to ingratiate themselves with native Iraqis and undermined 
attempts to augment the perceived legitimacy of their occupation of southern Iraq.
80
  
 
With sinister echoes of Northern Ireland, the British government justified the existence 
of a de facto policy of internment for suspected insurgents in Iraq by arguing that it was 
„necessary for maintaining security‟, claiming there existed „an operational need for it.‟81 
Concerns over the existence of such a blanket policy were exacerbated by the structures 
in place to formalise it. In December 2003 the British established a Divisional 
Temporary Detention Facility (DTDF) at the Shaibah Logistics Base. At its peak, the 
DTDF held 140 prisoners in January 2004, and by mid-2006 the figure was 81. The 
average length of internment during this period was 198 days.
82
 Vague MoD guidelines 
for detention criteria created a situation whereby internees only had their cases reviewed 
monthly by the Divisional Internment Review Committee, made up solely of British 
military and intelligence personnel.
83
 It was not until September 2006 that the British 
began including local Iraqi officers to sit on a joint Combined Review and Release 
Board to assess the cases of internees.
84
 Given the entrenched tribal relations of southern 
Iraq it is surprising that the British opted to exclude all indigenous input into the 
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detention process for so long given the axiomatic counter-insurgency need to keep local 
opinion, particularly that of local elites, onside and a part of the security process. By 
early 2008 all UK-held internees had been released
85
, despite the spike in insurgent 
violence – symptomatic of the British military disengagement from Basra and the 
inability of the intelligence agencies to make significant headway into paralysing the 
insurgent capabilities. The myriad nature of the insurgencies facing the British in 
southern Iraq made for a complicated intelligence picture. Local, ground-level 
intelligence became essential as, for example, tip-offs picked up on patrol regarding 
arms caches or insurgent meeting points, became the most effective source of counter-
insurgency information. Infiltration of insurgent groups, akin to the Northern Irish 
experience, was unable to occur, whilst efforts to co-opt „turned‟ insurgents to act as 
agents was more problematic than in previous campaigns given the embedded tribal and 
religious affiliations of fighters, which were psychological obstacles difficult to 
surmount. Intelligence officers, along with their military counterparts, were to soon 
appreciate the nuanced nature of this particular form of insurgency. 
 
 
Managing the Jihad: Insurgent Organisation in Iraq  
Given the multitude of insurgent groups operating in Iraq since 2003 it remains 
deceptive to talk of a single insurgency. There were numerous groups pursuing 
numerous strategies by employing numerous tactics. As Steven Metz rightly 
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characterised, the cornucopia of insurgent groups represented „a multi-headed snake, 
unable to decide on a single course of action but difficult to kill.‟86  
 
Yet the insurgent groups facing the British in the south were of a very different 
construction to those fighting the Americans in central Iraq. United solely by their Shia 
Islamic faith, the two primary organisations vying for paramilitary power in the south 
were the Mahdi Army, loyal to the powerful cleric Mutada al-Sadr, and the Badr 
Organisation, armed wing of the Iranian-linked party SCIRI. The internecine struggle for 
Shia supremacy between these groups became a powerful sub-narrative to the 
insurgency across the south. The latter‟s foreign ties added a further layer of complexity 
to the insurgency given the widespread assumption that the organisation of SCIRI and 
the Badr Organisation was directed from Iran, whose interest in southern Iraqi politics 
was cemented during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war. The Mahdi Army‟s distinctly more 
Iraqi brand of Shia theology was channelled through Mutada al-Sadr‟s extensive social 
and political network, derived from the legacies of his influential clerical father and 
grandfather. The Mahdi Army was therefore not solely defined by its insurgent 
organisation, potent though it was, but its remit also extended to providing the delivery 
of various social welfare schemes within Shia strongholds loyal to al-Sadr, notably the 
Sadr City district of Baghdad, which was the epicentre of an al-Sadr-inspired uprising in 
April 2004. This had the effect of ingratiating the Mahdi Army into wider sections of the 
Iraqi Shia population who were disillusioned by the coalition occupation. As a result, the 
CPA estimated that the Mahdi Army had swelled its ranks from just 200 in August 2003 
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to over 6,000 by March 2004.
87
 Both the Mahdi Army and the Badr Organisation 
therefore were inherently politico-military in their outlook, arguably as a result of the 
ubiquity of their religiously inspired strategy and their varied, if blunt, tactic repertoire. 
 
 
Prosecuting the Iraqi Insurgencies: Strategy and Tactics 
Strategic violence on the part of the multitude of insurgent organisations in Iraq 
significantly hampered the strategic effectiveness of the coalition. The perpetuation of 
tactics such as suicide bombings, ambushes, and the planting of roadside improvised 
explosive devices (IEDs), stalled coalition security and reconstruction initiatives and 
severely undermined coalition efforts to declare „victory‟ in Iraq. Andrew Hubbard has 
observed that militia groups shaped the strategic terrain of the insurgency in three 
primary ways: „(1) their overt and covert hostility to the coalition and central 
government; (2) their infiltration of the Iraqi security forces; and (3) their suspicion of 
operating „death squads‟ to carry out sectarian violence.‟88 Although insurgent violence 
in the British-controlled sections of MND(SE) was proportionally much smaller than in 
the American zones (it constituted just 4% of the total insurgent violence in the country 
in mid-2006
89
) it was enough to fundamentally destabilise British control of the security 
and political situation in and around Basra. 
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Insurgent tactics in Iraq will indelibly be associated with the prevalence of the suicide 
bomb. Almost half of all attacks instigated by insurgents in Iraq between mid-2003 and 
mid-2006 were suicide bombings.
90
 Indeed, more suicide attacks took place in Iraq 
between 2003 and 2006 than worldwide in the previous twenty years.
91
 As a 
contemporary incarnation of „propaganda of the deed‟ that creates a horrifying spectacle 
of political violence, suicide bombings hold a morbid fascination virtually guaranteeing 
global media coverage. Such attacks, intrinsically linked as they are to an extremist 
religious interpretation of sacrifice, martyrdom and glory in the next life, turn this 
seemingly shocking and irrational tactic into a redemptory and salvationary act in 
pursuit of eternal remembrance. This lends suicide attacks a distinct strategic advantage, 
in so much as they transcend the traditional boundaries of the moral risk of warfare – 
death is actually to be welcomed not feared. The intrinsic appeal of martyrdom to the 
extremist branch of radical Islam grants suicide bombings a strategic longevity given the 
exalted place it now holds in the jihadist tactical stock. Yet suicide attacks appeal to 
insurgents for operational as well as religious reasons. They can be interpreted as „the 
ultimate smart bombs‟ as suicide bombers are able to „choose the time and place of his 
attack with the utmost precision.‟92 Furthermore, suicide attacks, usually undertaken by 
individual insurgents, pragmatically help preserve the wider insurgent movement, who 
would be more vulnerable to high casualty rates if they engaged coalition armed forces 
in urban warfare. But despite the proclivity of suicide attacks in Iraq it is clear that 
insurgent groups did not intend to exclusively or consistently utilise such a tactic to 
                                                          
90
 The Independent, „Made in Palestine: Iraq‟s suicide bombers‟, 6 June 2006. 
91
 George Michael and Joseph Scolnick, „The Strategic Limits of Suicide Terrorism in Iraq‟, Small Wars 
and Insurgencies, Vol.17 No.2 (2006), p.122. 
92
 Ibid, p.115. 
326 
 
achieve their long term strategic goal of expelling coalition troops from the country. An 
overt reliance on suicide attacks rapidly exhausts the pool of the most dedicated and 
radical jihadists, therefore detrimentally effecting the potency of the insurgency in the 
long run. This shifted the tactical focus to the planting of remote IEDS, sniper attacks in 
urban areas, or, in the case of the British once they had retreated to Basra airport, mortar 
attacks. Such a varied tactical gamut had the effect of presenting an impression of a 
powerful and unrelenting insurgency and allowed the numerous groups to demonstrate 
their grip over the societies in whose name they claimed to act. 
 
 
The Jihad Within: Internal Insurgent Support 
The coalition endeavour to create a democratic Iraq, as enunciated through nationwide 
elections, gives us a crucial insight into how much support the numerous insurgent 
movements and their political branches were receiving. The elections were also a litmus 
test for the popularity of the military occupation and the newly imposed central political 
structures. Hilary Synnott, British CPA Regional Co-ordinator in the south of Iraq, 
recalls the popular mood towards the coalition as one of „utmost suspicion‟.93 This 
opened the door for insurgent political groupings, particularly those with allegiance to 
Muqtada al-Sadr, to exploit the resentment towards the occupation.  Al-Sadr played 
upon Shia disillusionment at the lack of functioning amenities, the lack of jobs, the lack 
of security, and stoked them by evoking Shia disenfranchisement in its historical context 
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in order to legitimise his claims to a rightful political standing, unshackled as he was 
from the repression of the Sunni-controlled Saddam era. The cleric‟s fiery rhetoric 
caught the popular Shia imagination, and in the 2005 national parliamentary elections 
Sadr‟s party won 30 of the 275 seats.94 Al-Sadr‟s electoral popularity allows us to 
quantify insurgent support above that of the usual estimates of latent domestic support 
for insurgencies that have been customary in counter-insurgency research (the obvious 
exception in the British case being the electoral support for Sinn Fein as being indicative 
of backing for the IRA). Against such high internal support for some of the most 
influential and active insurgent groups in Iraq, the coalition would find their task of 
winning support for their strategy amongst the local population increasingly difficult in 
the face of religiously-inspired and violently-enacted efforts to secure their departure. 
This situation was given an added complexity by the unprecedented amount of external 
influence being brought to bear on the conflict. 
 
 
The Jihad Without: External Insurgent Support 
Intelligence estimates as to the external jihadist content in the multiple Iraqi insurgencies 
range from 4-10% of the combatants.
95
 Yet despite this seemingly low figure these 
foreign fighters were amongst the most radical and were able to utilise their experiences 
in jihads abroad, most notably the Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who led the 
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notoriously brutal Al-Qaeda in Iraq before his death in an American bombing raid in 
2006. The external support dynamic to violence in Iraq was therefore of great import. 
 
Foreign fighters, by nature radicalised enough to travel across countries to engage in 
jihad, undertook a significant portion of suicide attacks in Iraq – their ultimate act of 
martyrdom against the coalition and its perceived cohorts. Many took Western foreign 
policy actions in the Middle East and the Israel/Palestine conflict as the catalyst to fuel 
their religious radicalism. By mid-2006 over 1,000 suicide bombers from across the 
Arab world had entered Iraq to undertake so-called „martyrdom operations.‟96 A senior 
Pentagon official in mid-2007 estimated that 80-90% of all foreign insurgents entering 
Iraq were doing so from Syria.
97
 Although most entered from Syria, the nationalities of 
the majority of foreign insurgents differed to that of their entrance point. Captured Sunni 
insurgent documents found by the US Army in November 2007 revealed that 41% of 
foreign fighters who had entered Iraq since August 2006 were Saudi Arabian (totalling 
307 insurgents). The second largest external insurgent contingent was Libyan, 
constituting 18% of the total (137 fighters).
98
  
 
However, the greatest external impingement on British counter-insurgency efforts in the 
south of Iraq came from Iran. By mid-2006 circumstantial evidence had engendered a 
widespread belief amongst British commanders in Basra that „specialist weaponry and 
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IED technology was being smuggled into the region from Iran.‟99 As a consequence 
border security became an integral part of British security provision, crucial considering 
that the two British-controlled provinces of Basra and Maysan shared over 300 miles of 
border with Iran. In February 2007 the Bush administration published an intelligence 
report citing Iranian complicity „at the highest levels‟ in supplying Shia militias across 
Iraq with IEDs, perpetuating Anglo-American diplomatic concerns at Iranian attempts to 
politically permeate Iraq and attain regional dominance.
100
 By mid-2007 US diplomats 
in Iraq were so assured of Iranian influence over insurgent violence in southern Iraq that 
one official bluntly stated that: „Iran is fighting a proxy war in Iraq... They are already 
committing daily acts of violence against US and British forces... The attacks are 
directed by the Revolutionary Guard who are connected right to the top [of the Iranian 
government].‟101 Even the then commander of US forces in Iraq, General David 
Petraeus, went out of his way to publicly accuse the Iranians of training, arming and 
advising a cell of the Mahdi Army who kidnapped five British civilians from the Iraqi 
Finance Ministry in May 2007.
102
 However, it is not just paramilitary weapons and 
training that the Iranian‟s stand accused of providing in order to encourage Shia violence 
in southern Iraq, but other logistical means through which they can prosecute an 
insurgency. A Washington Institute for Near East Policy report concluded that Iranian 
support „often arrived in the form of commodities – money, hashish, and prescription 
medications – that could be used to recruit young, poor foot soldiers.‟103 However, 
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despite such a strong Iranian influence over the violence in southern Iraq, it would be 
wrong to assume it would be absent without such input. Many militias were able to 
become self-sustaining by engaging in activities such as oil smuggling and extorting 
kidnap ransoms to the tune of tens of millions of dollars a year.
104
 Despite this level of 
financial independence that belies an overt reliance on outside support, the external input 
dynamic to the various insurgencies across Iraq was so active, symptomatic of the 
globalised nature of the Islamist jihad, as to significantly shape the potency and 
direction of the conflict to a level not encountered by the British since Egyptian 
involvement in Yemen in the 1960s.  
 
 
‘It’s Been a Bumpy Path...’: Reflecting on Counter-Insurgency in Iraq 
The campaign in Iraq has brutally demonstrated that in the post-colonial era, Britain 
lacks the political stomach and military edge to undertake prolonged counter-insurgency 
campaigns abroad. The challenge of the global Islamist jihadi insurgency and its feral 
franchise in Iraq since 2003 has questioned the efficacy of the British counter-
insurgency „approach‟ (a preferable term to „doctrine‟ given the national tendency to 
avoid codifying counter-insurgency methods). The post-Maoist incarnation of 
insurgency has created a distinct challenge for the British military, whose experiences in 
Iraq, and indeed in Afghanistan too, will certainly trigger a period of strategic and 
tactical reflexivity regarding the utility of previous „lesson learning‟, the worth of 
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maxims like „hearts and minds‟ and „centre of gravity‟, and the role of asymmetric 
conflict in future military training. 
 
Politically, the conflict in Iraq may also mark a distinct line in the counter-insurgency 
sands. The campaign severely stretched civil-military relations as this highly politicised 
war in search of weapons of mass destruction transmuted into a vicious quagmire of 
suicide bombs, roadside IEDs and homemade mortars. The acute frustrations over the 
degeneration of the Iraq war led to redefinitions of „victory‟ that would precipitate a 
withdrawal. On 18 December 2008 Prime Minister Gordon Brown outlined an exit 
strategy for British troops from a campaign that up to that point had cost £7billion and 
178 British lives.
105
 The phased withdrawal, agreed in conjunction with the Iraqi 
government, would see all but several hundred military advisors and trainers depart by 
the end of May 2009. The veracity of „victory‟ claims, however, must be questioned. On 
the face of things, the removal of Saddam and the establishment of a democratic 
governance structure present a veneer of strategic success. However, the strength, 
effectiveness and possible longevity of these new institutions are not guaranteed, whilst 
the propensity for future „blowback‟ to manifest itself could stem from measures such as 
co-opting former militias and insurgents into political and security functions. 
Furthermore, the question of Kurdish independence remains unanswered, whilst intra-
Islamic violence threatens the long-term stability of this religiously and ethnically 
fractured country.  
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The news of a long-awaited British withdrawal instigated a wave of claims from leading 
military figures as to the success of Operation Telic. As the full exit strategy got 
underway in March 2009, the Chief of the General Staff, General Sir Richard Dannatt, 
praised the UK counter-insurgency campaign: „It‟s been a bumpy path but it‟s got us to 
the right place in a relatively short period of time... [W]e have got a very satisfactory 
outcome in southern Iraq and Basra today.‟106 Even the departing British commander in 
Basra, Major-General Andy Salmon, declared at the handover of authority for MND 
South to the Americans that: „We‟ve helped deliver security, we‟ve set the conditions 
for social and economic development and I think we can leave with our heads held 
high.‟107 The security situation in and around Basra certainly disintegrated on the British 
watch in 2005 as insurgent anger, organisational abilities and weapons supplies 
increased as the British political and military commitment to a protracted counter-
insurgency campaign decreased. On-the-ground civil-military reconstruction efforts 
were tirelessly undertaken within the remit of limit finances and confused lines of 
authority. However, the military and political sands were shifted irrevocably once the 
British sought a negotiated retreat to their Contingency Operating Base at Basra airport 
in September 2007, ceding the paramilitary and political initiative to the multiple 
insurgent and militia forces in the city, in particular Muqtada al-Sadr‟s Mahdi Army. 
The security situation was only recovered once the joint US-Iraqi „Operation Charge of 
the Knights‟ reduced the potency of the insurgency in Basra in March 2008. This 
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rescued to a certain extent interpretations of the British mission in southern Iraq from 
being seen as an abject failure, yet it did highlight the spurious nature of claims to 
complete counter-insurgency victory.  
 
In short, the British campaign in southern Iraq represented the best and worst of British 
counter-insurgency. As the contemporary culmination of half a century‟s worth of 
„modern‟ counter-insurgency learning, Iraq proved that to a large extent many aspects of 
this accumulative experience were now redundant. Reconstruction efforts and initial 
ingratiating attempts at „soft‟ patrolling in the vein of a traditional „hearts and minds‟ 
approach, were undone by indigenous recalcitrance, a complex network of sub-state 
violence, and political ineptitude. As the former British CPA Administrator Rory 
Stewart concluded:  
„[I]t is true that the post-war planning was totally inadequate... 
We were indeed often comically isolated, whimsical and naive. 
And soldiers and civil servants were justified in their complaints 
about lack of strategy and lack of leadership... Nowhere in thirty 
years has there been such a concentration of foreign money, 
manpower and determination as in Iraq. Nowhere has their 
failure been more dramatic.‟108  
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Politically-motivated counter-insurgency campaigns have been familiar to the UK 
experience since the Aden debacle and the instigation of a mass counter-insurgency 
effort in Northern Ireland, and to that extent Iraq continues this lineage. However, Iraq 
deviates from what has gone before in several crucial respects. The fundamental nature 
of insurgencies has changed, as territory and ideology have become transcended by 
contested theocratic and cultural invocations of religious and political control. Unlike in 
previous colonial counter-insurgencies, this requires the British political community to 
shape and espouse a coherent counter-narrative to pan-national insurgent rhetoric 
regarding Western foreign policy, cultural heritage, and political designs. As the 
international indignation at the invasion of Iraq attested, the impact of insurgencies is 
now no longer defined within geographical boundaries. The inter-connectedness of 
insurgent groupings and the transnational nature of the jihadist message collapses the 
importance of borders, nullifying the delineation between the safety of home and 
conflict afar. As such, there has consequently been a conflation of the international and 
the national in terms of the impact of political actions and military conflict. There is no 
longer the need for insurgent recruits to travel to conflict zones to witness firsthand acts 
of violence or perceived atrocities against their own people. Global media and virtual 
interaction ensured that what happened in Iraq had resonance throughout the Muslim 
diaspora. For example, the martyrdom tape of one of the 7 July 2005 London bombers, 
Shehzad Tanweer from Leeds, made direct reference to coalition military action in 
Fallujah. The days of national or even locally recruited insurgents, inspired by an 
ideology (as in Malaya), by a tribal uprising (as in Kenya) or territorially restricted 
nationalism (as in Yemen and Northern Ireland) are seemingly relegated to the history 
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books as the operational space in which contemporary counter-insurgency is conducted 
conflates the domestic and the foreign. 
 
Telic, the operational codename for the British campaign in southern Iraq, is the Greek 
word meaning „the end‟. But the „end‟ for the British campaign in Iraq is certainly not 
the one initially envisaged and has been re-written by the political authors of the war as 
the narratives of WMD and transferring Iraq from dictatorship to democracy became 
subverted by counter-insurgency. Despite British involvement in Iraq reaching its 
operational endgame in May 2009, insurgents in Basra will continue, in part, to shape 
the landscape of post-Saddam Iraq. The British may have left, but the insurgency has not 
been completely countered. And with the announcement in June 2009 of a formal 
inquiry into the British decision to go to war in Iraq reawakening the political decision-
making and military actions in the country, the British departure from Iraq may only be 
the beginning of the Telic. 
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CHAPTER 8: ‘Slow Learners, Slow Burners: Britain and Counter-Insurgency in 
the Past, Present and Future’ 
 
 
The Value of the British Experience 
 
Britain‟s experience in the post-World War Two era presented the military with 
numerous insurgent challenges whose casus belli ranged from communism (Malaya), 
to tribal supremacist land struggles (Kenya), to socialist-inspired nationalism 
(Yemen), and the nationalist fight for an alternative union (Northern Ireland). It is 
generally accepted that this volume of experience has equated to competence in 
counter-insurgency operations. However, the British response to the complexities of 
twenty-first century insurgencies, in its decentralised and globally networked form, 
has threatened to expose this competency as a colonial-era myth. Quantity of 
counter-insurgency combat experience has not equated into outright quality.  
 
British thinking in the run up to the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq was arguably 
shaped by the formative experiences in Northern Ireland. It had moulded the 
military‟s low-intensity doctrine, had versed a generation of officers in the nuances 
of urban population pacification, and had demonstrated the difficulties of fostering a 
concomitant counter-insurgency and „hearts and minds‟ campaign not only within 
the same city but often on the same housing estate. The ability during Operation 
Banner to seek and maintain an „acceptable level of violence‟ combined with its 
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often hyperbolised colonial successes ensured that British thinking on the issue of 
countering insurgencies earned respect within foreign militaries and was exported as 
a rare example of how a state army can subdue a sub-state enemy without 
compromising strategic goals.  
 
However, this body of experience has not translated into a cogent counter-insurgency 
lesson-learning process within the British military. The very need to „re-learn‟ 
counter-insurgency in the post-9/11 conflict environment has undermined assertions 
as to the British military‟s existence as an effective „learning institution‟.1 This 
doctrinal amnesia has created an imperative for the armed forces to hone its lesson-
learning abilities whilst simultaneously adapting to the intricate challenges of sub-
state and transnational post-Maoist insurgent violence in the third millennium.  
  
Yet this process cannot begin unless, as the case studies and the Tri-partite Model 
have demonstrated, certain axiomatic elements are exposed. Firstly, when it comes to 
counter-insurgency, the British are slow learners. The early phases of nearly every 
campaign in the „classical‟ era were marred by stagnancy, mismanagement and 
confusion. It was two years into the Malayan Emergency before the military 
conceived of a cohesive civil-military strategy in the form of the Briggs Plan. The 
crucial early years of the „Troubles‟ in Northern Ireland were marked by displays of 
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indiscriminate force and an inability to domesticate the response.
2
 As Lt-General Sir 
John Kiszely rightly observes, the Malayan Emergency is „a much lauded counter-
insurgency campaign, but often overlooked is the fact that in the early years... the 
British Army achieved very little success.‟ The Director of the UK Defence 
Academy then goes on to concede that in relation to Northern Ireland, „it is easy in 
the light of the later success... to forget the early mistakes and the time it took to 
rectify them.‟3 In counter-insurgency terms, therefore, the British have been 
consistently slow to instigate an effective strategy and achieve operational success. 
 
Indeed, this trend reveals another painful element of British counter-insurgency 
conduct, namely the short-circuiting of context. The preponderance for template 
solutions, arguably stemming from the Malaya blue-print (or „Templer solutions‟ as 
they should perhaps be known), has contributed to a process of discriminate 
selectivity when it comes to imbibing doctrine and disseminating a lesson-learning 
programme. What is clear is that the mercurial and complex nature of transnational 
jihadi insurgency does not lend itself to any preconceived templates to countenance 
the threat that may have been more appropriate when faced with a more strategically 
cohesive and physically definable enemy. The contextualisation of the conflict‟s 
origins and the insurgent‟s motivations are essential if the non-kinetic counter-
narratives and the kinetic counter-insurgency operations are to be effective and 
nuanced.  
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As Theo Farrell has observed, the process of British military transformation to meet 
the push towards network-centric warfare and the demands of contemporary strategic 
needs is shaped by resource constraints, domestic politics and military culture.
4
 None 
of these three elements are conducive to quick adaptation in the British case. The 
military culture of the British Army is essential to the process of counter-insurgency 
„lesson-learning‟ given the inherent aversion to formalised doctrine. Pragmatic 
flexibility on a campaign by campaign basis has been evident given the absence of 
codified strategic manuals. Counter-insurgency lesson-learning for the British has 
therefore become a creative and not an imitative process. The transferral of lessons, 
particularly during the late colonial era, occurred in large part due to the deployment 
of personnel who brought with them pre-conceived notions of best operational 
practice honed from previous counter-insurgency experience in other theatres. This 
emphasis on the transfer of counter-insurgency lessons emanating from personal 
experience and conveyance of individual thought amongst senior officers (for 
example, Frank Kitson from Kenya to Northern Ireland) is strengthened by the 
relative absence of doctrinal enshrinement.
5
  
 
Yet in the technologically-fixated, nuclear war-gaming mindset that dominated Cold 
War military thinking, counter-insurgency was not deemed an appropriate or indeed 
relevant form of warfare that required significant thought or adequate training. 
Despite a plethora of combat experience in low-intensity scenarios, counter-
insurgency came bottom of the British strategic pile. Yet this only partially explains 
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the relative unease with which the British military has adapted to counter-insurgency 
in the „Long‟ War on Terror. It can arguably be perceived that a fear exists in 
Western military circles that the current emphasis on counter-insurgency is a 
temporary fad and that an undue focus of attention on low intensity and peace 
support operations undermines the ability to conduct potential future conventional 
wars. Despite these concerns there is a discernable need to adapt in the face of this 
seeming duopoly. Preparing for counter-insurgency operations can still be achieved 
with a degree of flexibility that does not ignore high intensity, regular warfare 
training. What it does engender, however, is an altered emphasis on personnel 
priorities, as the very nature of counter-insurgency requires a greater number of 
intelligence officers, medical officers (for use within the host nation population as 
well), and information officers (in an effort to shore up a cogent counter-narrative to 
the insurgent‟s message).  
 
Another barrier to counter-insurgency education within the British military is the 
basic, indeed inescapable, reality that counter-insurgency is inherently difficult to 
learn. It is a unique form of warfare, posing its own complex strategic problems and 
requiring challenging tactical adaptation. This is a hurdle not unique to the British 
army. The Americans learnt this the hard way, as did the French, the Dutch, the 
Russians, and the Portuguese. Subsequently, a reliance on doctrine and training 
manoeuvres are rendered largely irrelevant. It does, however, require a much higher 
degree of education within the military as to the distinctive threat posed by this 
inimitable form of conflict and a heightened level of both historical consciousness 
pertaining to past strategic and tactical successes and failures, as well as increasing 
the understanding of the contemporary insurgent threat. The military cannot learn 
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counter-insurgency without first understanding the nature of insurgency itself. Yet 
this is a time-consuming process and requires as much, if not more, emphasis on 
non-kinetic elements such as cultural learning, as it does on the kinetic training itself. 
This demands of military commanders a different set of characteristics and 
leadership skills than regular warfare, fostering the imperatives of cultural sensitivity 
and emotional intelligence as key tools in the contemporary counter-insurgency 
toolbox.  
 
One more significant plank of the debate regarding British conduct of counter-
insurgency surrounds the continuing relevance and utility of the essentially anti-
Maoist counter-insurgency doctrine to emerge from the „classical‟ period in the 
1960s. The Malaya and Vietnam-inspired thoughts of Robert Thompson in particular 
have influenced the thinking of the British Army and arguably can be seen as a 
departure point for British actions in Operation Telic.
6
 However, questions surround 
the applicability of half century-old maxims that were designed for a fundamentally 
different enemy on a fundamentally different battlefield in a fundamentally different 
political context.
7
 Modern globalised insurgency clearly represents a different 
challenge to that posed by previously territorially-defined Maoist insurgencies.
8
 
However, it would be remiss to throw the baby out with the bathwater. Certain 
discernable trends do need to become enveloped into new thinking, yet this does not 
render sixty years worth of counter-insurgency strategic thought obsolete. Learning 
                                                          
6
 Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency (St Petersburg, FL: Hailer Publishing, 2005 
[1966]). 
7
 For fear of the application of an „outdated and even obsolete doctrine not appropriate to the current 
situation‟ see Warren Chin, „Examining the Application of British Counterinsurgency Doctrine by the 
American Army in Iraq‟, Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol.18 No.1 (March 2007), p.14. 
8
 For analysis of the nuanced dimensions of contemporary global insurgency see David Kilcullen, 
„Countering Global Insurgency‟, Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol.28 No.4 (August 2005), pp.597-
617;  John Mackinlay, „Globalisation and Insurgency‟, Adelphi Papers, No.352 (2002). 
342 
 
from past campaigns is still a task of high importance and utility.
9
 There still remains 
a need to formulate a clear political strategy within the parameters of legality, and 
that addresses the subversive message of the „enemy‟ in the post-modern age. There 
are indeed some counter-insurgency truths that need to be held as self-evident. Half-
century old contributions to counter-insurgency are not the sum total of what British 
thinking on the issue can be. As Bruce Hoffman has argued, the British approach 
during the „classical‟ era of counter-insurgency „is not without relevance to 
America‟s current involvement in Iraq.‟10 As globalisation impacts upon the very 
conduct and presentation of counter-insurgency campaigns via the global media and 
an increasing sense of technologically-inspired human interconnectedness, it remains 
as crucial as ever that a political strategic narrative is cogently formulated.
11
   
 
Militarily speaking, single state counter-insurgency operations are no longer relevant. 
Coalition-based campaigns are likely to be the norm for the foreseeable future given 
the spatial and temporal freedom granted to an open-ended jihad and the shared 
conglomeration of threat to the „near‟ and „far‟ enemies. For these „enemies‟ the real 
challenge to effective coalition functioning is therefore political intractability. There 
is a clear imperative to adopt appropriate government structures; domestically 
(through inter-agency co-operation), within the coalition itself, and with the host 
nation where operations are being conducted (via simultaneous programmes of 
strengthening governance structures and economic and humanitarian assistance). 
Learning lessons from previous conflicts does not necessarily equate to re-fighting 
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the last war, but ensures a greater efficiency, a greater flexibility and, ultimately, a 
greater capacity to fulfil counter-insurgency objectives. Revisiting past conflicts, as 
Robert Tomes argues, „provides perspective as well as context‟ for current events.12 
Indeed, as John Lewis Gaddis stated at the end of the Cold War: „studying the past 
has a way of introducing humility… because it suggests continuity of the problems 
we confront, and the unoriginality of most of our solutions for them.‟13 The debate 
over the American adoption of a new counter-insurgency field manual, the much-
heralded FM3-24, is a testament to the consideration of „unoriginal‟ solutions.14 
 
 
The ‘Tri-Partite Model’: A New Paradigm for Understanding Counter-Insurgency 
The Tri-partite Model represents an effort to extrapolate multiple conflict variables 
across numerous case studies. It is intended to serve as an important lens for 
perceiving the full gamut of dynamics evident across any number of counter-
insurgency campaigns, providing a framework of understanding as to the ultimate 
level of strategic attainment for the counter-insurgent. In short, the insurgent/counter-
insurgent/international political context interface allows us to weight the importance 
of the variables ensconced in the model upon the conclusion of any given campaign. 
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From this it is possible to judge that despite the highly politicised nature of counter-
insurgency warfare the efficacy of the military aspect of the counter-insurgent 
dimension remains paramount to operational and strategic success. If the military 
cannot succeed in reducing insurgent violence then no manner of political measures 
will arrest the spiralling security situation. In relation to the insurgent dimension of 
the model, the level of external support insurgent groups received has proved itself to 
be a critical enabler of insurgent success. An absence of exogenous funding and 
weaponry has stunted insurgencies and fatally undermined their potency. Arguably, 
as the application of the model to these case studies reveals, external insurgent 
support is more important to the effectiveness of an insurgent group than the level of 
internal support it receives amongst its own population. An armed group without 
weapons is irrelevant, yet an armed group with minimal popular support is still an 
armed group. The security threat remains. 
 
When analysing the case studies holistically through the paradigm of the Tri-Partite 
Model in order to garner a meta-historical view of the evolution of British counter-
insurgency war-fighting in the post-World War Two era, a picture emerges of slow 
British learning, the implementation of a slow burning military strategy, and a 
succession of deficient insurgent opponents who have compensated for the 
inadequacies of the British approach. Reflecting on the past insurgent opponents 
facing the British, it can be concluded that despite engendering a perception of an 
effective counter-insurgency approach, the British have actually come up against a 
set of insurgent groups organisationally weak, strategically incompetent, or lacking 
in internal and external support. This perhaps explains why the abject failure of 
British counter-insurgency in Iraq must be contextualised in relation to the insurgent 
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enemy, who were well organised, strategically driven, tactically brutal and well-
supported from within and outside Iraq. On this issue, Thomas Mockaitis has taken a 
rather rosy view of British success in counter-insurgency in the post-war period. By 
equating experience with effectiveness, Mockaitis perhaps too benevolently observes 
that during the „classical‟ counter-insurgency period of the mid-twentieth century 
„the British approach had yielded more success than that of any other nation faced 
with internal conflict... Nothing like an Algeria or Vietnam tarnishes the British 
record.‟15 The absence of a catastrophic counter-insurgency failure, however, should 
not detract from the drawn-out strategic inertia that came to characterise consecutive 
campaigns, and is perhaps an outcome more indicative of the preparedness and 
efficiency of the insurgent opponents that the British have faced – the MRLA, Mau 
Mau and even the IRA were certainly not as tactically savvy or strategically 
trenchant as the National Liberation Front (NLF) in Algeria or the VietCong. 
 
Bearing in mind such other cross-national examples, it must be pressed that the Tri-
Partite Counter-Insurgency Model is not exclusive for application to the British 
experience. The inherent nature of overarching civil-military concerns, levels of 
insurgent support and international political pressures to counter-insurgency warfare 
as a whole bestows upon the model an element of transferability to other national 
cases, such as the French or American experiences, and could provide the 
comparative study of multi-nation asymmetric war-fighting with an insightful and 
holistic framework of understanding. 
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So what does the application of the Tri-Partite Model to the case studies in this thesis 
tell us about the British counter-insurgency experience? Firstly, it highlights the way 
in which omnipresent political determinants continue to play a large role in shaping 
the context of both the insurgency and the counter-insurgency strategy. The 
politicised nature of insurgency (and the efforts to counter them) is inescapable and 
presages the strategic endgame of participants – although, it should be noted, not to 
the extent that the efficacy of the kinetic effort becomes eclipsed.  French „warrior-
scholar‟ David Galula asserted back in 1964 that counter-insurgency was „20 per 
cent military action and 80 per cent political.‟16 However, as the Tri-Partite Model 
presages, it is often within that 20 per cent of military action that counter-insurgency 
campaigns are won or lost. Reconstruction work, „hearts and minds‟ efforts, and 
political restructuring can only take place effectively once the military situation is 
under control.  
 
There are certain trends that have been politically perennial in the post-war period 
when the British have been undertaking counter-insurgency operations. First is the 
secret yet persistent engagement in backchannel talks as a pre-cursor to attempted 
peace deals. Dialogue with insurgent groups happened in the Malayan jungle, the 
Kenyan forest, and the London homes of ministers. The deal struck with the Mahdi 
Army in Basra to secure an unhindered withdrawal from the city to the Contingency 
Operating Base (COB) at Basra airport has now become symbolic of the British 
impotence in Iraq. Previous efforts had always come from a relative position of 
strength. The second noticeable trend in the British political management of counter-
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insurgency campaigns from Malaya through to Iraq is the politically stage-managed 
withdrawals that have conditioned the military departure, presaged on training 
indigenous security forces and ensuring an acceptable post-occupation political 
regime is in place. The shift towards the domestication of political and military 
control was long established as an integral element of military „draw down‟ long 
before „Ulsterisation‟ came to dominate discourse on local security responsibilities, 
whilst the scuttling from Aden in 1967 prior to ensuring a feasible political structure 
was secured has haunting echoes with the British withdrawal from another Middle 
Eastern counter-insurgency campaign over forty years later.  
 
The military aspect of the Tri-Partite Model has shown us that after the withdrawal 
from Iraq, British counter-insurgency conduct stands at a crossroads. The 
underwhelming performance in and around Basra coincided with the Americans 
attaining a distinct level of counter-insurgency strategic vision and tactical ability. 
FM3-24; the rise to prominence and influence of the counter-insurgency wunderkind 
General David Petraeus; the inculcation of counter-insurgency learning at all levels 
of the American military; and the ubiquity of counter-insurgency in the US across the 
academic-military divide have all contributed to a distinct shifting of the sands in 
irregular warfare terms. The Americans no longer need to (misguidedly) hold up 
Malaya or Northern Ireland as exemplars of counter-insurgency conduct. They can 
now look at Anbar province and the „surge‟ to become the new case studies in 
counter-insurgency textbooks. The Americans have learnt the hard way in Iraq, and 
like the British before them, it has been a slow and painful process. However, the 
combination of British ineptitude in Basra and eventual American cogence in central 
and western Iraq has snuffed out residual opinion relating to British competence at 
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counter-insurgency. The volume of criticism directed at the British over Iraq has 
swept away long-standing perceptions that counter-insurgency is the British Army‟s 
default mode. Indeed, the British performance in Helmand province in Afghanistan 
since the resurgence of the Taliban by 2006-07, has done much to reinforce 
perceptions of a struggling and stretched military, searching for a level of strategic 
clarity and operational potency.
17
 Afghanistan now continues as the primary testing 
ground of new-found American confidence in the realm of counter-insurgency and 
Helmand province remains the crucible in which the British military can salvage 
their reputation. Yet eight years into Operation Herrick, the signs are again of a slow 
lesson-learning process (especially pertaining to the lessons emanating from Iraq 
regarding sufficient military resources and reconstruction efforts) and certainly a 
slow-burning strategy given the protracted inability to reduce the strength of the 
Taliban or sufficiently reduce their latent avenues of support and finance (namely the 
Afghan poppy harvest and heroin trade). 
 
As British combat troops have now withdrawn from Iraq, can we now point to an 
effective lesson-learning process within the British armed forces when it comes to 
counter-insurgency? At base, the struggle to contain the violence in southern Iraq, 
especially Basra, points to an increasingly inescapable conclusion that the British are 
not as good at counter-insurgency as was previously assumed. Political posturing has 
resulted in a reluctance to admit to failings, which only serves to stifle an effective 
lesson-learning process. Political intractability on the domestic front runs the risk of 
ensuring that tensions between commanders in theatre and Whitehall directly impacts 
                                                          
17
 For a critical overview see Warren Chin, „British Counter-Insurgency in Afghanistan‟, Defense and 
Security Analysis, Vol.23 No.2 (2007), pp.201-25. 
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upon the conduct and effectiveness of the campaign. There are thus severe strains on 
UK civil-military relations in the realm of counter-insurgency. With systems of a 
single civil-military commander now increasingly anachronistic (indeed, they were 
the exception and not the rule in the British experience), there has to be clear lines of 
communication and access between commanders on the ground and the highest 
echelons of executive government both back home and within the host nation. This 
will undoubtedly help foster the imperative of maintaining a clear political aim for 
military operations, thus ensuring that means do not come to overshadow ends. This 
is a concept that holds increased importance in the era of globalised post-Maoist 
insurgency.  
 
Another striking feature about the British experience that the Tri-Partite Counter-
Insurgency Model allows us to see is that each campaign begins with a familiar tale 
in relation to intelligence capabilities. From Malaya to Iraq, British intelligence has 
failed to foresee and has been woefully unprepared for the outbreak of an insurgency. 
Aside from agency deficiency, this oft-repeated scenario of intelligence agencies 
being taken unawares by the instigation of insurgent violence raises a wider question 
regarding the ability to forecast the political and paramilitary intentions of 
asymmetric non-state actors as opposed to symmetric state enemies. There are 
obvious difficulties in cultivating human intelligence (HUMINT) on insurgent 
groups often drawn from narrow and closed segments of a society. For this reason 
alone, insurgencies are difficult to see coming. Yet British intelligence capabilities, 
centrally and on-the-ground, did not (and arguably still do not) retain the capacity to 
estimate the emergence of sub-state insurgent threats. From these consistently 
inadequate origins, however, emerges a picture of British intelligence adapting to the 
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threat and positing itself as an indispensible counter-insurgent tool. The role played 
by the intelligence agencies, and their military intelligence counter-parts, has been 
integral to operational successes in every campaign. 
 
By highlighting the need to merge analysis of insurgent and counter-insurgent 
strategic and tactical factors within the context of the international political situation, 
the Tri-Partite Model presents a new synthesis of how we can interpret the evolution 
of the British approach to counter-insurgency over the past sixty years. The 
asymmetric nature of counter-insurgencies ensures that the role of the state (Britain) 
has been explored in relation to non-state actors (insurgents) within the wider 
international order, thus cutting across and between the multiple levels of global 
security. This applied analysis enables us to appreciate what lessons the colonial era 
counter-insurgencies can teach us about British conduct in Iraq and evaluate whether 
the British military, intelligence and political communities have been effective 
„learning institutions‟. The conclusion the analysis reaches, via the consistent 
application of the same variables across case studies, is that there are serious 
deficiencies in British „lesson learning‟ in the realm of counter-insurgency. It was, 
and remains, slow and parenthetic. For this reason, we can see that the historical case 
studies highlight much continuity in the British approach to tackling insurgencies 
from Malaya onwards, notably detention without trial of suspects, an emphasis (not 
always successful) on close civil-military relations, and attempted tactical flexibility. 
Even the introduction of compulsory ID cards for the purposes of countering the 
terrorist threat in Malaya in 1948 holds a prescient example for contemporary debate 
on the very same issue within the UK. In short, a projected historical analysis, under 
the guidance of an effective framework, reveals a steady permanence in security 
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study controversies: detention without trial, shoot-to-kill policies, torture of detainees 
for intelligence-gathering purposes, the application of „hearts and minds‟ tactics, 
alleged abuse by troops, and crucially, the inability of the British Army to quickly 
adapt to an asymmetric conflict environment. The Tri-partite Model enables this 
trajectory to be examined within the confines of a workable and effective model of 
analysis, lending the study of counter-insurgency a valuable and useful resource. 
 
Counter-insurgency is now far more complex given the operational environment, the 
non-imperial governance structures and psyches, and the rise of global instant media 
coverage. Previous adherence to the epithet of „hearts and minds‟ and „minimum 
force‟ have now transformed into a myriad of strategic axioms that are often 
undertaken simultaneously: peace support, stability and reconstruction, and 
humanitarian relief. Living as we do in the era of „Fourth Generation Warfare‟ 
(4GW), counter-insurgency is arguably the medium-term future of war-fighting. 
There is thus a pressing need for a greater understanding of insurgencies, in their 
past, present and potential future modes in order to contextualise the debates 
surrounding the efforts to counter them. The body of experience accumulated by the 
British in the past sixty years therefore represents a rich empirical base from which 
to observe, via the insights of applying the Tri-Partite Counter-Insurgency Model, the 
axiomatic nature of military effectiveness and the significance of external support 
upon insurgent potency. Yet slow British military lesson-learning, as seen throughout 
these case studies, provides strategists of the future the opportunity to understand the 
value of lesson transferral and the problems of slow-burning strategic inertia. The 
popular perception of British counter-insurgency efficacy from Malaya onwards has 
certainly been unsupported by a perpetual picture of consistent tactical errors in the 
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early phases of campaigns and long-term strategic obfuscation. After the abject 
performance in Iraq, the British military, and especially their political masters, have a 
long way to go to rebuild the mythology of British competence at counter-insurgency 
warfare. But perhaps they were never as good as everyone thought in the first place. 
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